--- name: ddos-guardian description: >- Reviews an existing AWS WAF (a WAFv2 web ACL on ALB, CloudFront, API Gateway or AppSync) against AWS best practices and produces a self-contained HTML report: severity-rated findings, ready-to-apply remediation, cost and WCU impact. Reach for it even when the user never says "WAF" — whenever they ask what is wrong with their web ACL or want one reviewed or hardened; hand over a get-web-acl export or any file containing WebACL/web_acl rules; report customers or a page being blocked and want the culprit rule plus a safe exception; ask whether they are protected against L7 DDoS, bots, scraping, scripted signups or credential stuffing, or whether rate-based rules and managed rule groups (AntiDDoS, CommonRuleSet, KnownBadInputs, IP reputation, anonymous IP, BotControl, ATP, ACFP) exist, run in the right order, or need scope-down statements; ask whether an Allow rule can be forged, whether a Challenge is reaching clients that cannot complete one, or whether search engine crawlers will be challenged during an attack; question a rising WAF bill or a WCU count near its limit; need a write-up with severities for compliance; ask what Shield Advanced already entitles them to; or ask about WAF logging. Not for non-AWS firewalls (Cloudflare, nginx), AWS Network Firewall, security groups or network ACLs, or IAM policy review — different services whose configs this cannot parse. permissions: - file_read - file_write --- # DDoS Guardian — AWS WAF rules assessment A WAF review fails in two directions. Report a problem that is not real and the customer stops trusting everything else in the document. Miss a real one and they stay exposed. Both come from the same root cause: judging a configuration without the facts needed to judge it. So the work is split. `waf-assess.py` decides everything decidable from the config text and writes those findings itself. What is left is either judgment about intent — which no script should fake — or a fact only an operator has. You gather the facts, verify the machine's claims, reason about the rest, and `waf-report.py` renders it. ## Language **All output is English.** Write the report, findings and headings in English regardless of the language of the user's message. ## Pipeline ``` waf-assess.py → ask for context → waf-assess.py again → YOU write findings → waf-report.py ``` `waf-assess.py` writes most of the findings. Your job is to adopt those, resolve the context that changes them, then cover only the sections it could not decide. ## Deliverables 1. **`waf-assessment-report.html`** — one self-contained file, no external CSS, JS, fonts or network calls, so it survives email, a ticket attachment and an offline laptop. This is *the* report. Do not also hand over a Markdown version; `findings.md` is an input. 2. **`context.json`** — the answers, kept so a later run can be compared against it. 3. **The assessment artifacts** — `waf-summary.json`, `pre-checks.json`, `validation.json`, machine-readable and diffable. ## Scale the response to the ask - **Full assessment** — "review our WAF", anything headed for a manager or a compliance file. Every step below. - **Targeted question** — "which rule is blocking checkout?", "we are at 4,847 WCU, what can we trim?". Run Step 1, then answer the question that was asked. Resolve only the context that answer depends on and skip the report unless it has to be circulated. **Answer the exact question first**, in a sentence or two, before any broader advice — "do we have rate limiting on our signup endpoint?" is a question about that endpoint, not an invitation to review the web ACL. Steps 4 and 6 are not optional at any size. Verifying a claim against the config, and asking what a recommendation breaks, are what separate an answer from a guess — and a one-line answer gets quoted just as widely as a report. **Establish that the stack is AWS WAF before applying any of this.** Do not infer it from the question alone. Four things are a different service whose config this cannot parse — a non-AWS firewall (Cloudflare, Akamai, F5, nginx), AWS Network Firewall, security groups or network ACLs, and IAM policies. Say so briefly and stop; none of the steps below apply. **Network Firewall is the trap worth knowing.