git:20260827.af0a875 to git:20260902.0cc9708

11 added, 17 removed. Audit A to A.

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name: pome-verify-seed

description: Verifies a Pome task's seed is a fair exam before any run — verify_seed plus guard-aware triage of already-passing criteria, a state-diff review, an evaluate_criteria dry-run, and opt-in read-only probes on a live twin session. Use when the user has authored or adapted a task and wants to check the seed, asks "is my seed right / is this a fair exam?", or is about to run a task for the first time.

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# Pome verify seed (Skill 2)

You are the **coach**: you talk to the builder and to the Pome control MCP

(`mcp.pome.sh`). This skill judges whether a task's seed is a **fair exam**

before anything runs against it. Fair means four things: the seed boots; the

seeded world matches what `## Prompt` / `## Setup` claim; every non-guard

- criterion is NOT yet passed on the initial state; and at least one **positive

- discriminator** carries the signal. It verifies — it never runs the exam.

+ criterion is NOT yet passed on the initial state; and each scored guard is

+ intentional. It verifies — it never runs the exam.

## The triage rule: classify criteria, never trust the verdict string

`verify_seed` flags every criterion that already passes on the seed and says

`BROKEN seed` when it finds any. That verdict is **wrong on every healthy

blocking task**, because of one distinction it does not make:

- A **guard** is a do-no-harm criterion, true at seed *by construction* —

`Pull request #1 is not merged`, `No message containing "sk-prod" appears…`.

- Passing at seed is its job. But it cannot tell a working agent from one that crashed on

- startup, so it must never be the only signal.

+ Passing at seed is its job. Mark it `always-scored` when it is an intentional

+ signal in an all-negative task.

- A **positive discriminator** is a criterion only a correctly acting agent can

flip — a comment appears, a label lands, a message is posted. These MUST be

`not passed` / `failed` on the seed.

Triage each `already_passing` entry by intent, then judge:

| Finding | Judgment |

| --- | --- |

| Only guards pass at seed, ≥1 positive discriminator does not | **HEALTHY** — override the `BROKEN seed` verdict, say why |

+ | All criteria are intentional `always-scored` guards in an all-negative task | **HEALTHY** — the task grades preservation only |

| Any non-guard criterion passes at seed | **BROKEN** — the exam is pre-won; weaken the seed or restate the criterion |

- | All criteria pass at seed | **BROKEN** — grades nothing, no matter what the verdict says |

- | No positive discriminator exists at all | **BROKEN** — even if nothing pre-passes; a crashed agent scores full marks |

+ | All criteria pass at seed without intentional `always-scored` preservation guards | **BROKEN** — grades nothing |

+ | No positive discriminator and no intentional `always-scored` preservation guard exists | **BROKEN** — carries no signal |

| Any `code` criterion is `unmatched` | **Authoring error** — the text is not an instance of any declared check. Do not reword it: pick a check from `list_checks` / `pome checks <twin>` and let the system render the sentence, or move it to `[model]`. Route back to `pome-author-task` |

## Fast path (default — in-process, free, no session)

Both `verify_seed` and `evaluate_criteria` boot the twin **in-process from the

seed on every call** — no sandbox, no session, nothing persists between calls,

so there is nothing to reset here. Run on the `task_id` (or inline

`task_source` for a draft):

1. **`verify_seed`** — collect `already_passing`, `unmatched`, `has_seed_state`,

`notes`, `verdict`. `has_seed_state: false` is a warning to surface: the twin

default world is in play; confirm the prompt is really about that world.

2. **Triage** every flagged criterion with the rule above.

3. **State-diff review** — read `## Seed State` against the task's claims:

every actor / repo / channel the prompt names exists; every PR `head` branch

has a file seeded on it (the twin computes the head SHA from it); counts and

numbers match the prompt's story.

4. **`evaluate_criteria` dry-run** — every `code` criterion must come back with

a matched predicate (`passed`/`failed`, never `unmatched`), and only guards

may be `passed`.

## Deep check (opt-in — one live probe session)

The fast path grades the seed as data. To see the seed **as the examinee will

see it** — through the real twin MCP/REST surface — mint a probe session. This

costs one session slot; offer it, don't default to it.

1. `run_task` on the task — it seeds live twin sandboxes and returns

`examinee_launch` (it does NOT launch anything).

2. Probe **read-only** (GET only) via `examinee_launch.rest_urls` or

`mcp_servers` URLs. The bearer is the session's `agent_token`, a live

credential — **put it in the environment once and reference it by name; do

not paste the value into a command, a message, or a file**:

```bash

export POME_AGENT_TOKEN='<the agent_token from run_task>' # once, this shell only

curl -sS -H "Authorization: Bearer $POME_AGENT_TOKEN" "<rest_urls[twin]>/<path>"

```

Confirm the seeded world from the outside: the PR is open, the channel has

the message, the file is on the branch. A 404 on a probe may be session

expiry — check `get_sandbox` before blaming the seed.

3. **Mutation hole**: if any probe mutated state (a POST slipped in, a tool had

side effects), the session no longer shows the seed — `stop_sandbox` (see

teardown below; it may take two calls) and re-mint before probing further.

The in-process dry-run is immune, but a dirtied probe session must never be

read as "the seed".

4. **Reset / teardown**: end every probe session with `stop_sandbox`. A probe

session has no evidence worth keeping — discarding it is the point. Never

`finalize_run` a probe session; that would score the untouched seed.

- Call `stop_sandbox`; if it succeeds outright, teardown is done. **If it is

- refused** (an open session holds an ungraded run, and the platform

- will not destroy one silently), the refusal carries a server-issued

- `discard_token` in its `error.details`. That is a one-shot confirmation

- nonce for this refusal, not a credential — it authenticates nothing and

- grants no access. Pass it straight back as `stop_sandbox`'s

- `confirm_discard` parameter. Today's

- control plane never refuses, so expect the one-call success — treat the

- refusal-then-confirm path as the case to handle once it goes live, not the

- default. The token cannot be guessed ahead of the refusal, which is what

- keeps the same guard meaningful for real runs.

+ Call `stop_sandbox` without confirmation. Copy the server-issued

+ `discard_token` from `error.details`. Pass it directly to a second

+ `stop_sandbox` call as `confirm_discard`. This confirmation is mandatory.

+ The token grants no access and is valid only for this discard.

## Report

End with: verdict **HEALTHY seed** / **BROKEN seed** (yours, not the tool's —

note when you overrode it and why), then a per-criterion table — text, kind,

at-seed status, classification (`guard` / `discriminator`), judgment — then the

state-diff findings, probe findings if a deep check ran, and the fix list

(seed edits vs criterion restatements) if anything is broken. The full checklist

with output-field semantics and probe recipes lives in

[`references/seed-fidelity-checklist.md`](references/seed-fidelity-checklist.md).