5 added, 6 removed. Audit B to B.
---
name: install-tend
description: Sets up tend — an autonomous junior maintainer for a GitHub repo, powered by Claude or OpenAI Codex — that reviews PRs, triages issues, and fixes CI. Creates config, generates workflows, configures secrets and branch protection via API, creates the bot account, and provisions the harness auth token (Claude OAuth or OpenAI API key). Use when installing tend, when clearing a failing `tend check`, and when changing an installed repo's tend config, generated workflows, secrets, environments, branch protection, or bot access.
---
# Install Tend
Set up tend on the current repo, or change an installation it already has.
When asking the user questions during these steps, use the `AskUserQuestion`
tool — present concrete options when there are clear choices (e.g.
secret-migration confirmation, registry token route).
When a question requires the user to do something off-screen (visit a URL,
run a command, paste a value back), spell the next step out in the question
or option description: the exact web link, the exact command. "Generate a
token on the registry's site" is not enough — give the URL. The user should
not have to ask "where do I do that?".
## Kickoff
Read `.config/tend.yaml` first. Its presence says whether this is an install or
a change to one, and where it exists it settles the harness: the `harness` key,
or Claude when the key is absent, which is how a Claude install is normally
written.
Derive `REPO` once at the start — the second call resolves a fork clone to
its root source, so no remotes need touching (every command below passes
`--repo "$REPO"` explicitly):
```bash
gh auth status
LOCAL=$(gh repo view --json nameWithOwner --jq '.nameWithOwner')
REPO=$(gh api "repos/$LOCAL" --jq 'if .fork then .source.full_name else .full_name end')
echo "$REPO"
```
When the resolution changes the name, or returns `null` (source deleted or
invisible to the token), confirm the target with the user before touching
anything — a deliberately maintained hard fork keeps its own name.
A config from a finished install makes this a change: take the harness from
the config, lay out only the steps the task touches, and start. Finished
means `uvx tend@latest check` passes — secrets, bot access, protection —
*and* the workflows are live on the default branch, which that check never
looks at (step 11 commits without pushing, so an install can stop with
everything else in place):
```bash
gh api "repos/$REPO/contents/.github/workflows" \
--jq '[.[].name | select(startswith("tend-"))] | length'
```
The summary checklist at the end describes a finished install, so skip it.
A preference a step needs (7a's auth mode, 10's bio stance) is asked at
that step.
Otherwise this is an install, including a resume of one that never finished
(config present, later steps missing). Gather every preference at the
Kickoff, so the rest of the install stops only where a step genuinely
needs the user. First generate three bot-name candidates from the
bare repo name (`<repo>-bot`, `<repo>-tend`, `tend-<repo>`) and check their
availability in parallel:
```bash
for name in cand1 cand2 cand3; do
gh api "users/$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "$name: TAKEN" || echo "$name: available"
done
```
Also check whether the repo has a README (names in step 5) — it decides
whether the badge appears in question 3 and the customize follow-up.
In the message alongside the questions, lay out the install: it targets
`$REPO`, runs the section headings below as steps, and typically takes 5–10
minutes of the user's hands-on time (browser logins, OAuth approvals,
occasional copy-paste) — the agent drives the rest, ending at a local
commit (pushing waits for their go-ahead, step 11).
Then one `AskUserQuestion` call with three questions. Answering it is the
go-ahead — no separate "ready to start?" confirmation. Drop any question the
user's request or an existing config already answers (a supplied bot name, a
chosen harness; the auth mode a config-settled harness leaves open is asked
at 7a, not here); a fully specified request leaves nothing to ask, and is
itself the go-ahead.
1. **Harness** — which model runs the bot and which credential it
bills to:
- **Claude — OAuth token** (recommended for adopters with a Claude
subscription) — draws from the subscription's usage limits.
- **Claude — API key** — a console.anthropic.com key, billed per token.
Fits when there's no subscription to draw on, or the user wants a
dedicated billing surface and per-key revocation.
- **Codex — OpenAI API key** — pay-per-token. The `auth.json`
subscription path is incompatible with tend's concurrent workflows
(per-call refresh-token invalidation) and is being removed. Detail in
${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/security-model.md.
2. **Bot name** — the available candidates, recommended first. "Other"
takes a custom name; check its availability before using it. The tool
needs 2–4 options, so generate more candidates whenever fewer than two
come back available.
3. **Defaults** — accept the default setup, or pick areas to change:
- **Accept all defaults** (recommended) — no workflow overrides, a
placeholder guidance overlay, the badge added, and the bot bio
"tend agent for `<owner>/<repo>`. I triage issues and help maintain
`<repo>`." Nothing is locked in: every default is an ordinary edit later
(`.config/tend.yaml`, the files the install writes) or a re-run of
this skill.
- **Customize…** — pick the areas in a follow-up question.