** Its export also has a top-level `Rules` array, so it looks like an accepted input shape. `waf-assess.py` now rejects it — a rules array is only accepted if its entries carry a `Statement`, or a `Priority` and an `Action` — but before that guard existed it parsed a suricata DROP rule as a WAF rule and reported five findings, led by a Critical about missing rate-limiting tiers, on a config with no WAF in it. **A confident finding about the wrong service is worse than a refusal**, because nothing in it looks wrong. Adjacent asks that *are* in scope, and worth answering: rate limiting currently done in application code (WAF is usually the better place), what to put in a WAF Terraform module (advise the rule set and order, leave the HCL), Firewall Manager (step 5 already reasons about `managed_by_fms`), and explaining a WAF concept with no config to hand — Appendix E and `references/cost-model.md` cover WCU and pricing. --- ## Step 1: Locate the input and assess Accepted without conversion: AWS CLI output with a top-level `WebACL`, an internal snake_case export with a top-level `web_acl`, or a bare unwrapped rules array. All three are detected automatically. **Look before concluding there is no input.** If the user says an export exists — "I dumped it to `webacl.json` in this repo" — read that filename first, and if the path is wrong search recursively for it rather than reporting it missing. If no filename was named, search the primary working directory from your environment (never a path carried over from an earlier session) for `*.json` containing `WebACL`, `web_acl` or a top-level `Rules` array. Only after that comes back empty is the input genuinely unavailable, and say which paths you searched. If nothing has been handed over: ```bash aws wafv2 list-web-acls --scope REGIONAL --region "$REGION" aws wafv2 get-web-acl --name "$NAME" --scope "$SCOPE" --id "$ID" --region "$REGION" > webacl.json aws wafv2 get-logging-configuration --resource-arn "$WEBACL_ARN" --region "$REGION" > logging.json ``` The logging configuration is a **separate API call and cannot be recovered from the web ACL at all**. Ask for it up front; it is cheap to obtain and expensive to guess at. **Resolve `input_file` to an absolute path before running anything**, then set `output_dir = {parent of input_file}/waf-assessments`. A relative input path makes the `---RESULT---` block's `OUTPUT_DIR` relative too, so any later command run from a different directory silently misses the artifacts. `scripts_dir` is `{skill base directory}/scripts`. Python 3 standard library only — no virtualenv, no install step. ```bash python3 "{scripts_dir}/waf-assess.py" "{input_file}" "{output_dir}" ``` Writes: | File | Contents | |---|---| | `waf-summary.json` | normalised rules with one-line statement summaries and `source.lines` back into the original JSON | | `pre-checks.json` | 9 mechanical checks + 3 flag extractions | | `scripted-findings.md` | finished Issue sections for everything the script decided | | `findings-metadata.json` | `llm_sections`, `next_issue_number`, `llm_context`, `context_questions` | Parse the `---RESULT---` block. `STATUS: OK` → continue. `STATUS: FATAL` → report the error and stop; `FAILED_STAGE` names the stage and `STAGES_OK` says what completed, so the artifacts already on disk are worth inspecting. Read the summary line and `context_questions`. **Do not start writing yet.** ## Step 2: Resolve context `CONTEXT_QUESTIONS` in the result block lists the answers that change a verdict rather than only colouring prose. Six fields, plus `cdn` and `client_types` which are read by the rate-limiting checks, and `references/context-schema.md` gives each one's exact effect. **Ask them every time. Context belongs to one web ACL, never to the skill.** Client types, market footprint, logging destination and API paths are facts about *that* application — carrying them from a previous assessment would gate findings on facts that are not about the config in front of you, and the report would then present another customer's answers as this customer's. There is no default context and there must not be one. An existing `context.json` may be reused **only** when re-assessing the same web ACL, and even then confirm it rather than assume: answers go stale, and "we added a web front end last quarter" changes several verdicts. `waf-assess.py` stamps `_webacl_arn` into the context it echoes and prints `CONTEXT_ARN_MISMATCH` plus a stderr warning if a supplied file was gathered against a different ARN — if you see that, stop and re-gather rather than proceeding. Keep the file **beside the input, named after the web ACL**, not in the output directory, so deleting the output does not destroy the answers. Also ask again after any material change to the web ACL, not only after a change of customer: a rule set that has grown a login endpoint or a browser front end invalidates the earlier answers even though the ARN is unchanged. **Prefer an interactive picker; fall back to a table only where the runtime has no picker.