ca-review · git:20261016.a9f63fc · 2026-10-16 · sha256 97de1d35ef09be2b
ca-review git:20261016.a9f63fcA
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---
name: ca-review
description: Review a diff with the reviewer fleet, funneled to one triaged verdict. Targets the current working diff, a path, or an inbound GitHub PR.
argument-hint: "[path | #<pr> | <pr-url>] (defaults to the current diff)"
---
# $ca-review — diff review
Read-only review of a change. Routes to `dispatching-parallel-agents` ([routines/dispatching-parallel-agents/SKILL.md](../../routines/dispatching-parallel-agents/SKILL.md)): dispatches the reviewer fleet by path matrix, dedupes, then funnels through `finding-triage` → `verdict-aggregator` to a single in-memory verdict. No code is modified.
`$ca-review #123` reviews an inbound pull request through the same fleet and triage as a local diff.
## Flow
1. Resolve scope from `$ARGUMENTS`:
- **empty** → the current working diff (unchanged default).
- **a path** → that path (unchanged).
- **`#<number>`, a bare number, or a GitHub PR URL** → an INBOUND PR. Fetch its diff with
`gh pr diff <number>` and review that. If `gh` is missing or unauthenticated, STOP and say so —
do NOT silently fall back to the working diff, which would report a verdict on the wrong change
under the PR's name.
For a PR target, resolve the diff ONCE and review that text. Do not re-fetch per reviewer: the
fleet runs in parallel, and a PR updated mid-review would otherwise have different reviewers
reading different code and a triage that reconciles findings from two versions.
2. Before any substantive verdict, deliver task context to each actual reviewer.
Use the changed paths from the resolved diff to select the current bounded
packet with `_contextselectlib.select_task_context`; preserve the owning
host's effective root/nested instruction order and the original source
owner, scope/cwd, authority, and evidence epoch for each record. Identify
task-critical source refs from the review obligation. Pass the packet and
those refs to `_contextselectlib.prepare_review_input` for each reviewer,
then include its `reviewer_input` in that reviewer's actual input. The
returned `ready` state checks required inputs; it does not attest host delivery.
For each actual reviewer, call `_contextselectlib.prepare_actor_delivery`
with that selected packet, reviewer/task, absolute worktree and current
source/host epochs. Send its bounded `delivery_text` with the review input
on `deliver` and retain the counted attempt. On `advisory`, record the unknown
delivery observation and continue the review without further delivery retries.
Re-select after resume, compaction, scope or worktree change.
Preserve applicable native instruction precedence. Source-scoped records,
imported instruction text, map prose, and accepted ADR labels do not gain
local normative authority by being copied into the packet.
Bounded read-only source orientation and prerequisite inspection may happen
before this preflight, including inspecting missing context. If a critical
ref is missing or an applicable constraint conflicts, stop the substantive
verdict and report the gap; do not block the bounded read-only inspection
needed to resolve it. A stale or incomplete optional map, or a legacy
provenance warning, remains visible and advisory unless it hides a named
critical source. Review must not write context/native artifacts or any
tracked or preexisting untracked file. Inventory only exact allowed
transient host state, if the host creates any.
3. Build the unit list by path matrix; each matched reviewer is one read-only unit:
| Reviewer | Dispatched when scope touches |
|---|---|
| `security-reviewer` | auth, middleware, secrets, deploy/CI, any security-sensitive path |
| `auth-crypto-reviewer` | authn, crypto, key handling, secrets |
| `dependency-reviewer` | `package.json`, lockfiles, base images, dependency manifests |
| `migration-reviewer` | DB migration file add/modify |
| `coverage-auditor` | any source change (test coverage vs. obligations) |
| `architecture-drift-reviewer` | code that may diverge from accepted ADRs in `.codearbiter/decisions/` |
4. Route to `dispatching-parallel-agents` with that unit list (read-only batch — no collision check).
It dedupes overlapping findings, then funnels through `finding-triage` (severity + inline
`[NEEDS-TRIAGE]` on out-of-scope items) → `verdict-aggregator` (single read-only verdict).
5. Surface the aggregated verdict: findings by severity, file:line, remediation, and the applicable
control from `<project-root>/.codearbiter/security-controls.md` for security findings.
6. **For a PR target, posting the verdict is a separate, confirmed step.** Report locally first; post only on explicit instruction, with `gh pr review <number> --comment --body-file <file>`. A review comment on someone else's PR is outward-facing and effectively public the moment it lands — it notifies subscribers and cannot be un-sent. Never `--request-changes` or `--approve` from here: those carry merge authority, and this command produces a finding list, not a maintainer's decision.
## Severity
- **CRITICAL** — exploitable vuln, secret exposure, banned primitive, data-integrity breach.
- **HIGH** — significant compliance gap or unsafe pattern.
- **MEDIUM** — standards deviation or coverage gap.
- **LOW** — informational or style.
## Hard gate
Read-only — MUST NOT modify a file, and MUST NOT check out, merge, or otherwise move the repository to the PR's branch: reviewing an inbound PR means reading its DIFF, not adopting its code, and a checkout would run its content through hooks that trust the working tree. BLOCK on any CRITICAL or HIGH finding on your OWN change: it must be resolved before `$ca-pr`. On an inbound PR there is nothing local to block — the verdict is the deliverable. MUST NOT consume raw reviewer output — only the `finding-triage` → `verdict-aggregator` verdict. MUST NOT resolve a `[CONFIRM-NN]` surfaced during review by guessing.
## When NOT to use
- Opening a PR (reviews dispatch automatically) → `$ca-pr`.
- A periodic full-codebase sweep → `$ca-checkpoint`.
- A pre-implementation threat model → `$ca-threat-model`.
- A question about the code → `$ca-btw`.