A **Customize…** answer gets one more `AskUserQuestion`
(`multiSelect: true`): which areas to change, defaults applying to
whatever is left unselected (an empty submission included), each option
naming its default in its description. Both the defaults description
and this follow-up list only the areas still open — drop an area the
user's request settles (the request, not the default, governs its step:
"skip the badge" skips it), an area a previous run already applied, and
an area that can't apply (no README → no badge option). The tool caps a
question at 4 options, so a new area means grouping, not appending.
- **Workflow config** — setup steps, workflow conditions, schedules, job
permissions/timeouts, env vars (default: no overrides)
- **Bot guidance overlay** — PR title format, labels, review routing,
target branch, nightly actions (default: a placeholder overlay)
- **README badge** — placement and style, or leaving it out (default:
added, matching the README's existing badge style)
- **Bot profile bio** — the stance line on the bot's profile (default:
"tend agent for `<owner>/<repo>`. I triage issues and help maintain
`<repo>`.")
Each area selected there is asked about at its step (1, 4, 5, 10); the
rest apply the default without asking. Steps that can't be defaulted —
migrating a release secret, naming environment reviewers, creating the bot
account, approving OAuth — still interact when they arrive.
Follow each step in order. Skip steps that are already done — check each
prerequisite before acting.
## Browser sessions
Step 6 (when the bot account must be created) and step 8's mint paths
(8a/8b) need a browser session logged in as the bot. Check whether
`mcp__claude-in-chrome__*` is connected (`tabs_context_mcp`) before the
first browser step, or any question that would offer one as an option.
When it is, drive the browser steps yourself rather than offering a
hand-off choice: hand the user only the prompts automation can't cross
(a signup CAPTCHA, a 2FA or password reauth), and resume once they
complete the prompt in the open tab. When it isn't, give the user URLs
and wait for confirmation.
Driving uses the user's real Chrome profile, so logging in as the bot
displaces their own github.com session until they sign back in — tell
them when handing the browser back. Before acting as the bot, verify
the logged-in user via the avatar menu.
## 1. Create config
Create `.config/tend.yaml` with at minimum `bot_name`, plus `harness` if
the user chose Codex (the default Claude harness can be omitted). See
README.md "Harnesses" for the comparison.
```yaml
bot_name: <bot-name>
# For Codex, also:
# harness: codex
# effort: medium # optional: low | medium | high | xhigh
```
List the secrets the repo already holds:
```bash
gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --json name --jq '.[].name'
```
Any repo-level secret not in `secrets.allowed` triggers a `tend check`
warning. The operational secrets (bot token, harness auth) never belong at
repo level — steps 7–8 store them in the `tend` environment, and a
repo-level copy from a pre-environment install is exactly the exposure the
environment closes, so it gets deleted once the environment copy is in
place. Classify each remaining secret and act now — don't defer:
- Build/observability tokens (e.g., `CODECOV_TOKEN`, `SENTRY_DSN`) are
fine at the repo level. Add them to the allowlist:
```yaml
secrets:
allowed: ["CODECOV_TOKEN"]
```
- Release secrets (registry tokens like `PYPI_TOKEN`/`NPM_TOKEN`, signing
keys, deploy credentials) at the repo level are reachable from any
workflow run, including ones a write-access bot can trigger with no
merge. Don't allowlist them. Migrate each to a GitHub Environment whose
deployment policy pins to the admin-gated refs from §3 (the default
branch and/or all tags). The bot can reach neither ref class, so it
cannot reach the secret. `tend check` sweeps every credential-holding
environment — one that stores a secret, or that an `id-token: write` job
deploys to, since trusted publishing stores nothing — and fails on any it
cannot confirm gated: no reviewer and no policy, an unverified branch
entry, tag entries without §3's all-tags ruleset, or a ref policy on an
environment some workflow reaches on `release`, `repository_dispatch`, or
a `workflow_dispatch` with inputs, which the bot fires at a ref the policy
already admits. A half-migrated environment surfaces on the next check
rather than passing silently.
Migrate the secret: recreate it on the Environment, delete the
repo-level copy (confirm via `AskUserQuestion` first), and set
`environment: <name>` on the publishing job.
Configure the deployment policy. Allow whichever ref classes the
workflow runs on:
```bash
REPO=<owner>/<repo>; ENV=<name>
DEFAULT_BRANCH=$(gh api "repos/$REPO" --jq .default_branch)
gh api --method PUT "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV" \
-F 'deployment_branch_policy[protected_branches]=false' \
-F 'deployment_branch_policy[custom_branch_policies]=true'
# Continuous-deploy on default branch:
gh api --method POST "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
-f "name=$DEFAULT_BRANCH" -f type=branch
# Release on tags (workflow has `on: push: tags:`):
gh api --method POST "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
-f 'name=*' -f type=tag
```
Verify:
```bash
gh api "/repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
--jq '.branch_policies | map({name, type})'
```
Each entry must match a ref class from §3 (default branch and/or all
tags).