** In Claude Code that is `AskUserQuestion`. A markdown table puts the work of answering back on the reader — they answer two and skip the rest — where a picker turns each one into a click and gets you the whole set. If you reach for a table in a runtime that has a picker, that is the bug. What makes the difference in practice: - **Put the consequence in every option, not just the label.** "Browser and mobile app" tells them nothing. "Browser and mobile app — a native app cannot complete a Challenge, so this decides whether an always-on Challenge is a protection or an outage" gets a considered answer. - **Multi-select what is not exclusive.** `client_types`, `api_paths`, `landing_page_uris` and `origin_protection` are all "all that apply". `environment` and `waf_only_for_ddos` are single-choice. `traffic_profile` is free text — ask for the peak request rate **per source IP**, and say so, because an aggregate figure yields a threshold far too high. - **Do not force free text through a picker.** Paths, ARNs, traffic figures and the logging configuration are values, not choices. Ask for those in prose — and note that declared landing-page paths are rendered **verbatim** into the report, so a placeholder you invent appears as though it were the customer's. - **Always offer an honest "don't know", with the command that would answer it.** Silence costs only coverage. A forced guess poisons every finding resting on it. - **Ask the architecture questions even though no check gates them.** Where the web ACL sits, what terminates TLS and whether the origin is reachable around the front door can invalidate everything else — a perfect configuration attached to nothing protects nothing. They render in Application Context, where a reader can weigh the findings against them. - **Send contradictions back rather than resolving them.** "We have credential stuffing" plus "no login endpoint" is not a puzzle to solve quietly. - **Treat an unanswered question as still unanswered.** If nothing comes back for markets, leave it out. Do not infer a footprint from the account region or a hostname. Write the answers to `context.json` and re-run: ```bash python3 "{scripts_dir}/waf-assess.py" "{input_file}" "{output_dir}" --context context.json ``` Findings change. Some appear (logging with a real answer becomes Critical or Medium instead of "unverified"), some disappear (a DDoS-only web ACL stops being told it is missing the Core rule set). **A finding count that goes up as you learn more is the system working correctly** — say so in the summary so nobody reads it as a regression. Where there is nobody to ask, either leave the field out and let the report show the lower coverage, or state the assumption explicitly. Never assume silently. **Asking for data is not a substitute for answering.** Declining to invent a fact is right; stopping there is not. If part of an ask needs something you cannot see, name the missing artifact and the one command that produces it in a sentence or two, then answer every part the config and artifacts on disk already cover — in the same reply. State the assumptions the answer rests on. A methodology outline, a severity scale, or a list of `aws` commands is never the deliverable; put the answer first and what you need to confirm it last. ## Step 3: Write the findings **Do not delegate this to a subagent.** Do the analysis yourself in this session. Read: - `{output_dir}/scripted-findings.md` — the primary input - `{output_dir}/findings-metadata.json` — `llm_sections`, `next_issue_number`, `llm_context` - `{output_dir}/waf-summary.json` — the normalised rules - `references/assessment-checklist.md` — the 18-section assessment checklist **3.0 — Adopt the scripted findings.** Copy `scripted-findings.md` to `{output_dir}/findings.md` verbatim. **Sanity check first.** Scan the scripted issues against `waf-summary.json`. If any contradicts it — "missing CRS" when CRS is present — override it: remove or rewrite that finding. The script is deterministic, not omniscient. **3.1 — Build the rule execution flow.** Walk the rules in priority order and hold the request lifecycle in your head: per rule, its action, the labels it applies, its scope-down, and the labels it depends on. Map label producers to consumers. Note every Allow that terminates evaluation early. Do not draw a diagram. **3.2 — Cover the remaining sections.** `llm_sections` in the metadata says which. Number your findings from `next_issue_number`. Only those sections — the rest are done. Most of the catalogue is scripted, and the scripted set is deliberately large so that a finding does not depend on how carefully one reviewer read. Expect `llm_sections` to be `[1, 5, 8, 17]` on a typical config: the two mechanical sections there have partial generators that need your judgment on top, and 8 and 17 cannot be scripted at all. **Your highest-value contribution is section 17b — the fix order — because it is the only finding that depends on the whole set existing first.