git:20260905.1599675 to git:20260905.3d84d94

+ description: "Implement features via Codex exec. Use when: writing new code from specs, implementing features, Codex-driven development. Not for: code review (use codex-code-review), architecture advice (use codex-architect). Output: implemented code + review loop."

+ allowed-tools: Bash(git:*), Read, Grep, Glob, Edit, Write, AskUserQuestion, Skill, Agent, Bash(node:*)

+ reject/modify → § Resume

+ ### Step 0: Pre-check and precondition (before any repository read)

+

+ **The index must carry no `assume-unchanged` / `skip-worktree` path before anything is dispatched**

+ — under the two grants this skill holds, `Bash(git:*)` and `Bash(node:*)`, and no others:

+

+ ```bash

+ node -e '

+ const { execSync } = require("child_process");

+ // The REPOSITORY, not the invocation directory. `git ls-files` is path-limited to the cwd

+ // subtree, so running this from `skills/` would inspect a fraction of the index and report a

+ // clean tree while a flagged file sat elsewhere — and the dispatch runs Codex at the top level

+ // regardless of where this skill was invoked.

+ const root = execSync("git rev-parse --show-toplevel").toString().trim();

+ // `git ls-files -v` tags every cached path. Measured on git 2.55.0: `H` is the ordinary cached

+ // entry, `S` is skip-worktree, and `-v` LOWERCASES the tag of an assume-unchanged file — so `h`

+ // is assume-unchanged and `s` is both bits. Hidden state is therefore "tag is `S`, or the tag is

+ // lowercase"; testing only for lowercase misses plain skip-worktree, and testing for "not `H`"

+ // over-triggers on `M`, an unmerged entry, whose remedy is finishing the merge and which neither

+ // `--no-assume-unchanged` nor `--no-skip-worktree` would touch.

+ const lines = execSync("git ls-files -v", { cwd: root, maxBuffer: 1 << 28 }).toString()

+ .split("\n").filter(Boolean);

+ const hidden = lines.filter((l) => /^[a-z] /.test(l) || l.startsWith("S "));

+ const unmerged = lines.filter((l) => /^[Mm] /.test(l));

+ console.log(hidden.length ? hidden.join("\n") : "(none)");

+ if (unmerged.length) console.log("[UNMERGED — finish the merge first]\n" + unmerged.join("\n"));

+ '

+ ```

+

+ A hidden-state tag is an `assume-unchanged` or `skip-worktree` bit, and such a path is invisible three

+ times over: the precondition below cannot see a local edit to it, Step 3b cannot display one, and

+ Step 3b's Reject would treat it as baseline-absent and run `git checkout -- <path>` — which restores

+ the *index* version and destroys the edit for good. That is data loss with no recovery path, so it

+ is a hard stop rather than an opt-out: list the flagged paths, ask the user to clear the bit

+ (`git update-index --no-assume-unchanged <path>` / `--no-skip-worktree <path>`) or to commit or stash

+ the work, and re-run this step. **Never auto-revert a tracked path whose prior contents were not

+ captured** — the Reject row's "no state to lose" holds only for paths the baseline could actually

+ see.

+

+ Then resolve the adapter through `@skills/codex-code-review/references/codex-transport.md`

+ § Locator, and let any auto-install that section prescribes happen before the `git status` below —

+ in a consuming repository its second step *writes* the adapter into the tree, and a write after the

+ snapshot puts an untracked file there that the changeset this step captured does not contain. Same reason the rest of this step is ordered the way it is: a snapshot that goes stale

+ while the work runs describes a tree nobody is looking at.

+

+ Then `git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all --ignored`, and satisfy the precondition in

+ § Step 3a before Step 1 reads anything. Step 1 parses the spec, loads the feature intent and derives the items

+ from files the precondition may ask the user to stash or remove; running it first leaves the plan —

+ and later the dispatched prompt — describing a tree that no longer exists. Three review rounds moved

+ this earlier twice: it began inside Step 3, then before Step 2, and neither was early enough because

+ each time a reader still hit a repository read first. It is a numbered step so the order is

+ executable rather than asserted from inside a later one.

+

+ If cleanup happens after this step for any other reason, repeat the Step 1 reads and plan

+ confirmation, and rebind the Step 2 context, before dispatching.

