git:20260808.5432913 to git:20260808.eecacd8
22 added, 15 removed. Audit A to A.
---
name: agoragentic-buzz-signed-workspace-evidence
description: Convert exported Block Buzz / Nostr workspace events into bounded Agoragentic evidence. Use for signed release history, incident memory, workflow evidence, or Transaction Assurance preparation without treating channel membership as financial authority.
license: Apache-2.0
metadata:
- upstream: block/buzz
+ upstream: block/buzz@f029deafae6ad3b63e13c29104f3be76122cb1df
+ upstream_provenance: upstream-provenance.json
+ nip01: nostr-protocol/nips@c53877571f96eb423661fc23c620d629d37b8f19
status: experimental
---
# Buzz Signed Workspace Evidence
Run locally:
```bash
cd examples/buzz-signed-workspace-evidence
node cli.mjs <events.json> --out buzz-evidence.json
```
Rules:
- 1. Verify each canonical NIP-01 event ID; reject an ID/content mismatch.
- 2. Do not claim a valid Schnorr signature unless external verifier evidence is supplied.
- 3. Do not infer a principal or owner from a pubkey alone.
- 4. Buzz channel membership and workspace scopes are not economic mandates.
- 5. A relay-accepted event is not payment, delivery, outcome, or reconciliation proof.
- 6. Require separate relay-audit persistence evidence when persistence matters.
- 7. Keep event content hash-only by default. Use bounded content only when the principal permits it.
- 8. Never expose nsec keys, bearer tokens, API keys, private payment data, or raw private workspace exports.
+ 1. Verify each canonical NIP-01 event ID with strict lower-case wire fields; reject coercion, an ID/content mismatch, or an out-of-range kind.
+ 2. Accept signature, principal, and persistence claims only as typed external attestation references bound to the exact event ID, pubkey, and signature hash; persistence claims must also bind the exact source relay hash.
+ 3. Treat every caller-supplied attestation reference as unverified until a separate trusted resolver authenticates the artifact and verifier identity; never accept a naked verification, persistence, or principal boolean.
+ 4. Do not infer a principal or owner from a pubkey alone.
+ 5. Buzz channel membership and workspace scopes are not economic mandates.
+ 6. A relay-accepted event is not payment, delivery, outcome, or reconciliation proof. Require separate relay-audit persistence evidence when persistence matters.
+ 7. Keep event content and source metadata hash-only by default. Hashes can remain correlatable for low-entropy values, so use bounded content only when the principal permits it and protect private exports separately.
+ 8. Treat bounded mode as raw workspace content with best-effort known-pattern redaction, never as complete secret scanning or a public-safe export. Require explicit content authority, private handling, and publication review even when no redaction fires.
9. Do not post a receipt reference to Buzz without explicit principal publication authority and a signing key outside this adapter.
- 10. This skill grants no spend, wallet, deployment, publication, memory-write, or trust authority.
+ 10. This source pin is review provenance only; it is not live relay, CLI, ACP, signature-verifier, private-channel, or audit-export compatibility evidence.
+ 11. This skill grants no spend, wallet, deployment, publication, memory-write, or trust authority.
Report:
```text
event count and types
+ exact upstream and NIP-01 source pin
canonical ID integrity
- signature-verification state
- principal-binding state
- relay-audit state
+ event-bound but unverified signature-attestation-reference state
+ event-bound but unverified principal-attestation-reference state
+ event-bound but unverified relay-audit-reference state
content policy and redactions
- channel/event/pubkey references
- evidence root
+ hash-only source references
+ event root and full security-envelope bundle root
+ bundle verification result and externally trusted expected root, when available
+ raw-content, redaction-assurance, and publication-review state
Transaction Assurance blockers
+ caller-claimed Transaction Assurance states and state_claims_verified: false
next safe action
authority granted: false
```