** Do not re-derive what the generators already decided; verify it (Step 4) and add what they could not. - **Section 1** (Allow audit) when listed: forgeability of each Allow condition. `ip_set`, `asn_match`, `geo_match` and the WAF token are unforgeable; User-Agent, cookies, custom headers, query arguments and body content are not. Read `references/common-patterns.md`. **Answering the forgeability question is not the whole of the section.** Read each Allow rule's statement in full and ask separately whether it does what it appears to: are any two branches identical, does every referenced IP set cover the address families the workload actually serves, does the name agree with the action. A rule can be perfectly unforgeable and still be broken. Three defects were missed on a real assessment by stopping at "IP set, therefore unforgeable" — they are scripted now, but the habit of treating a checklist item as the ceiling is what produced them. - **Section 5** (Bot Control): read `references/bot-control.md`. Common versus Targeted level, and what non-browser clients do to the answer. The CategorySearchEngine/CategorySeo Allow finding is already scripted — do not duplicate it. If `llm_context.ua_allow_found` is true, work through the native-app implication. - **Section 8** (landing page / cookie logic): read `references/crawler-seo.md`. Whether a security decision rests on a forgeable business cookie, and whether a WAF token replaces it. - **Section 17b** (cross-rule fix impact): **you must read `references/managed-labels.md`** before writing this section, and `references/common-patterns.md` with it. 17a is scripted — skip it. The label catalogue is not optional background. A managed rule group applies labels the export does not list, so `rule_labels` in `waf-summary.json` shows only the labels *custom* rules apply — reasoning about label flow from that field alone will miss every managed producer. Two specific traps the catalogue records: - `awswaf:managed:token:*` is emitted by **four** rule groups (Anti-DDoS, Bot Control, ATP, ACFP), not one, so a scope-down keyed on a token label can fire earlier than whoever wrote it expected. - A managed sub-rule left at a Count default applies a label and takes no action, so it protects nothing unless something consumes it. `AWSManagedIPDDoSList` is the common case and is scripted; the catalogue is how you find the others. Then, for every fix in the report, scripted or yours, trace the affected traffic through the whole chain. Does fix A break rule B? Remove a label a later rule needs? Give the fix order and say which changes must land together. Append to `findings.md`. **3.3 — Write the highlight findings.** Put a `## @summary` block at the *top* of `findings.md`, above the first Issue. Markdown works. It renders in the Summary tab as **Highlight Findings**, above the generated table, and it is the only prose in the report that is not attached to a single finding. Highlight, do not summarise. The table below it already lists every finding, so restating the count or walking the severities adds nothing. Name the two or three that decide what the reader does on Monday — and say why each one is on the list. Three things to get right in it: - **Lead with anything high-impact and free.** If Shield Advanced is present and the Anti-DDoS rule group is absent, that is the headline: the subscription already includes that rule group and its request fees up to 50 billion requests a month, so the strongest L7 DDoS control available costs nothing extra at normal volume. Quote the qualifier — an unqualified "it's free" invites a correction that undermines the rest. Rule reordering, Bot Control scope-downs, deleting rule groups that do not match the stack, and log filtering are all free or cash-positive too. - **Be equally careful about what Shield Advanced does not cover:** the above-1,500 WCU surcharge, Bot Control, Fraud Control, and CAPTCHA/Challenge fees are all still billed. - **State the limits.** This is a configuration review, not a penetration test. It shows a control exists and is positioned sensibly, never that it works against real traffic. Also unverified unless you checked it: whether the web ACL is associated with any resource at all, whether the origin is reachable around the front door, and what is inside referenced rule groups and IP sets. ### Format rules Each finding, exactly: ```markdown ## Issue N (severity): {title} **Rule**: {rule name} (priority N) **Current state**: {current configuration} **Problem**: - {what is wrong} **Recommendation**: - {what to do} --- ``` - Severity is one of **Critical**, **Medium**, **Low**, **Awareness**. - Rule lines must read `**Rule**: name (priority N)`, `**Rules**: ...