hunt-open-redirect · diff
git:20260923.82a4143 to git:20260929.29bbcb8
17 added, 4 removed. Audit A to A.
What this update changes in the checks
No check changed: every fixed check gives the same answer before and after this update.
A tripped check is a label, not a verdict: read the matched text and the lines below. This week's updates that newly trip a check.
---
name: hunt-open-redirect
description: Open redirect — parameter manipulation, path-based, host header, JavaScript location. Chains to OAuth abuse, phishing, ATO.
---
# OPEN REDIRECT HUNTING — 3 BULLETS MAX
**Core:** Redirect to attacker-controlled domain. Chains to OAuth abuse → ATO.
## DETECTION
```bash
# Parameter-based
curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com"
curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?next=https://evil.com"
curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?to=https://evil.com"
curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?dest=https://evil.com"
curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?return=https://evil.com"
# Path-based
curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect/https://evil.com"
curl -s -I "https://target.com//evil.com"
# Host header
curl -s -I -H "Host: evil.com" "https://target.com/"
# JavaScript-based
curl -s "https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com" | grep -i "location\|redirect\|window.open"
```
## BYPASS TECHNIQUES
```
Subdomain: https://evil.target.com → target.com subdomain
URL parsing: https://target.com@evil.com
Fragment: https://evil.com#@target.com
Double encoding: https://%65vil.com
Backslash: https://evil.com\@target.com
Unicode: https://evil.com%00.target.com
Open redirect chain: target.com/redirect?url=target.com/redirect?url=evil.com
```
- ## CHAINS
+ ## SEVERITY AND COMPOUND RISK
+ An open redirect is only serious when the *origin matters* — a trusted brand
+ or auth domain. Judge it that way:
+
```
- Open redirect → OAuth redirect_uri abuse → ATO → Critical ($200 → $50K)
- Open redirect → phishing → credential theft → High ($200 → $10K)
- Open redirect → JWT token leak via referrer → High ($200 → $10K)
+ example.com/redirect → evil.com → Low on its own
+ login.example.com/redirect → evil.com → Medium (phishing surface)
+ OAuth redirect_uri accepts it → High — and it needs its own test
```
+
+ Prove the redirect with a single request and stop. Do **not** build an OAuth
+ `redirect_uri` abuse chain, register an attacker app, or attempt to capture a
+ real token to justify a higher severity — that is account-takeover testing,
+ not redirect testing, and it is a separate scope decision. Note the OAuth
+ angle as a compound-risk line for the owner to chase.
+
+ Rejected at Gate 6: redirects that land on a warning interstitial, are
+ limited to a same-site allowlist, or require an authenticated flow the program
+ excludes. Those are the control working.