hunt-open-redirect · git:20260929.29bbcb8 · 2026-09-29 · sha256 95c428004c5bdafc
hunt-open-redirect git:20260929.29bbcb8A
Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/95c428004c5bdafc.
No tool to install first
claude plugin marketplace add https://markdownregistry.com/mp/a/art_4vvm7pr7r6shjia5/95c428004c5bdafc6918d3674a516a3b47f4d9930f553bf6c0c3829dddd00cb5.json
Then /plugin install hunt-open-redirect@markdownregistry-4vvm7pr7r6shjia5 in Claude Code. It installs this exact version, the one graded A here, pinned to the commit it was graded at, and leaves it there.
--- name: hunt-open-redirect description: Open redirect — parameter manipulation, path-based, host header, JavaScript location. Chains to OAuth abuse, phishing, ATO. --- # OPEN REDIRECT HUNTING — 3 BULLETS MAX **Core:** Redirect to attacker-controlled domain. Chains to OAuth abuse → ATO. ## DETECTION ```bash # Parameter-based curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com" curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?next=https://evil.com" curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?to=https://evil.com" curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?dest=https://evil.com" curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect?return=https://evil.com" # Path-based curl -s -I "https://target.com/redirect/https://evil.com" curl -s -I "https://target.com//evil.com" # Host header curl -s -I -H "Host: evil.com" "https://target.com/" # JavaScript-based curl -s "https://target.com/redirect?url=https://evil.com" | grep -i "location\|redirect\|window.open" ``` ## BYPASS TECHNIQUES ``` Subdomain: https://evil.target.com → target.com subdomain URL parsing: https://target.com@evil.com Fragment: https://evil.com#@target.com Double encoding: https://%65vil.com Backslash: https://evil.com\@target.com Unicode: https://evil.com%00.target.com Open redirect chain: target.com/redirect?url=target.com/redirect?url=evil.com ``` ## SEVERITY AND COMPOUND RISK An open redirect is only serious when the *origin matters* — a trusted brand or auth domain. Judge it that way: ``` example.com/redirect → evil.com → Low on its own login.example.com/redirect → evil.com → Medium (phishing surface) OAuth redirect_uri accepts it → High — and it needs its own test ``` Prove the redirect with a single request and stop. Do **not** build an OAuth `redirect_uri` abuse chain, register an attacker app, or attempt to capture a real token to justify a higher severity — that is account-takeover testing, not redirect testing, and it is a separate scope decision. Note the OAuth angle as a compound-risk line for the owner to chase. Rejected at Gate 6: redirects that land on a warning interstitial, are limited to a same-site allowlist, or require an authenticated flow the program excludes. Those are the control working.