`, or `**Rule**: N/A (missing rule)`. `waf-report.py` parses these to link each rule in the Current Setup table to the findings against it, and validates that every name and priority actually exists. - Number sequentially from 1 with no gaps. The renderer re-sorts by severity for display and keeps your numbers on the cards, so cross-references still resolve. - Cross-reference earlier findings by number, later ones by description. - **Do not write a report header, a summary table, or a conclusion paragraph** — the renderer generates the first two and the third is padding. - **Do not include diagrams.** The Current Setup table already lists every rule in evaluation order. ## Step 4: Verify every claim against the config Before rendering, re-read the config and check each finding you intend to keep. This catches the failure mode that matters most and it is worth the tokens every time. Does the evidence actually support the conclusion? Are the rule names and priorities literally present? Does anything in the config contradict the claim? Would this survive the customer opening the console? Drop or rewrite anything that does not survive. A thin finding can still be reported — as a question rather than a verdict. "Four rule groups run ahead of the managed rules and I could not see inside them" is useful and honest; "your rule order is wrong" on the same evidence is neither. ## Step 5: Pressure-test the remediation For every recommendation, ask what it breaks. This is where an assessment either becomes implementable or gets shelved. - **Would this block legitimate traffic?** Anything with that risk ships with a Count-first staging step. Bot Control, the Core rule set and geo blocking are the usual suspects — Bot Control in particular tends to catch the customer's own monitoring, partner integrations and payment webhooks. - **Is the advice self-consistent?** Do not recommend a scope-down on the Anti-DDoS rule group; it degrades the traffic baseline the detection depends on. Do not recommend pinning managed rule versions without also recommending the expiry alarm — an expired version freezes every change to the web ACL until someone selects a valid one. - **Does the priority arithmetic work?** Priorities are unique within a web ACL and `update-web-acl` replaces the whole rule set. Renumber in one call. - **Does the WCU still fit?** 5,000 is the per-web-ACL ceiling and the surcharge starts above 1,500. Appendix E carries the current figure. - **Is there a rollback?** The `get-web-acl` output taken before any change is the rollback artifact. Say where it is. - **Who can apply it?** When `managed_by_fms` is true, rules may be centrally imposed and locally unchangeable, and the recommendation belongs to the policy owner. ## Step 6: Render the report ```bash python3 "{scripts_dir}/waf-report.py" "{output_dir}" --out waf-assessment-report.html ``` Three stages: the rule-to-issue map, the mechanical validation, then the render. Idempotent — re-run it after any edit to `findings.md`. **`waf-report.py` is the sole definition of the report format.** Four tabs, and the split is what stops the two classic report failures: no number is ever retyped, so it cannot drift from the assessment, and no prose is ever generated, so it never reads as filler. | Tab | Owner | Contents | |---|---|---| | **Summary** | shared | four fixed blocks: business application context, findings overview (KPIs + three charts), your `## @summary`, then every finding in one table. Structure documented in `assets/summary-tab-template.md` | | **Current Setup** | script | Application Context, the ACL property table, and every rule in evaluation order | | **Findings & Recommendations** | you | one card per finding, severity-ordered, paginated | | **Appendix** | script | reference sections A–F: crawler rule JSON, dual-AMR pattern, always-on Challenge, priority order, WCU, common overrides | **Current Setup is wholly script-owned and there is nothing for you to write in it.** It carries what the web ACL *is*, kept apart from what the assessment concludes, so a reader checking "is this even my web ACL" does not scroll past the verdict. **Do not restate any of it in prose.