Then sweep deploy/publish workflows. Each must trigger on `push: tags:`
or `push: branches: [<default-branch>]` (per §3 workflow design) and
declare an Environment. The grep below catches the common shapes; it
misses reusable workflows in other repos and over-matches
`pull_request_target` references in expressions and step inputs, so
read each hit:
```bash
grep -RniE 'tags:|workflow_dispatch|release:|schedule:|workflow_run|repository_dispatch|deployment:|pull_request_target' .github/workflows
```
An OIDC-to-cloud deploy has no secret to migrate; the Environment with
its admin-gated deployment policy plus the cloud provider's trust policy
is then the only control on that path.
The original repo-level secret value isn't readable (GitHub secrets are
write-only), so a fresh token is needed. Ask the user via `AskUserQuestion`
how to obtain it; recommend whichever fits the registry:
- **CLI** — if the registry has a token-issuing CLI (e.g., `npm token create`),
run it and capture the token.
- **Chrome** — drive the registry's token page via `mcp__claude-in-chrome`
(most registries — PyPI, crates.io, Docker Hub — only issue tokens via
the web UI). Some registries (PyPI in particular) force a 2FA reauth
at token-creation time; the user completes it in the open tab, per
Browser sessions.
- **Manual** — user generates the token themselves on the registry's
site and stores it themselves: hand over the environment's
`gh secret set` command fully substituted. With neither `--body` nor
a pipe it prompts for the value, so the token never sits in the chat
transcript. Don't delete the repo-level copy until
`gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --env "$ENV" --json name` shows it —
the write is theirs on this route, so nothing else tells the agent it
landed.
Whichever route is chosen, include the exact token-creation URL in
the question or option description (and in the follow-up message if
manual). Common registries:
- PyPI: `https://pypi.org/manage/account/token/`
- npm: `https://www.npmjs.com/settings/<user>/tokens/new` (or `npm token create`)
- crates.io: `https://crates.io/settings/tokens`
- Docker Hub: `https://app.docker.com/settings/personal-access-tokens`
- GitHub Packages / deploy: `https://github.com/settings/tokens`
For other registries, look up the token page before asking. Accept any
other route the user suggests. Never ask the user to dig the old token
out of their password manager and re-paste it — issuing a fresh token
and revoking the old one is part of the migration's point.
Discover existing CI workflows so tend-ci-fix can watch them:
```bash
grep -l 'push:\|pull_request' .github/workflows/*.yml .github/workflows/*.yaml 2>/dev/null
```
For each match, extract the workflow `name:` field. These are the workflows
that run tests, linting, or builds — tend-ci-fix should watch them. Configure:
```yaml
workflows:
ci-fix:
watched_workflows: ["ci", "lint"] # names of workflows to watch
```
If no CI workflows exist, either skip ci-fix (`enabled: false`) or help the
user create one first.
If the user picked workflow config at Kickoff, ask via `AskUserQuestion`
(`multiSelect: true`) which overrides to set — otherwise set none:
- Setup steps and env vars (system deps, language version, pre-build
hooks, top-level env vars)
- Workflow conditions (e.g., skip review on `tend:dismissed` PRs — see below)
- Schedule overrides (cron timing for nightly/weekly)
- Permissions / timeouts on specific jobs
For each selected category, follow up with a free-text ask, then write
the override into `.config/tend.yaml`. See the next subsection for
override syntax.
### Customizing generated workflow YAML
The generator owns every `tend-*.yaml` file — direct edits are lost on the next
`uvx tend@latest init`. Instead, set `workflow_extra` (top-level) or
`jobs.<name>` (job-level) overrides in `.config/tend.yaml`. Overrides follow
RFC 7396 (JSON Merge Patch): mappings deep-merge, scalars and lists replace.
Common example — skip review on PRs labeled `tend:dismissed` (so authors can
opt out of re-reviews after the initial pass). Because scalars replace under
Merge Patch, the override must duplicate the default draft check:
```yaml
workflows:
review:
jobs:
review:
if: "github.event.pull_request.draft == false && !contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'tend:dismissed')"
```
See ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/tend.example.yaml for more override
examples (extending permissions, timeouts, top-level env vars).
## 2. Generate workflows
```bash
uvx tend@latest init --with-install-test
```
`--with-install-test` adds a one-shot `tend-install-test.yaml` workflow
that runs on the install PR to verify the committed workflows match the
generator's current output. (It cannot see secrets — its `pull_request`
run is outside the `tend` environment — so `tend check` is what verifies
those.) The next nightly regen
runs `uvx tend@latest init` without the flag, and the init cleanup step
removes the file from the default branch.
Verify workflow files appear in `.github/workflows/tend-*.yaml`. Run
`uvx tend@latest check` to validate branch protection, secrets, and bot access.