+

+ **Then pin the redactor Step 3b will run, by digest, before Codex is dispatched.** Step 3b executes

+ that module (`require`), and by then the tree has been through a write-capable child — so no check

+ made *afterwards* can establish what the module was: a child that sets `assume-unchanged` on a

+ tracked file and then overwrites it leaves `git status` empty, which is exactly the invisibility this

+ step's own probe exists to catch, and a path swapped for a symlink resolves somewhere else entirely.

+ Authenticating the **bytes now** and requiring the same bytes later is the only order that works.

+

+ ```bash

+ node -e '

+ const fs = require("fs"), path = require("path"), crypto = require("crypto");

+ const { execSync, execFileSync } = require("child_process");

+ const root = fs.realpathSync(execSync("git rev-parse --show-toplevel").toString().trim());

+ const real = (p) => { try { return fs.realpathSync(p); } catch { return null; } };

+ const inside = (p) => p === root || p.startsWith(root + path.sep);

+ const dirs = (d) => { try { return fs.readdirSync(d, { withFileTypes: true }).filter((e) => e.isDirectory()).map((e) => path.join(d, e.name)); } catch { return []; } };

+ // Candidates: the named active installation, the two in-repo locations, and a bounded walk of the

+ // plugin tree (layouts vary: cache/<marketplace>/<plugin>/<version>/, marketplaces/.../plugins/,

+ // data/<plugin>/), deduplicated by real path so one physical file is never counted twice.

+ // Keep BOTH paths: the one we were given and where it really points. Classifying by the real path

+ // alone is an escape - a repository-local `scripts/security-redact.js` symlinked to a file outside

+ // the tree would resolve "outside" and skip git validation entirely, while still being a path the

+ // child can replace. So a candidate is repository-local if EITHER form is inside, and a

+ // repository-local candidate must be a regular file at the path as given, not a link to one.

+ const cands = [];

+ const add = (p) => { const ap = path.resolve(p); if (!cands.some((c) => c.given === ap)) cands.push({ given: ap, real: real(ap) }); };

+ if (process.env.CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT) add(path.join(process.env.CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT, "scripts", "security-redact.js"));

+ for (const rel of [".claude/scripts/security-redact.js", "scripts/security-redact.js"]) add(path.join(root, rel));

+ const plugins = [];

+ let frontier = [path.join(require("os").homedir(), ".claude", "plugins")], seen = 0;

+ for (let d = 0; d < 6 && frontier.length && seen < 4000; d++) {

+ const next = [];

+ for (const dir of frontier) {

+ if (++seen > 4000) break;

+ for (const c of [path.join(dir, "sd0x-dev-flow", "scripts", "security-redact.js"),

+ path.join(dir, "scripts", "security-redact.js")]) {

+ const rp = fs.existsSync(c) && c.split(path.sep).includes("sd0x-dev-flow") ? real(c) : null;

+ if (rp && !plugins.includes(rp)) plugins.push(rp);

+ }

+ next.push(...dirs(dir));

+ }

+ frontier = next;

+ }

+ if (plugins.length === 1) add(plugins[0]);

+ // Pick the first candidate that is a regular file and, if it lives inside the repository, is

+ // tracked and unmodified. THIS check is sound here and nowhere later: the tree is clean by the

+ // precondition above and no write-capable child has run yet.

+ const ok = cands.find((c) => {

+ let st; try { st = fs.lstatSync(c.given); } catch { return false; }

+ if (!st.isFile()) return false; // lstat: a symlink is never a candidate

+ if (!inside(c.given) && (!c.real || !inside(c.real))) return true; // genuinely outside the tree

+ const rel = path.relative(root, c.real || c.given);

+ try { execFileSync("git", ["ls-files", "--error-unmatch", "--", rel], { cwd: root, stdio: "ignore" }); }

+ catch { return false; }

+ return execFileSync("git", ["status", "--porcelain", "-z", "--", rel], { cwd: root }).toString() === "";

+ });

+ if (!ok) { console.log("[STOP] no trusted security-redact.js to pin" + (plugins.length > 1 ? " (several plugin installations found - set CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT)" : "")); process.exit(1); }

+ console.log(ok.given);

+ console.log(crypto.createHash("sha256").update(fs.readFileSync(ok.given)).digest("hex"));

+ '

+ ```

+

+ Carry both lines — the absolute path and its digest — in the conversation, as you carry the

+ `threadId`. Step 3b takes them as its two arguments and refuses to run if the file no longer hashes

+ to that value.

