review-security v1.1.0B

Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/91c40132ef663902.

---
name: review-security
description: Perform an OWASP Top 10-focused static security review of a PR, commit, or
  entire codebase, grep for vulnerable patterns (injection, broken access control, crypto
  failures, hardcoded secrets), verify each match by reading it in context, and produce a
  severity-ranked report with file:line evidence and fix suggestions. Use to audit code
  security, scan for vulnerabilities, or check OWASP compliance, "security review", "scan
  for vulnerabilities", "check OWASP top 10", "audit for XSS/SQLi/hardcoded secrets", "is
  this PR safe to ship security-wise". Analysis only, never modifies code. Not for general
  code quality review (use review-code), or dependency CVE/license/staleness auditing
  (use review-deps).
metadata:
  summary: "OWASP Top 10 2025 security analysis with parallel scanning agents where available"
  author: mgiovani
  version: 1.1.0
disable-model-invocation: true
argument-hint: '[pr_number|commit_sha|--all] [--scope scope]'
context: fork
agent: general-purpose
---

# Security Review

Static security analysis targeting OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities and common language-specific
security patterns. This skill only analyzes: it identifies vulnerabilities, explains why each
one matters, and suggests fix approaches, all without touching the code.

OWASP renumbers and re-titles its Top 10 categories periodically. Before labeling any finding
with a category code (A01, A02, ...), do a quick web check against owasp.org/Top10/ to confirm
the codes below are still current; if they've shifted, use the current codes and note the
change in the report instead of silently reusing stale labels.

## Anti-hallucination guidelines

| Rule | Detail |
| --- | --- |
| Read before claiming | Never report a vulnerability in code that hasn't been read |
| Evidence-based findings | Every finding references a specific file path and line number |
| Pattern matching | Use Grep to find actual vulnerable patterns, not hypothetical ones |
| No invented CVEs | Only reference real vulnerabilities when providing context |
| Quantifiable results | Statistics come from counting actual matches, never estimates |
| No false positives | Verify each finding matches a documented vulnerability pattern |
| Scope verification | Only scan files within the specified scope (PR/commit/all) |

## Scan Workflow

### Phase 0: Determine Scan Scope

Parse arguments to determine what to scan:

- `<pr_number>`: scan only files changed in PR (e.g. "123", "#123")
- `<commit_sha>`: scan only files changed in commit (e.g. "abc123")
- `--all` or no args: scan entire codebase
- `--scope [web|api|mobile|backend|frontend]`: focus on specific vulnerability categories

If a PR or commit is specified, use Bash to get changed files:

```bash
# For PR
gh pr view <pr_number> --json files --jq '.files[].path'

# For commit
git diff-tree --no-commit-id --name-only -r <commit_sha>
```

### Phase 1: Project Technology Discovery

Use an Explore agent (`model: haiku`) to identify the stack: languages/frameworks from
package.json/pyproject.toml/pom.xml/go.mod, existing security tooling
(.pre-commit-config.yaml, SAST steps in .github/workflows), web framework, DB/ORM patterns,
auth patterns (JWT/OAuth/sessions), and any SECURITY.md. Return a stack summary with the
vulnerability categories to prioritize. No Task tool available? Skip the agent: read those
same files and grep those same paths yourself, inline, then note the stack directly.

### Phase 2: Initialize Progress Tracking

Use TodoWrite to track scan progress across all OWASP categories, bytecode security, and
report generation.

### Phase 3: Vulnerability Scanning

Each OWASP category is owned by a fixed agent number (grep patterns and full prompts for
each are in [references/agent-prompts.md](references/agent-prompts.md)):

| Agent | Owns |
|---|---|
| 1 | A01 Access Control, A07 Authentication |
| 2 | A02 Security Misconfiguration, A06 Insecure Design |
| 3 | A05 Injection, A08 Data Integrity |
| 4 | A04 Cryptographic Failures, A03 Supply Chain (SRI/lockfiles/CI trust settings only, see note below) |
| 5 | Bytecode & compiled-code security |
| 6 | A09 Logging/Monitoring, A10 Exception Handling |

**Scope → categories in scope** (the only place scope decides anything: edit this table,
nowhere else, if scope definitions change):

| `--scope` | Categories |
|---|---|
| `web` | A02, A05 |
| `api` | A01, A06, A07 |
| `mobile` | A04, A08 |
| `backend` | A05, A06, A08 |
| `frontend` | A02, A05, A08 |
| (none) / `--all` | all categories, all 6 agents |

Spawn every agent that owns at least one category from the scope's list (per the ownership
table above). Spawn all 6 for `--all` or no scope given.

