findings-lifecycle · diff
git:20260929.29bbcb8 to git:20261002.de4d363
21 added, 0 removed. Audit A to A.
What this update changes in the checks
No check changed: every fixed check gives the same answer before and after this update.
A tripped check is a label, not a verdict: read the matched text and the lines below. This week's updates that newly trip a check.
---
name: findings-lifecycle
description: Finding lifecycle management — Track security findings through states: candidate → observed → verified → reportable (or rejected/stale). Use when managing findings, deciding if something is a real vulnerability, or organizing results from security testing.
---
# FINDING LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT
**Not every idea is a finding. Track the evidence, not the excitement.**
---
## 1. FINDING STATES
```
┌──────────────┐
│ CANDIDATE │ Suspicion, not yet proven
│ (weak sig) │
└──────┬───────┘
│
┌────────────┼────────────┐
│ │ │
▼ │ ▼
┌──────────────┐ │ ┌──────────────┐
│ OBSERVED │ │ │ REJECTED │ Ruled out
│ (evidence) │ │ │ (closed) │
└──────┬───────┘ │ └──────────────┘
│ │
▼ │
┌──────────────┐ │
│ VERIFIED │ │
│ (proof) │ │
└──────┬───────┘ │
│ │
┌────┴────┐ │
│ │ │
▼ ▼ │
┌───────────┐ ┌──────────┐ │
│REPORTABLE │ │ STALE │ │
│ (proof + │ │ (no long │ │
│ replay) │ │ trust) │ │
└───────────┘ └──────────┘ │
```
---
## 2. STATE DEFINITIONS
### Candidate
- **What:** A suspicion or weak signal. Something "feels" off but isn't proven.
- **Evidence:** None or minimal. Maybe a suspicious response, an unusual behavior.
- **Action:** Investigate further. Gather evidence. Don't report yet.
- **Example:** "This endpoint returns 200 without auth, but I'm not sure if it's public by design."
### Observed
- **What:** An evidence-backed signal. You have proof something exists.
- **Evidence:** HTTP requests, responses, screenshots, tool output.
- **Action:** Verify exploitation. Build proof. Check for false positive.
- **Example:** "IDOR confirmed — accessing /api/users/123 with attacker token returns victim's email."
### Verified
- **What:** Promoted with proof semantics. The vulnerability is real and exploitable.
- **Evidence:** Full PoC, reproduction steps, impact demonstrated.
- **Action:** Write the report at the severity you demonstrated. Assign severity.
- **Example:** "IDOR confirmed — /api/users/123 with a second user's token returns that user's email. Read-only; no write path tested."
**Verified is where the review of a finding stops.** Do not keep escalating a
proven finding to raise its severity — see the impact-sufficiency rule in the
`bugbounty` skill. If a chain seems relevant, record it as an analyst note.
### Reportable
- **What:** Ready for submission. Has evidence + replay/exemption.
- **Evidence:** Complete PoC, reproduction steps, impact, severity, remediation.
- **Action:** Submit to the program or hand to the client.
- **Example:** Report written with severity, CVSS, and fix recommendation.
### Rejected
- **What:** Ruled out. Investigation showed this is not a vulnerability.
- **Evidence:** May have evidence showing it's a false positive.
- **Action:** Document why it was rejected. Don't delete — it prevents re-investigation.
- **Example:** "CORS reflects origin but Access-Control-Allow-Credentials is false → no impact."
### Stale
- **What:** Was once trusted but no longer. Target changed, fix applied, or context changed.
- **Evidence:** Historical evidence may exist but is no longer valid.
- **Action:** Re-investigate if the context changes.
- **Example:** "Found XSS in search page, but target deployed WAF that now blocks the payload."
+ ### Damage — the state you hope never to use
+
+ - **What:** The assessment itself caused harm. A test artifact was not
+ restored, a production object was modified or deleted, or an action
+ had an unintended side effect.
+ - **Evidence:** The before/after state, the restoration attempt and its
+ result, and whether the damage is recoverable.
+ - **Action:** Report it. Immediately. Do not hide it, do not let it
+ age into a stale finding, and do not let another finding's severity
+ distract from it. The owner needs to know what happened and whether
+ they need to restore from backup.
+ - **Example:** "During write-access testing, sub-category 1 was deleted.
+ The create endpoint for sub-categories was not available, so it could
+ not be recreated. Category 3 was recreated as id 15. Banner 1 is
+ unrecoverable — no create-banner endpoint exists."