+

+ **Two reads, in this order, before EVERY item — 3a, every 3c, and every Step 5 dispatch alike.**

+ Saying "take the baseline after the precondition" was circular, since the precondition is evaluated

+ *against* a baseline; a reviewer caught it. They are two different reads:

+ 1. a **pre-check** — `git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all --ignored` — which is what the

+ precondition below is evaluated against;

+ 2. once the user has resolved or accepted it, the **detector baseline**: the same status command

+ plus `git rev-parse HEAD` and `git stash list`. Taking this one *after* the cleanup is what stops

+ the user's own commit or stash being read as a Codex violation.

+

+ The detector baseline is what the table below compares against — 3a and each 3c alike, never once per session:

+ `git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all --ignored`. This skill owns the implementation lifecycle, so it owns

+ the baseline. Both flags matter, measured once in this checkout on 2026-08-30 as a dated example

+ and not a property of any tree: the bare command returned 92 entries where this returned 166. The

+ ratio is the point, not the numbers — `--untracked-files=all` because an untracked directory otherwise collapses to a

+ single line and hides its files, `--ignored` because ignored files are omitted entirely. Either

+ omission makes an existing path look newly created. Capturing once per session is the other half of

+ the same bug: rejecting item 2 against item 1's baseline can revert item 1's accepted work.

+ Rejection (Step 3b) reverts **only** paths absent from the current item's baseline.

+

+ **One precondition, checked BEFORE dispatching each item — 3a and every 3c alike.** Step 3b runs

+ *after* the Codex call, so a warning there reaches the user only once the overwrite has happened.

+

+ **The item's write set must be clean at baseline.** The prompt tells Codex to touch whatever the

+ item needs — tests, imports, call sites — so that set is not knowable in advance, which makes the

+ only checkable form of this condition the strong one: **every path in the baseline must be resolved

+ before dispatch** (commit, stash, or remove), or the user explicitly accepts **both** consequences,

+ named separately because they are different losses: this run has no working rollback at all, **and**

+ a modified baseline-present untracked or ignored file keeps its `??`/`!!` status, so Step 3b cannot

+ show it either — the "complete changeset" it promises is complete only over a tree that was clean at

+ baseline. Accepting the first is not accepting the second; ask for both.

+

+ Five review rounds were spent patching this branch one category at a time — staged changes, ignored

+ files, collapsed untracked directories, the ordering, and finally the discovery that a modified

+ baseline-present untracked or ignored file keeps its `??`/`!!` status and so cannot be *shown* to the

+ user at all, let alone restored. The diagnosis behind the current shape: git cannot give this

+ workflow reversibility on a dirty tree, and per-category reasoning kept finding one more category.

+ A single upfront condition is the thing that is actually true, so it replaced the sequence of

+ partial promises.

+

+ **What the condition does not cover, stated rather than implied.** This class runs Codex with

+ workspace write access, so nothing written here *prevents* what it does to the tree. What the

+ workflow can still do is **notice**, and three reviewers corrected an earlier version of this

+ paragraph that got the boundary wrong — it claimed staging bypasses Step 3b, which is false.

+ Measured:

+

+ | Operation | Visible to Step 3b? | Detected how |

+ |-----------|--------------------|--------------|

+ | **Staging** (`git add`) | **Yes** — `git diff HEAD` includes staged changes, and the status command shows the index column (`M ` rather than ` M`) | Already displayed; the Reject row stops on it |

+ | **Commit** | **No** — `HEAD` moves, so the *committed* changes vanish from `git diff HEAD`. Measured: after a full commit that display is empty, but a partial commit (`git commit -- <path>`) leaves everything else in it, so a non-empty diff is no evidence that nothing was committed | **Record `git rev-parse HEAD` with the baseline and compare after the item.** A moved `HEAD` means the decision was bypassed: say so and stop |

