internal-controls-and-audit · git:20260829.42b4a27 · 2026-08-29 · sha256 64273c51f6911fd9
internal-controls-and-audit git:20260829.42b4a27A
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--- name: internal-controls-and-audit description: Designs and tests controls over financial reporting — segregation of duties, approval limits, evidence, and preparing for audit. Use this to design controls for a process, prepare for an external audit, respond to an audit finding, set approval thresholds, or assess where a small team's segregation of duties is genuinely broken. --- # Internal controls and audit Controls exist because a single person who can initiate, approve and record a transaction can also conceal one. Everything else is elaboration on that. **This structures control design and audit readiness. Statutory audit requirements, and regimes such as SOX where they apply, are matters for your auditors and qualified advisers.** ## Segregation of duties Four capabilities should not sit with one person: **initiating** a transaction, **approving** it, **recording** it, and **holding the asset**. Any two combined is a risk; three is an unmonitored opportunity. Small teams cannot always separate these. That is a normal constraint and pretending otherwise produces a fictional control matrix. Where separation is impossible, compensate visibly: - Review by someone outside the process, on a defined cadence rather than when convenient. - Exception reporting that goes to someone who is not the preparer. - Bank confirmations and reconciliations reviewed independently of whoever performs them. Document the gap and the compensating control. An acknowledged, mitigated gap is a defensible position; an unacknowledged one is a finding waiting to be written. ## Design controls that leave evidence A control that happened but left no trace did not happen, as far as an auditor can determine. Each control needs a stated owner, frequency, what is examined, and an artefact produced as a by-product of doing the work — not assembled afterwards for the audit. Prefer **preventive** controls, which stop the transaction, over **detective** ones, which find it afterwards. Prefer automated over manual: system-enforced approval limits do not have busy weeks. ## Approval thresholds Set limits by value and by risk, not value alone. A low-value payment to a new supplier deserves more scrutiny than a large one to an established counterparty on contracted terms. Watch for splitting — transactions repeatedly landing just under a threshold is the pattern the threshold creates, and it is straightforward to monitor for. ## Audit findings Treat a finding as information. Fix the cause rather than the instance, and be sceptical of remediation that consists of more careful behaviour: the same conditions will reproduce the finding with different people. Related but distinct: `legal-risk:corporate-governance` owns board and entity governance, `legal-risk:enterprise-risk` owns the risk framework. This skill owns controls over financial reporting. ## Never - Sign a control matrix that describes separation the team does not actually have. - Accept a control with no evidence produced in the ordinary course of performing it. - Remediate a finding with a commitment to be more careful. - Set approval limits on value alone and not monitor for splitting.