Check for workflows using `anthropics/claude-code-action`:
```bash
grep -rl 'anthropics/claude-code-action' .github/workflows/ 2>/dev/null
```
If found, delete them — tend replaces claude-code-action entirely. Remind the
user that team members should @-mention the bot account instead of `@claude`.
## 3. Ref protection
Two ref classes can land code that reaches a deploy or publish workflow:
the default branch (via merge) and tags (via tag push). Restrict both to
admin-only operations so every privileged code path chains back to an
admin action. The bot has write, which is below every role that can
bypass, so it satisfies neither.
Survey existing rulesets; skip any slot already covered:
```bash
gh api "repos/$REPO/rulesets" --jq '.[] | {name, target, enforcement}'
```
**Merge restriction on the default branch.** Create if missing:
```bash
gh api "repos/$REPO/rulesets" --method POST --input - << 'EOF'
{
"name": "Merge access",
"target": "branch",
"enforcement": "active",
"conditions": {
"ref_name": { "include": ["~DEFAULT_BRANCH"], "exclude": [] }
},
"rules": [{ "type": "update" }],
"bypass_actors": [{
"actor_id": 5,
"actor_type": "RepositoryRole",
"bypass_mode": "exempt"
}]
}
EOF
```
`actor_id: 5` is the admin role. The base role IDs run maintain 2, write 4,
admin 5 — not ordered by privilege, so the plausible guess for maintain is in
fact write, the bot's own role, and granting it hands the bot the merge. Before
adding any bypass actor, read back what the ruleset actually granted:
```bash
gh api graphql -f query='{repository(owner:"<owner>", name:"<repo>")
{rulesets(first:10){nodes{name bypassActors(first:10)
{nodes{repositoryRoleDatabaseId repositoryRoleName}}}}}}'
```
**Tag operations.** Same shape, applied to all tags. Pushing a new tag or
moving an existing one becomes an admin operation; the bot can do
neither. Skipping the "what pattern do your tags use?" question is
deliberate: matching all tags removes a per-repo configuration choice
and gives the chain a single, uniform rule.
```bash
gh api "repos/$REPO/rulesets" --method POST --input - << 'EOF'
{
"name": "Tag operations",
"target": "tag",
"enforcement": "active",
"conditions": {
"ref_name": { "include": ["~ALL"], "exclude": [] }
},
"rules": [
{ "type": "creation" },
{ "type": "update" }
],
"bypass_actors": [{
"actor_id": 5,
"actor_type": "RepositoryRole",
"bypass_mode": "exempt"
}]
}
EOF
```
`creation` blocks the bot from pushing a fresh admin-gated tag; `update`
blocks rewriting an existing tag to point at a bot-controlled commit. The
chain doesn't need `deletion` separately. Recreation is already blocked
by `creation`, so a deleted tag can't be replaced with malicious code.
Bot-deleting an admin-pushed tag is brief availability damage at worst;
repos that need stronger protection against published-tag deletion can
add a no-bypass `deletion` ruleset (see the publisher uplift below).
**Environment gates.** A new Environment admits every ref and requires no
approval — `deployment_branch_policy: null`, no reviewers — so a bot-pushed
branch or tag reaches its secrets and mints its OIDC token. Survey what
exists, including environments GitHub created on the repo's behalf
(`github-pages`) and ones that predate tend:
```bash
gh api "repos/$REPO/environments" \
--jq '.environments[] | {name, deployment_branch_policy, rules: [.protection_rules[].type]}'
```
Each environment that holds a secret, or that a job with `id-token: write`
names, needs a gate: a deployment policy pinned to admin-gated refs, or
required reviewers who exclude the bot. Either clears
`credential-environments`, so an environment already behind reviewers
stays as it is.
Pin the policy to the admin-gated refs its workflows actually use — all
tags for a release, the default branch for a continuous deploy. The
rulesets above are what hold those refs out of the bot's reach:
```bash
gh api "repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV" --method PUT --input - << 'EOF'
{"deployment_branch_policy": {"protected_branches": false, "custom_branch_policies": true}}
EOF
gh api "repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV/deployment-branch-policies" \
--method POST -f name='*' -f type=tag
```
`type` is `tag` or `branch` and defaults to `branch` when omitted, so a
tag entry that leaves it out silently protects nothing. Prefer this
explicit list to the "protected branches only" setting, which admits any
branch carrying a *classic* protection rule — a set that grows as
branches are created, and that excludes a branch protected by the
ruleset above.
Name required reviewers where no ref list fits — a deploy running from a
ref no policy can name, such as a preview published from
`refs/pull/N/merge`. Approval holds whatever ref the run starts from. Ask
which humans to name; the bot cannot be one of them:
```bash
ID=$(gh api "users/<login>" --jq .id)
gh api "repos/$REPO/environments/$ENV" --method PUT --input - << EOF
{"reviewers": [{"type": "User", "id": $ID}], "deployment_branch_policy": null}
EOF
```
**Release/deploy workflow design.** Workflows that use release or deploy
secrets must trigger on `push: tags:` (release) or `push: branches: [main]`
(continuous deploy from the default branch), and reference an Environment
(§1). Don't trigger on `pull_request`. A `pull_request` workflow runs the
YAML at the PR's head ref, which a bot can write, so the workflow code is
no longer admin-vetted and the chain breaks at the workflow file itself.