+ | **Stash** | **No**, for the stashed portion only — `git stash push` takes `--keep-index`, `--staged`, `--patch` and a pathspec, so anything it did not take stays visible. Same shape as the partial-commit row: what is still in the diff proves nothing about what was stashed | `git stash list` before and after — `git log` does not see a stash at all. **A changed list stops the item**, exactly as a moved `HEAD` does: show the new entries (`git stash list` and `git stash show -p <entry>`) and say that reviewed changes may have left the tree |

+ | `assume-unchanged` / `skip-worktree` on a tracked path | **No** — the path is absent from `git status` entirely, so neither the baseline nor Step 3b's display can see a local edit to it | The Step 0 probe above reads `git ls-files -v` and flags a tag that is `S` **or lowercase**. Measured: `h` = assume-unchanged, `S` = skip-worktree, `s` = both; `-v` lowercases only the assume-unchanged mark, so a lowercase-only test misses plain skip-worktree and a not-`H` test misdiagnoses `M` (an unmerged entry, reported separately with its own remedy). Step 0's precondition requires them cleared before any dispatch — this row used to read "nothing here detects it", which was true of `git status` and false of the index |

+

+ **Run the comparisons after every write-capable dispatch** — each item at 3a/3c and each Step 5

+ review-loop dispatch — not once at the end: an item that committed is only attributable to that item

+ if the check ran around it. The prompt forbids all three operations (`references/codex-prompts.md`), which is an **instruction,

+ not an enforcement** — the HEAD and stash comparisons above observe **persistent drift in those two values** — not the operation: a commit later undone inside the same item, or a stash created and popped, leaves both readings unchanged.

+

+

+ **Bind every placeholder before writing `prompt.md`.** The template is body-only, so nothing

+ evaluates an expression inside it — a `${X || 'default'}` would reach Codex as literal text. Two

+ have no natural empty form and this skill supplies it: `${CONTEXT_CONTENT}` becomes `None` when

+ there is no extra context, and `${TARGET_CONTENT}` becomes `(new file)` when the target does not

+ exist yet.

+

+ Dispatch per `@skills/codex-code-review/references/codex-transport.md` § Start with

+ **`--class implement`** — this skill is its only caller, and that class is what gives Codex

+ `workspace-write`. Guard 3 in `test/rules/codex-transport-guards.test.js` pins that ownership.

+

+ **The MCP era's ask-on-failure approval had no headless equivalent**, so the transport pins its own

+ policy instead — the value is in `@skills/codex-code-review/references/codex-transport.md` § Start, and naming it here would make this file a second

+ authority for it. The reason is that the exec transport is non-interactive: nobody could answer an

+ approval prompt, so the old policy could only hang or fail. The human control that replaced it is

+ **Step 3b below**, which shows the complete changeset and requires the user to accept, reject or

+ modify every item before the next one.

+

+ After each Codex call, show the **complete** changeset, then ask the user. The changeset has two

+ halves and **both go through the scanner** — the single command below produces the whole display:

+ - **tracked modifications**, from `git diff HEAD` — `HEAD`, not a bare `git diff`, which shows only

+ unstaged changes and would hide anything the item staged. Printing that diff directly was a leak

+ path of its own: an item that writes a token into an existing tracked file and stages it puts the

+ token in the diff, and the created-file scan never sees that file at all;

+ - **created paths**, from `git status --porcelain --untracked-files=all --ignored`, including

+ ignored ones that `--exclude-standard` would omit. Listing filenames is not showing the changeset:

+ this workflow explicitly supports new files (`${TARGET_CONTENT}` renders `(new file)`), so without

+ the contents a user can accept source or test files they never saw.

+

+ **Nothing is printed until it has passed a content scan, and status alone is not the

+ boundary.** An earlier revision withheld ignored (`!!`) files and printed the rest, which is

+ half a rule: a `credentials.json` or a source file with an embedded token is routinely untracked

+ and *not* ignored, so a status test would have printed it. Two gates, and every printed path — a

+ tracked diff included — must clear both:

+

+ 1. **Status.** An ignored path (`!!`) is never printed. `.gitignore` is the project's own statement

+ that these files are not source, and it is where `.env`, credentials, key material and logs live —

+ this repository ignores `.env` itself.

+ 2. **Content.** Every path that *is* printed has its bytes scanned first, and the scan decides:

+ high-confidence secret ⇒ withhold the file; medium-confidence ⇒ print the masked text, never the

+ raw. This is what catches the non-ignored file the status gate lets through.