+
+ **A damage finding is reported alongside, not instead of, the vulnerability
+ that enabled it.** Both go in the report. The damage does not invalidate
+ the finding — it is evidence of its severity — but it must be stated
+ plainly and without softening.
+
---
## 3. FINDING TEMPLATE
For every finding, track:
```markdown
## FINDING: [Vuln Type] in [Endpoint]
**ID:** FND-001
**State:** candidate | observed | verified | reportable | rejected | stale
**Severity:** Critical | High | Medium | Low | Info
**CVSS:** 8.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N)
### Description
[What is the vulnerability?]
### Evidence
- EVD-001: [HTTP request/response showing the issue]
- EVD-002: [Screenshot or tool output]
### Reproduction Steps
1. Send [specific request]
2. Observe [specific response]
3. [Verify impact]
### Impact
- What can an attacker do? [Specific impact]
- How many users affected? [Scope]
- Business impact? [Data loss, financial, reputation]
### False Positive Check
- [ ] Does it return real data? (not mock/empty)
- [ ] Is it reproducible?
- [ ] **Is it intended behavior?** (was this resource meant to be reachable
by this actor? public content shown to a logged-in user is the feature
working, not a vulnerability)
- [ ] Is there a known fix?
### Compound Risk (analyst note, not a test)
- Might this compound with another finding? [Note only — do not execute]
- Reported as context for the owner to prioritize, not as demonstrated impact
### Remediation
[How to fix this vulnerability]
### References
- CVE: [if applicable]
- OWASP: [WSTG section]
- CVSS Calculator: [link]
```
---
## 4. STATE TRANSITIONS
### Promoting a Finding
```
CANDIDATE → OBSERVED:
✓ You have HTTP request/response as evidence
✓ The finding is reproducible
✓ You can show the specific issue
OBSERVED → VERIFIED:
✓ You have a full PoC
✓ Impact is demonstrated
✓ False positive checks passed
✓ You can show exploit steps
VERIFIED → REPORTABLE:
✓ Report is written
✓ Severity is assigned
✓ Remediation is provided
✓ All evidence is attached
```
### Rejecting a Finding
```
CANDIDATE → REJECTED:
- False positive confirmed
- Intended behavior
- No impact
- Cannot reproduce
OBSERVED → REJECTED:
- Evidence doesn't support the claim
- Target deployed fix
- Context changed
```
### Staling a Finding
```
OBSERVED/VERIFIED → STALE:
- Target applied fix (verify with retest)
- Technology changed
- Scope changed
- Evidence is no longer valid
```
---
## 5. FINDING TRACKER
Maintain a tracker across your operation:
```markdown
## Finding Tracker — example.com assessment
| ID | Type | Endpoint | State | Severity | Note |
|----|------|----------|-------|----------|------|
| FND-001 | IDOR | /api/users/{id} | Verified | High | read-only, not escalated |
| FND-002 | SQLi | /search | Observed | Critical | |
| FND-003 | XSS | /comments | Candidate | Medium | |
| FND-004 | Open Redirect | /redirect | Rejected | - | warning interstitial = designed behavior |
| FND-005 | CORS | /api | Stale | - | |
### Coverage Notes
- Not tested: admin panel (out of scope, no test account)
- Rejected with evidence: FND-004 (interstitial is the intended control)
```
Severity here is the **demonstrated** severity. Do not raise a row's severity
to reflect a chain you did not execute.
---
## 6. FALSE POSITIVE RULES
### Always Reject If:
```
- Endpoint returns empty/null data (not real user data)
- Behavior is documented as intended
- No sensitive data is exposed
- Impact cannot be demonstrated
- Finding is "missing header" without exploitation chain
- Finding is "version disclosure" without known CVE
- Finding is "self-XSS" (only you can trigger it)
- Finding is "clickjacking on non-sensitive page"
- Finding is "CORS reflects origin" without credentials
- Finding is "GraphQL introspection works" without data access
```
### Always Verify If:
```
- You can show different user's data (IDOR)
- You can execute code (RCE)
- You can access internal services (SSRF)
- You can bypass authentication (auth bypass)
- You can modify other users' data (mass assignment)
- You can escalate privileges (privilege escalation)
```
---
## 7. QUICK COMMANDS
```bash
# List current findings
/findings list
# Inspect a specific finding
/findings inspect FND-001
# Promote a candidate to verified
/promote FND-001 --evidence EVD-001 --replay REPLAY-001
# Reject a finding
/reject FND-004 --reason "intended behavior, documented in API docs"
# Generate report from findings
/report build
```