Triggers a write-scoped bot can fire *and* steer are outside the packaged
recipe: `release: published` (creating a release against an existing tag
takes no tag operation, and its body and assets are the bot's),
`repository_dispatch`, and a `workflow_dispatch` carrying inputs. Their
workflow files still run from the default branch, so the code is
admin-vetted, but the bot chooses when they fire and what payload they
see. If a repo keeps one on a release/deploy workflow, gate that
Environment with required reviewers before migrating release or deploy
secrets to it.
Run `uvx tend@latest check` after this section; its
`credential-environments` line reports any environment still reachable by
the bot.
**More complicated approaches are possible** (per-pattern tag rulesets,
mixed bypass actors, layered no-bypass immutability rulesets for repos
that publish actions consumed via tag pins). Install-tend packages the
recipe above because it is the simplest configuration that holds the chain;
adopters with stricter requirements can layer additional rulesets or
environment protection rules on top.
## 4. Create skill overlay (recommended)
Create `.claude/skills/running-tend/SKILL.md` with tend-specific project
- guidance. This skill is loaded by tend workflows alongside the generic
- `tend-*` skills — by skill discovery, so it must open with the
- frontmatter shown below. An existing overlay without it isn't done:
- add the frontmatter in place.
+ guidance, opening with the frontmatter below so discovery lists it by
+ description rather than by its first heading. An existing overlay without
+ frontmatter needs it added in place.
**Do NOT duplicate CLAUDE.md** and **do NOT invent project conventions.**
If the user picked the overlay at Kickoff, ask via `AskUserQuestion`
(`multiSelect: true`) which tend-specific preferences to capture:
- PR conventions (title format — e.g., conventional commits, Jira ticket
prefix — and labels the bot should apply)
- Review request routing (specific teams or people)
- Target branch if not the default branch
- Optional nightly actions (e.g., changelog maintenance — specify file and branch)
For each selected item, follow up with a free-text ask to capture the
- specifics, then write them into the overlay, opening with the same
- frontmatter as the placeholder below. Otherwise create a placeholder:
+ specifics, then write them into the overlay. Otherwise create a
+ placeholder:
```markdown
---
name: running-tend
description: Project-specific guidance for tend workflows running on this repo.
---
No project-specific tend preferences yet. Add guidance here as
needed — this file is loaded by tend workflows alongside CLAUDE.md.
```
Build commands, test commands, code style, and project structure belong
in CLAUDE.md — tend reads it like any other Claude session.
## 5. README badge
If the repo has a README (any of `README.md`, `README.rst`, `README`), add a
"maintained with tend" badge. If the user picked the badge at Kickoff, first
ask what they want (skip it, or a placement/style preference); otherwise
insert it without asking.
Base URL (always include the logo):
```
https://img.shields.io/badge/maintained_with-tend-bba580?logo=
```
Match the `style` parameter used by existing badges in the README. For
example, if the repo uses `style=for-the-badge`, append
`&style=for-the-badge` to the URL. If no existing badges or no style
parameter, use the default (no style parameter needed).
Wrap the image in a link to `https://github.com/max-sixty/tend` — always
this exact URL, regardless of the consumer's org or repo name. The full
markdown shape:
```
[](https://github.com/max-sixty/tend)
```
Wherever the badge comes up in chat (the Kickoff defaults description,
the customize follow-up),
describe it briefly ("an olive-green 'maintained with tend' badge with the
tend wordmark") — do NOT paste the raw `img.shields.io` URL or its base64
logo blob into the chat; the blob is hundreds of characters of noise.
Place it near the top of the README — after the title/heading but
before the first paragraph. If there are already badges on that line,
append to the same line.
## 6. Bot account
```bash
gh api users/<bot-name> --jq '.login,.id' 2>/dev/null && echo "EXISTS" || echo "NOT FOUND"
```
If the account doesn't exist (the name comes from Kickoff or
`bot_name` in the config):
1. Ask for the bot's email address. It must be one the user can read —
the verification code lands there; a plus-alias of their own address
(`user+<bot-name>@…`) works.
2. Navigate Chrome to `https://github.com/signup` and fill the form.
The user types the password and solves the CAPTCHA — the password
stays out of the conversation like any secret. Have them save it;
later bot logins (device-flow approvals, scope refreshes) need it.
3. If a verification code is needed and an email-reading skill or MCP is
available, use it to fetch the latest GitHub verification email
(`from:github subject:code`); otherwise have the user paste the code.