+

+ Both gates run under the existing `Bash(node:*)` grant, and deliberately so — this workflow adds no

+ command grant to display a changeset:

+

+ The whole thing is one `node` command that takes **no arguments** — locator and file list included.

+ Three constraints force that shape, each measured:

+

+ - the grant is `Bash(node:*)`, so a line beginning `REDACT=...` is not a command this skill may run;

+ - `require("scripts/security-redact.js")` resolves as a *package* name and fails with

+ `Cannot find module`, so the locator resolves to an absolute path first;

+ - **and no created filename may reach a shell.** Codex chooses those names. A file called

+ `$(printf SHELL_INJECTED >&2)` is expanded by the shell *before node starts* — measured, it

+ printed `SHELL_INJECTED` — so interpolating paths into the command line hands a write-capable

+ child arbitrary command execution in the parent. Node's `--` end-of-options marker does not help

+ here: it protects node's own parser, one layer too late. The only fix is to remove the boundary:

+ the program asks git for the created paths itself, NUL-delimited, and nothing about a filename is

+ ever parsed by a shell.

+

+ The **two arguments it does take** are the redactor path and digest **Step 0 produced before the

+ dispatch**, and they are the exception that proves the rule: they are values this workflow computed

+ while the tree was still clean, not names the child chose. Both are **single-quoted** in the

+ invocation above, and that is not decoration — an ordinary installation path such as

+ `/Users/me/My Project/scripts/security-redact.js` would otherwise split into two arguments and the

+ run would stop with the second half read as a digest. Write an embedded apostrophe as `'\''`. The

+ digest is validated as 64 hex characters before anything is read, and the run stops if the file no

+ longer hashes to it.

