vault-unseal · git:20260723.6e5370b · 2026-07-23 · sha256 4b06413baba0efb6
vault-unseal git:20260723.6e5370bA
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--- name: vault-unseal description: Plan or execute a scoped, time-bounded vault-unseal request through Runx Connect, returning only opaque handle metadata and provider readback. runx: category: security --- # Vault Unseal Prepare one least-privilege request to make an opaque secret reference available to one principal for one purpose, scope, and short access window. The default runner stops at a plan. `execute` sends that exact request through a configured vault Connect grant after approval and independently reads the resulting handle metadata. Neither runner retrieves or reveals secret material. Use it when a later workload needs a bounded secret handle and the request must pass a human approval and real vault adapter. Do not use it as a secret store, credential loader, environment-file parser, or way to put secret values into an agent context. ## How it works 1. Bind the opaque secret reference to the requesting principal, declared purpose, allowed scope, and requested time window. 2. Validate that the reference is opaque and the TTL is between one minute and one hour. 3. Reject raw secret-shaped input, ambiguous principals, broad purpose, or unbounded scope. 4. Emit an approval-ready request and exact provider handoff. 5. With `execute`, request approval for that exact plan, invoke `secret.unseal` under one idempotency key, then call `handle.read` for the returned opaque reference. Completion requires both provider operations. The local plan needs no approval because it exposes no secret and changes no provider state. The unseal operation is consequential and remains a separate gate. Credentials stay in Runx Connect; the package receives no token and owns no request client. ## Result and stop conditions A ready plan contains the bounded request, expiry, approval requirement, and provider handoff with `provider_status: not_called` and no secret value. A successful execution additionally carries native mutation and handle-readback packets. The provider result is required to expose only an opaque `handle_ref`, expiry, and status metadata; a raw secret is a provider contract violation. Missing or unsafe inputs return a useful stop packet rather than a guessed request. - Never accept or emit raw credentials, key material, tokens, or secret values. - Refuse TTL below one minute or above one hour. - Refuse wildcard principals, purposes, scopes, or an opaque ref that cannot be distinguished from secret material. - Refuse a missing, ambiguous, wrong-provider, or under-scoped Connect grant; never fall back to local environment parsing or a raw vault token. - Do not claim a handle was issued, mounted, used, or revoked without adapter evidence and independent handle readback. ## Example A deployment runner needs database credentials for fifteen minutes. The skill can prepare a request binding `vault://prod/db/deployer` to that runner, the single deployment purpose, and the exact environment scope. `execute` may then issue an opaque handle after approval and confirm its metadata. It cannot reveal the password or treat a provider acknowledgement without `handle.read` as complete.