4. After confirmation, re-verify via API.
## 7. Harness auth token
This step and step 8 store their secrets in the `tend` GitHub
Environment — a repo-level secret is readable by any workflow the repo
runs, including one pushed to a branch, and the environment's deployment
policy is what closes that. `tend check --fix` owns the environment's
shape (it creates it and admits exactly the default branch and each
`protected_branches` entry), so create it with:
```bash
uvx tend@latest check --fix
```
It exits non-zero here, reporting the secrets this step and step 8 are
about to set. Read its `environment` line: that is the one that must pass.
A repo-level copy of an operational secret (from a pre-environment
install) can't be read back — GitHub secrets are write-only — so mint the
value into the environment per the steps below, then delete the
repo-level copy; `tend check` flags it until deleted.
Where a path below has the user run `gh secret set` themselves, the step
finishes when its pre-check prints SET — re-run it once they say they're
done.
Branch on the harness.
### 7a. Harness = claude
The action prefers `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` when both auth modes' secrets
are set.
```bash
gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --env tend --json name --jq '.[].name' \
| grep -E -q '^(CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN|ANTHROPIC_API_KEY)$' \
&& echo "SET" || echo "NOT SET"
```
If not set, mint per the auth mode chosen at Kickoff. Absent a Kickoff
answer — the config records the harness, never the auth mode, so a change
flow or a resumed install lands here without one — first ask which mode
via `AskUserQuestion`: the two Claude options from Kickoff question 1.
For **OAuth token** (`sk-ant-oat01-…` from `claude setup-token`; advertised
as 1-year), two mint paths, routed by environment rather than asked:
- **CLI** — the default when `claude` is on PATH (`command -v claude`) and
`uname` reports macOS or Linux; the bundled wrapper needs `python3` and a
pty and has only been validated there, so `MINGW*`, `CYGWIN*`, `MSYS*`,
`Windows_NT`, etc. route to Manual. The wrapper drives
`claude setup-token` (OAuth 2.0 PKCE) and prints only the token to
stdout, so piping straight into `gh` keeps it out of the transcript.
Launch the command below with the Bash tool's `run_in_background: true`
— a foreground call sits blocked with the URL trapped in its pending
result, and times out before the user has anything to click. Start it
only once the user says they are at the browser: the wrapper prints the
authorize URL within seconds, then waits — up to 15 minutes — for their
approval, and a run started ahead of them spends its window and takes
its own URL down.
```bash
TOKEN=$("${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/oauth_token.py" --code-file /tmp/tend-oauth-code)
[ -n "$TOKEN" ] && printf '%s' "$TOKEN" \
| gh secret set CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN --repo "$REPO" --env tend
```
Read the task's output as it runs and hand the user the authorize URL
it prints. Approving it either returns to the CLI, which finishes the
run on its own, or lands on a page showing a `code#state` string. For
the second, have them paste that string back and write it to the
watched path while the task runs — the wrapper types it into the
prompt:
```bash
printf '%s' '<code#state>' > /tmp/tend-oauth-code
```
Each run generates a fresh PKCE challenge, so a code from an earlier
run is dead; a restart needs a fresh approval.
The window needs the user at the browser throughout it. The authorize
URL logs the browser out on the way in
(`claude.ai/login?reauth=1&from=logout`), which means an
already-signed-in Claude session doesn't shorten the job, and the login
in front of the approval is theirs — an agent driving Chrome reaches
that page and stops there. After a window lapses twice, stop reissuing
and hand over the Manual path, which has no window.
When the task exits, its status alone says whether the secret was
stored: 0 stored it; anything else wrote nothing. The guard is
load-bearing for that — `gh secret set` stores empty stdin as an empty
secret and exits 0, and every check downstream reads names rather than
values (`check_secrets`, and this step's own pre-check above) — so one
unguarded failed run would leave a `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` that the
next run reads as already set, skips, and finishes green on.
- **Manual** — when the CLI path is unavailable, the wrapper errors out,
or the user isn't at the browser when the agent is. Hand over both
commands, fully substituted, for them to run in their own terminal (any
machine with Claude Code installed and `gh` logged in as the
maintainer; `https://claude.com/claude-code` to install it), whenever
suits them:
```bash
claude setup-token
```
```bash
gh secret set CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN --repo "$REPO" --env tend
```
Given neither `--body` nor a pipe, `gh secret set` prompts for the
value, so the token goes from the first command's output to that prompt
and nowhere else. Don't ask for it in chat: the agent has no use for the
value, and a token pasted there is a live credential sitting in the
transcript. The prompt refuses an empty submission and keeps waiting, so
the empty-value hazard that makes the CLI path's guard load-bearing has
no counterpart here.