+

+ ```bash

+ node -e '

+ const fs = require("fs"), path = require("path");

+ const { execSync, execFileSync } = require("child_process");

+ const MAX_BYTES = 1 << 20, MAX_LINES = 500;

+ // The repository root, for the same reason the Step 0 probe resolves it: paths are root-relative

+ // and the redactor lives under the root, so a nested invocation would mislocate both.

+ const root = execSync("git rev-parse --show-toplevel").toString().trim();

+ // THE REDACTOR IS CODE THIS COMMAND EXECUTES, and it runs AFTER a workspace-write child. So the

+ // candidate list is trust-ordered, not convenience-ordered: a plugin copy outside the workspace

+ // first (Codex is confined to the repository by `-C <toplevel>`, so it cannot write there), and an

+ // in-repo copy only when git says this run did not create or modify it. Without that, Codex could

+ // drop a `.claude/scripts/security-redact.js` of its own and the confirmation step would execute

+ // it before the user was asked to accept anything.

+ // The redactor is pinned, not searched. Step 0 resolved it and recorded its digest BEFORE the

+ // write-capable dispatch; this process only checks that the same bytes are still there. Searching

+ // here cannot be made safe: after a write-capable child has run, a tracked file marked

+ // `assume-unchanged` and then overwritten still reports clean, and a path replaced by a symlink

+ // resolves somewhere else - so every predicate evaluated at this point can be arranged to pass.

+ const crypto = require("crypto");

+ const [pinnedPath, pinnedDigest] = process.argv.slice(1);

+ if (!pinnedPath || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(pinnedDigest || "")) {

+ console.log("[STOP] this command takes the redactor path and its 64-hex digest from Step 0; re-run Step 0 to obtain them");

+ process.exit(1);

+ }

+ let pst; try { pst = fs.lstatSync(pinnedPath); } catch { pst = null; }

+ if (!pst || !pst.isFile()) {

+ console.log(`[STOP] the pinned redactor is missing or is no longer a regular file: ${pinnedPath}`);

+ process.exit(1);

+ }

+ // ONE read. The bytes that are hashed are the bytes that are executed - `require(pinnedPath)`

+ // would open the pathname a second time, and between the two opens a background process left by

+ // the child can swap the file. Compiling the verified buffer closes that window by construction;

+ // no ordering of checks around a second open can.

+ const src = fs.readFileSync(pinnedPath);

+ const nowDigest = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(src).digest("hex");

+ if (nowDigest !== pinnedDigest) {

+ console.log(`[STOP] the redactor changed since Step 0 pinned it (${pinnedPath}); this run may have written it - restore it and re-run`);

+ process.exit(1);

+ }

+ const Module = require("module");

+ const mod = new Module(pinnedPath, null);

+ mod.filename = pinnedPath;

+ mod.paths = Module._nodeModulePaths(path.dirname(pinnedPath));

+ mod._compile(src.toString("utf8"), pinnedPath);

+ const { redact } = mod.exports;

+ if (typeof redact !== "function") {

+ console.log(`[STOP] the pinned redactor exports no redact() function: ${pinnedPath}`);

+ process.exit(1);

+ }

+ // CAPABILITY CHECK, defence in depth behind the digest. The pin proves the bytes did not change

+ // since Step 0; it does not prove Step 0 pinned a redactor that actually works - an older

+ // installation is unchanged and still gets the positional cases wrong (the value equal to, or

+ // inside, its own key). A redactor that fails this is not used at all: with no trustworthy scan,

+ // nothing may be printed.

+ for (const probe of ["{\"password\":\"pass\"}", "API_TOKEN=TOKEN"]) {

+ let masked; try { masked = redact(probe); } catch { masked = ""; }

+ if (!masked.includes("[REDACTED]") || /:"pass"|=TOKEN/.test(masked)) {

+ console.log(`[STOP] the pinned redactor (${pinnedPath}) fails its capability probe - it leaves ${probe} unmasked, so it is an older copy; point CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT at the active installation or update it, then re-run Step 0`);

+ process.exit(1);

+ }

+ }

+ // Half one: the tracked diff, per file, each hunk set scanned before it is shown. A diff is text

+ // like any other and a token written into an existing tracked file arrives here, not in the

+ // created-path loop below.

+ // A repository with no commit yet has no HEAD to diff against, and that is not an error: every

+ // path in it is a created path and the loop below covers them all. Failing here would take the

+ // whole display down on the first item of a brand-new project.

+ let diffNames = [];

+ try {

+ diffNames = execSync("git diff --name-only -z HEAD", { cwd: root, maxBuffer: 1 << 28 })

+ .toString().split("\0").filter(Boolean);

+ } catch { diffNames = []; }

+ for (const rel of diffNames) {

+ let d;

+ try { d = execFileSync("git", ["diff", "HEAD", "--", rel], { cwd: root, maxBuffer: 1 << 28 }).toString(); }

+ catch (e) { console.log(`[WITHHELD unreadable-diff] ${rel} — ${e.code}`); continue; }

+ if (d.length > MAX_BYTES) { console.log(`[WITHHELD oversized-diff] ${rel} (${d.length} bytes)`); continue; }

+ let safeDiff; try { safeDiff = redact(d); }

+ catch (e) { console.log(`[WITHHELD secret-in-diff] ${rel} — ${e.name}; inspect it locally`); continue; }

+ console.log(`--- diff ${rel}`); console.log(safeDiff);

+ }

+ // Half two: the created paths, asked of git INSIDE this process. `-z` is NUL-delimited, so a

+ // filename may contain spaces, quotes, newlines or shell metacharacters and still arrive as one

+ // field.

+ const fields = execSync("git status --porcelain=v1 -z --untracked-files=all --ignored",

+ { cwd: root, maxBuffer: 1 << 28 }).toString().split("\0");

+ for (let i = 0; i < fields.length; i++) {

+ const e = fields[i];

+ if (!e || e.length < 4) continue;

+ const x = e[0], y = e[1], rel = e.slice(3);

+ if (x === "R" || x === "C") { i++; continue; } // rename/copy carries an origin field too

+ const ignored = x === "!" && y === "!";

+ const created = ignored || (x === "?" && y === "?") || x === "A";

+ if (!created) continue;

+ // Gate 1, status: an ignored path is named and never read. .gitignore is the project saying

+ // these are not source, and it is where .env, credentials, keys and logs live.

+ if (ignored) { console.log(`[WITHHELD ignored] ${rel} — inspect it locally`); continue; }

+ const p = path.resolve(root, rel);

+ // Gate 2, the filesystem node, BEFORE any read. lstat does not follow links, so a symlink is

+ // classified as one; readFileSync would have followed it out of the repository, and a FIFO or

+ // device would block. Size is checked here too — a multi-gigabyte or sparse file must never be

+ // read into memory to discover it was too big.

+ if (p !== root && !p.startsWith(root + path.sep)) { console.log(`[WITHHELD outside-repo] ${rel}`); continue; }

+ let st; try { st = fs.lstatSync(p); } catch (e) { console.log(`[WITHHELD unreadable] ${rel} — ${e.code}`); continue; }

+ if (!st.isFile()) { console.log(`[WITHHELD non-regular] ${rel} (${st.isSymbolicLink() ? "symlink" : "not a regular file"})`); continue; }

+ if (st.size > MAX_BYTES) { console.log(`[WITHHELD oversized] ${rel} (${st.size} bytes)`); continue; }

+ let buf; try { buf = fs.readFileSync(p); } catch (e) { console.log(`[WITHHELD unreadable] ${rel} — ${e.code}`); continue; }

+ // Metadata without `file` or `wc`: a NUL byte is the binary test, newlines are the line count.

+ if (buf.includes(0)) { console.log(`[WITHHELD binary] ${rel} (${buf.length} bytes)`); continue; }

+ const text = buf.toString("utf8"), lines = text.split("\n").length;

+ if (lines > MAX_LINES) { console.log(`[WITHHELD oversized] ${rel} (${lines} lines)`); continue; }

+ // Gate 3, content. Redact FIRST, then print: a header before the scan announces a file the scan

+ // is about to refuse, and the reader has to notice the WITHHELD line to know it was void.

+ let safe; try { safe = redact(text); }

+ catch (e) { console.log(`[WITHHELD secret] ${rel} — ${e.name}; inspect it locally`); continue; }

+ console.log(`--- ${rel} (${lines} lines)`); console.log(safe);

+ }

+ ' -- '<the path Step 0 printed>' '<the digest Step 0 printed>'