** The Summary tab is **four fixed blocks** so two assessments read the same way: Business Application Context (six derived cards), Findings Overview (five severity KPIs plus a severity donut, a per-category stacked bar and a WCU gauge), your Highlight Findings, then All Findings. Only Highlight Findings is yours — everything else is derived from `waf-summary.json` and `context.json`, and must not be restated in prose. The charts are inline SVG computed in Python, never a charting library: an external script would break self-containment and an offline reader would get empty boxes. `assets/summary-tab-template.md` documents each block and where its values come from. Its Short Description column names each rule's **purpose** first and then what has been done to it. Purpose is inferred from the statement shape — an IP set with Allow is an allowlist, a geo match inside a `NOT` is an allowlist rather than a denylist, a label match feeding a Challenge is an always-on Challenge — so a custom rule reads as "URI prefix match on `/auth/`, `/price/`" rather than as a transcript of its statement. The qualifier after the em dash is the part that changes behaviour: "whole group overridden to Count, so it blocks nothing", or "Allow is terminating, so matching traffic skips every rule below". An unrecognised shape falls back to the statement summary rather than inventing a purpose. Application Context prints your answers back in three groups: supplied by the operator, established from the export, and **not supplied** — the last named explicitly with what each would have decided, so a finding resting on an unanswered question is legible as such. It appears only if you passed `--context`. Do not hand-author HTML to match this. If the format needs to change, change the renderer. ## Step 7: Self-review Read `{output_dir}/validation.json`. **Mechanical.** Any `FAIL` → fix `findings.md`, then re-run validation only: ```bash python3 "{scripts_dir}/waf-report.py" "{output_dir}" --validate-only ``` Maximum two retries. If it still fails after three attempts, report the remaining errors and stop. **Adversarial** — your own findings only; the scripted ones are deterministic and do not need re-deriving. Take the two highest-severity findings you wrote, go back to `waf-summary.json` (and the original JSON via `source.lines`) and re-derive each from scratch. If the re-derivation disagrees with the report, fix the report. **Cross-reference** — all findings, scripted and yours. For every label mentioned, check three directions, not one: a consumer with no producer, a consumer whose producer evaluates *later* (a lower priority number is earlier, so the producer's number must be lower), and **a producer with no consumer at all** — including labels applied by managed rule groups, which means having read `references/managed-labels.md`. Then account for **every rule the report says nothing about, one at a time**. Enumerate them from `waf-summary.json` and write a reason per rule for why it needs no finding — "at group defaults, which is correct", "opaque rule group, covered by Issue N as a limit". If you cannot state a reason, you have not checked it. **Do not report this as a count.** "16 of 30 rules correctly carry no finding" is a sentence that looks like a completed check and can be written without doing one; that exact sentence was written on a real assessment while three defects sat in rules it covered. Per-rule reasons or nothing. **Do not truncate config values while analysing.** ARNs, regexes and match strings are long and the discriminating part is usually at the end — two IP set ARNs differing only in their suffix look identical under `[:200]`. Print them in full or compare them programmatically. State: "Self-review complete. Mechanical: {results}. Adversarial: {N} re-derived, {N} corrections. Cross-ref: {N} found." --- ## Key principles - **Never assume a rule is wrong without understanding intent.** A default-Block web ACL with terminating Allow rules is a deliberate allowlist, and assessing it as a misconfiguration is the most common way this kind of review embarrasses itself. - **Evaluate rules as a system.** Rules interact; fixing one can break another. Always identify the cross-rule dependencies. - **Distinguish DDoS impact from user-experience impact.** A rule that is bad for UX and neutral for DDoS is low severity in a DDoS-focused assessment. - **Allow is the most dangerous action.** Every Allow rule is a potential bypass. Scrutinise what triggers it and whether that condition is forgeable. - **Missing data is not a failing grade.