For **API key**: the user takes a key from
`https://console.anthropic.com/settings/keys` and runs this themselves,
substituted, pasting the key at the prompt:
```bash
gh secret set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY --repo "$REPO" --env tend
```
### 7b. Harness = codex
Codex uses `OPENAI_API_KEY` (pay-per-token). The subscription `auth.json`
path is not supported — Codex rotates that refresh token on every
API call and invalidates the prior one, so tend's concurrent
workflows (review/mention/triage/nightly/…) would break each other's
auth mid-run. See ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/security-model.md.
```bash
gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --env tend --json name --jq '.[].name' | grep -q OPENAI_API_KEY && echo "SET" || echo "NOT SET"
```
If not set, the user takes a key from
`https://platform.openai.com/api-keys` and runs this themselves,
substituted, pasting the key at the prompt:
```bash
gh secret set OPENAI_API_KEY --repo "$REPO" --env tend
```
## 8. Bot token and secret
The bot's token needs scopes `repo`, `workflow`, `notifications`,
`write:discussion`, `gist`, and `user` (per-scope justifications in
${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/tend.example.yaml).
This step checks what gh already stores for the bot, mints a token
only if needed (8a or 8b), and pushes it to the environment secret (8c). It
serves both the install sequence and a standalone `Bot PAT`
scope-audit remediation; in the audit case it is the whole fix, and
you close the issue once 8c verifies. `<bot-name>` is `bot_name` in
`.config/tend.yaml`; `$REPO` derives as in the Kickoff (whose recipe
resolves a fork clone to the canonical repo).
Bot auth lives in a dedicated config dir,
`$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>`, with the token stored plaintext
(mode 0600) via `--insecure-storage` — never the OS keychain, which gh
keys by account name globally, so a keychain-backed bot login could
overwrite the maintainer's own credential. The bot also never enters
the default config, which git's gh credential helper answers as, so a
stray `git push` can't land as the bot. The token is already an Actions
secret, so the on-disk copy adds no exposure. The dir is durable:
scope audits and reinstalls read it to skip a fresh device flow. Full
rationale: ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/security-model.md.
Three auth postures, one per command — never export a token for the
session (git's gh helper would forward it):
- **Bot dir** (`gh auth …`, `gh api user`): prefix with
`env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>"`.
Ambient env tokens otherwise hijack the reads and block the auth
writes.
- **Bot via token** (`GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api …`): each block
reads the token, then skips its action if the read came back empty —
an empty `GH_TOKEN` silently falls back to the maintainer's stored
auth, and `gh secret set` accepts an empty body. Guards skip rather
than `exit` because blocks may be pasted into the user's shell.
- **Maintainer** (`gh secret`, the collaborator API in step 9): bare,
on ambient auth. A 403 means that auth lacks admin — often a weak
env token; `env -u` it to fall back to the stored login.
No step writes the maintainer's default config — and the bot must not
sit there either (pre-dir installs put it there). If a bare
`gh auth token --user <bot-name>` prints a token, evict it with
`env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN gh auth logout --user <bot-name>`;
workflows run on the repo secret, so nothing breaks.
Check what the bot dir holds:
```bash
env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth status 2>&1
```
A missing dir prints "not logged in", which is a routing answer, not an
error to debug. Read the output:
- Logged in as `<bot-name>` with a `Token scopes:` line listing all six
scopes → skip to 8c.
- Logged in as `<bot-name>`, scopes missing → **refresh path** (8a).
- Not logged in here → **login path** (8b).
8a and 8b both run gh's device flow: the command prints a one-time code
and polls until it is approved at `https://github.com/login/device` by
a browser logged in as the bot (codes expire after ~15 minutes). Run
the command yourself in the background, surfacing the code and URL;
delegate to the user's terminal only if that fails, and then hand over
the rest of the step's commands (8c, steps 9 and 10) fully
substituted — the token lives on whichever machine ran the login. On
Windows, run everything in Git Bash (bundled with Git for Windows); the
snippets work unmodified.
### 8a. Refresh path (bot already in the bot dir)
```bash
env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" \
gh auth refresh --hostname github.com --insecure-storage \
--scopes repo,workflow,notifications,write:discussion,gist,user
```
`gh auth refresh` has no `--user` flag; it operates on the dir's active
account, the bot. Requested scopes merge with the stored token's while
it is still valid (a revoked one yields just the six). No identity
check is needed: a wrong-session approval makes refresh itself error
("received credentials for <other-user>") — have the user re-approve
from the bot's session and rerun.
### 8b. Login path (first-time setup)
```bash
env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" \
gh auth login --hostname github.com --web \
--insecure-storage \
--scopes repo,workflow,notifications,write:discussion,gist,user
```
No `--git-protocol` here: that flag writes gh's credential helper into
the global git config, host-wide (git config is not scoped by
`GH_CONFIG_DIR`).