+ ```

+

+ For every withheld path — ignored, binary, oversized, secret-bearing, non-regular or outside the

+ repository — give the path, the reason

+ and its size, say plainly that the contents were withheld, and ask the user to inspect it locally

+ before deciding. **Name the reason, never the matched value** (`@rules/security.md`; a fingerprint is

+ what `security-redact.js` returns for that purpose). Accepting a file unseen is the user's explicit

+ call, not a silent default.

+

+ What is printed, then, is the ordinary case this workflow exists for — new source and test files,

+ untracked, not ignored, and carrying no secret the scan can see.

+

+ The same commands and the same two gates apply at **Step 4**'s final confirmation, not only here.

+

+ | Reject | Revert **only paths absent from this item's baseline** (`git checkout -- <path>…`) — those had no state to lose, which is true only because Step 0 refused to dispatch while any `assume-unchanged` / `skip-worktree` path existed: such a path is baseline-absent *and* holds state, and reverting it destroys the edit. Any path that appeared in the baseline in **any** column (staged, unstaged or untracked) is never reverted automatically: name it, show `git diff -- <path>`, and let the user decide, because its pre-item contents were overwritten and nothing here can recover them. Files the item created are baseline-absent, but `git checkout --` cannot restore a file with no committed version — removal is a separate, confirmed action: show each and ask. If the item **staged** anything, stop and say so — `git checkout --` restores from the index. Never a bare `git checkout .`. Re-attempt (max 2 retries, then ⛔) |

+ | Modify | § Resume with feedback on the same thread → loop back to 3b |

+ Dispatch per that reference's § Resume with the saved `threadId` — **still `--class implement`**, since the class does not change across a thread and a continuation must still be able to make edits. See `references/codex-prompts.md`.

+ the same complete changeset as Step 3b — `git diff HEAD`, plus the untracked-and-ignored listing

+ with the contents of each printable new file and the named-but-withheld entry for each ignored,

+ binary, oversized or secret-bearing one → user confirms.

+ **Every dispatch in this loop is a dispatch**: re-record the baseline and re-check the precondition

+ before each one, exactly as at 3a and 3c. A reviewer found the loop reaching § Resume without either,

+ so a run that started clean could accumulate unacknowledged overwrites here.

+

+

+ | 1 | `/codex-review-fast` | § Resume on the same thread to fix → re-review |

+ | 2 | `/precommit` | § Resume on the same thread to fix → re-run |

+ If Codex omitted tests → § Resume on the same thread to request them.