Each agent must: grep for its patterns, read each match to verify context, extract the exact
code snippet (5-10 lines), explain why it's vulnerable, classify severity
(Critical/High/Medium/Low), and give 2-3 fix approaches.

No Task tool available? Work through each owned category inline and sequentially instead of
spawning its agent, same grep patterns from the reference file, same read-and-verify step,
one category at a time.

**A03 note**: dependency staleness and known-CVE scans (outdated package versions, `npm
audit`-style findings) are review-deps' job, not this skill's: don't duplicate them here.
Agent 4 only checks the supply-chain surface review-deps doesn't: missing SRI on CDN
`<script>` tags, absent lockfiles, and CI/CD steps that weaken package integrity (e.g.
`--trusted-host`, `strict-ssl false`). If dependency CVEs come up, point the user to
review-deps instead of reporting them here.

### Phase 4: Consolidate & Analyze Findings

After scanning completes:

1. Collect all findings from every agent/category pass.
2. Deduplicate: remove duplicate findings across categories.
3. Prioritize by severity, using this table:

   | Severity | Examples |
   | --- | --- |
   | Critical | RCE, SQLi, auth bypass, hardcoded secrets |
   | High | XSS, CSRF, broken access control, weak crypto |
   | Medium | Info disclosure, missing logging, insecure design |
   | Low | Minor security-adjacent code quality |

4. Categorize by OWASP category (confirm codes are current per the note at the top of this file before tagging).
5. Compute statistics: total vulnerabilities, counts by severity/category, files scanned vs. files with issues, all counted from actual findings, never estimated.

### Phase 5: Generate Security Report

Generate a markdown report following [references/report-template.md](references/report-template.md).

### Phase 6: Verification & Quality Check

Before presenting the report, verify that every finding has a file path + line numbers + an
actual code snippet (not a placeholder) + a clear explanation + 2-3 fix approaches. Then confirm
the report as a whole: statistics are counted rather than estimated; no duplicate findings;
severity ratings are justified; only files within the specified scope were scanned; no invented
vulnerabilities; any CWE/CVE references are accurate.

## Usage

```bash
review-security 123              # scan files changed in PR #123
review-security abc123def        # scan files changed in a commit
review-security --all            # scan entire codebase
review-security                  # same as --all
review-security --all --scope web
review-security 123 --scope api
```

If no scope is specified, scan comprehensively across all categories.

## Worked Example

Input: `review-security --all --scope api` on a Flask API.

Agent 1 (A01/A07) and Agent 2 (A02/A06) run, per the scope table above, `api` maps to
A01/A06/A07, both owned by those two agents. A finding might read:

```
#### Finding 1: Missing authorization check on account balance endpoint
- Severity: Critical
- File: `app/routes/accounts.py:42-47`
- Code:
  @app.route("/api/accounts/<account_id>/balance")
  def get_balance(account_id):
      account = Account.query.get(account_id)
      return jsonify(balance=account.balance)
- Explanation: any authenticated user can read any account's balance by
  guessing/enumerating account_id, no ownership check against the current session user.
- Fix approaches:
  1. Add `if account.owner_id != current_user.id: abort(403)` before the query returns.
  2. Scope the query itself: `Account.query.filter_by(id=account_id, owner_id=current_user.id).first_or_404()`.
```

Agent 3/4/5/6 don't run for this scope: their categories (A03-A05, A08-A10, bytecode)
aren't in the `api` scope's list.

## Additional Resources

- [references/agent-prompts.md](references/agent-prompts.md): grep patterns and full agent prompts per category
- [references/report-template.md](references/report-template.md): full markdown report template

## What This Skill Does NOT Do

- Does not modify code or auto-fix vulnerabilities, and never commits changes
- Does not run dynamic security testing (DAST) or penetration testing
- Does not audit dependency CVEs, versions, or licenses (use review-deps)
- Does not guarantee 100% detection: static, pattern-based analysis only

## OWASP References

- [OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
- [OWASP Testing Guide](https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/)
- [OWASP Code Review Guide](https://owasp.org/www-project-code-review-guide/)