`gh auth login` stores whatever account approved the code, without
checking. Verify before continuing:
```bash
env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh api user --jq '.login'
```
This must print the bot name. Anything else means the wrong session
approved the code; the token never left the bot dir, so delete the dir
and rerun 8b before proceeding — no other account is affected:
```bash
rm -rf "$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>"
```
### 8c. Push token to secret
Copy the bot's token to the `TEND_BOT_TOKEN` environment secret and verify
the `Updated` timestamp is fresh:
```bash
BOT_GH_TOKEN=$(env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth token --user <bot-name>)
if [ -z "$BOT_GH_TOKEN" ]; then
echo "bot token empty — fix step 8 first" >&2
else
gh secret set TEND_BOT_TOKEN --repo "$REPO" --env tend --body "$BOT_GH_TOKEN"
gh secret list --repo "$REPO" --env tend
fi
```
## 9. Grant bot access
The collaborator PUT and final list run as the maintainer (they need
admin); accepting the invitation runs as the bot. GitHub may grant
access directly (204) without creating an invitation — accept only if
one exists.
```bash
BOT_GH_TOKEN=$(env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth token --user <bot-name>)
if [ -z "$BOT_GH_TOKEN" ]; then
echo "bot token empty — fix step 8 first" >&2
else
gh api "repos/$REPO/collaborators/<bot-name>" -X PUT -f permission=push
INVITE_ID=$(GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api "user/repository_invitations" --jq ".[] | select(.repository.full_name == \"$REPO\") | .id")
if [ -n "$INVITE_ID" ]; then
GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api "user/repository_invitations/$INVITE_ID" -X PATCH
fi
gh api "repos/$REPO/collaborators" --jq '.[].login'
fi
```
## 10. Bot profile bio
Capture what the creator is comfortable with contributors/users asking the
bot to do, then reflect that stance in the bot's profile bio (≤160 chars)
so it's discoverable on the bot's user page. This is advisory — the bot
doesn't gate behavior on it.
Use the recommended stance below unless the user picked the bio at Kickoff
or there was no Kickoff round (a change flow) — then ask via
`AskUserQuestion` which applies. Substitute
`<owner>/<repo>`. Order options recommended-first and mark the recommended
one explicitly:
- `tend agent for <owner>/<repo>. I triage issues and help maintain <repo>.` (Recommended — invites issue/PR engagement without inviting open-ended Q&A)
- `tend agent for <owner>/<repo>. Feel free to ask me questions about <repo>.` (Most permissive — invites contributor questions)
- `tend agent for <owner>/<repo>. I respond to maintainers of <repo>.` (Most restrictive — limits engagement to maintainers)
Check the current bio as the bot — skip the write if it already matches:
```bash
BOT_GH_TOKEN=$(env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth token --user <bot-name>)
if [ -z "$BOT_GH_TOKEN" ]; then
echo "bot token empty — fix step 8 first" >&2
else
GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api user --jq '.bio'
fi
```
Otherwise write it (requires `user` scope on the bot's token from step 8):
```bash
BOT_GH_TOKEN=$(env -u GH_TOKEN -u GITHUB_TOKEN \
GH_CONFIG_DIR="$HOME/.config/gh-bots/<bot-name>" gh auth token --user <bot-name>)
if [ -z "$BOT_GH_TOKEN" ]; then
echo "bot token empty — fix step 8 first" >&2
else
GH_TOKEN=$BOT_GH_TOKEN gh api user -X PATCH -f bio="<drafted bio>"
fi
```
## 11. Commit and push
Stage all changes:
```bash
git add .
```
Commit with co-author attribution. Do NOT push without explicit permission.
After pushing the install PR, wait for the `tend-install-test` workflow
to pass before merging — it verifies the bot+harness secrets are set and
that the committed workflow files match the generator's output. Merging
is the user's call. The file
itself is removed on the next nightly regen, so future PRs won't trigger
it.
## Summary checklist
After completing all steps, present this checklist (harness-specific
line picks the row that matches the chosen harness):
- [ ] Config: `.config/tend.yaml` created (with `harness` set if Codex)
- [ ] Workflows: generated in `.github/workflows/`
- [ ] Rulesets: merge restriction on default branch (admin bypass), tag operations on all tags (admin bypass)
- [ ] Release/deploy secrets: environment-protected; the environment's deployment-branch-policies list only the admin-gated refs from §3 (default branch and/or all tags)
- [ ] Skill overlay: `.claude/skills/running-tend/SKILL.md` (tend-specific only)
- [ ] Badge: added to README (unless skipped, or no README)
- [ ] Bot account: `<bot-name>` exists on GitHub
- [ ] Harness auth (claude): `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` or `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` secret set
- [ ] Harness auth (codex): `OPENAI_API_KEY` secret set
- [ ] Bot token: `TEND_BOT_TOKEN` set with `repo`+`workflow`+`notifications`+`write:discussion`+`gist`+`user` scopes
- [ ] Bot access: repo collaborator with write access, invitation accepted
- [ ] Bot bio: profile bio reflects the authorization stance
- [ ] Committed (push requires explicit permission)
- [ ] `tend-install-test` workflow passed on the install PR before merging