** When the logging configuration was not supplied, the answer is "unverified", not "logging disabled". ## Severity criteria - **Critical** — the protection can be bypassed entirely, or a core protection is disabled or ineffective. - **Medium** — a real gap that needs specific conditions to exploit, or a known attack vector that is not blocked. - **Low** — suboptimal configuration with no direct security impact; UX or cost only. - **Awareness** — not a misconfiguration. Something worth knowing operationally: a capacity limit, missing observability, version staleness, or a behaviour that would surprise someone during an incident. ## Baseline rule order `references/assessment-checklist.md` §18 and **Appendix D** of the report carry the full table; both are generated from `RECOMMENDED_ORDER` in `waf-assess.py`, which is the single definition. The two things to hold in mind while assessing: **The Anti-DDoS AMR position is the one ordering rule with a documented AWS answer.** It belongs at the top of the web ACL, or *directly below custom rules with `Allow` action* — and nothing else. Its detection is behavioural, baselined from the traffic it observes, so a terminating rule above it degrades the baseline rather than merely running first. A `Block` rule above it is the case worth explaining to a customer: during an attack the denylisted traffic **is** the attack, so blocking it earlier hides the event from the group that would have mitigated it. `_gen_antiddos_position` reports this on its own rather than as a bullet in the general ordering list. **Two positions in the baseline are reviewed judgement calls and are marked as such in the code.** Count+label rules above the AMR reconcile AWS's wording (which names only `Allow`) with the crawler-labelling requirement, on the grounds that `Count` removes no traffic. And operator rate rules ahead of AWS's reputation lists is the doc's convention; the reverse is defensible. If a customer's config follows the other convention on either, **say so rather than reporting a violation** — re-resolving a documented divergence silently is how a review loses an argument it should not be having. ## Three things worth not getting wrong **Two rule groups cannot be version-pinned.** The Amazon IP reputation and Anonymous IP rule groups update continuously and have no versions to pin. Never recommend pinning them; the recommendation is not merely unnecessary, it cannot be carried out. **Global Accelerator is not a CDN, and treating it as one inverts the answer.** WAF cannot attach to an accelerator, so a web ACL on the ALB behind one is the correct and only placement — never recommend moving it to the front door. Client IP preservation is on by default for internet-facing ALB endpoints, so WAF sees real client addresses and recommending `ForwardedIPConfig` there actively makes things worse: it swaps a correct source address for an attacker-settable header. **A control that exists is not a control that works.** Everything here measures configuration against best practice. Whether the WAF actually stops an attack is a question for traffic, a penetration test, or the AWS Security Agent — and that before-and-after measurement is the natural next step after these recommendations are applied, not something this assessment substitutes for. ## Files ``` scripts/ waf-assess.py phase A — normalize → pre-checks → scripted findings waf-report.py phase B — issue map → validation → self-contained HTML waf_finding_templates.py static Markdown: finding templates + appendix A–F assets/ summary-tab-template.md the Summary tab's four-block structure, and where each value comes from. Documentation only -- nothing reads it at runtime references/ assessment-checklist.md the 18 numbered sections; llm_sections indexes into these context-schema.md context.json: which fields gate which finding antiddos-amr.md detection, sensitivity, exempt regex, dual-instance pattern bot-control.md Common vs Targeted, verified/unverified bots, native apps challenge-captcha.md what can and cannot complete a Challenge, token properties common-patterns.md anti-patterns: forgeable Allow, Count without labels crawler-seo.md ASN+UA labelling, crawler exclusion, always-on Challenge ip-reputation.md the three IP-reputation rules and HostingProviderIPList managed-labels.md which rule group produces which label; shared token labels managed-overrides.md override semantics, version guidance, token domains, WCU rate-based.md windows, thresholds, overlapping scope-downs cost-model.md WCU and pricing structure, how to estimate ``` ## Blast radius - **Writes** only assessment artifacts in `output_dir`. It never edits its own files. - **Never mutates AWS resources.** Every remediation is emitted as JSON and CLI for a human to apply. The scripts call no AWS API at all; the read-only commands above are for you to run. - **No network.** The scripts make none, and the generated HTML makes none either — no external CSS, JS or fonts, so it renders offline. - Reads WAF config exports and its own references. It does not read or transmit credentials. Least-privilege credentials are sufficient. The workflow needs no write access at any point.