hunt-cors · diff
git:20260929.29bbcb8 to git:20261002.de4d363
38 added, 0 removed. Audit A to A.
What this update changes in the checks
No check changed: every fixed check gives the same answer before and after this update.
A tripped check is a label, not a verdict: read the matched text and the lines below. This week's updates that newly trip a check.
---
name: hunt-cors
description: CORS — origin reflection, null origin, preflight abuse, wildcard detection. Establishes whether credentialed cross-origin reads are actually possible.
---
# CORS ASSESSMENT
**Core:** the only question that matters is whether a hostile origin can read
an authenticated response. A reflected `Origin` without `Access-Control-
Allow-Credentials: true` is not exploitable and must not be reported.
## DETECTION
```bash
curl -s -I -H "Origin: https://evil.com" "https://target.com/api/userinfo" | grep -i "access-control"
# ACAO reflects evil.com AND ACAC: true → credentialed read is possible
curl -s -I -H "Origin: null" "https://target.com/api/userinfo" | grep -i "access-control"
# Also check the OPTIONS preflight response, which is what the browser enforces
curl -s -X OPTIONS -H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
-H "Access-Control-Request-Method: POST" \
-H "Access-Control-Request-Headers: authorization" \
"https://target.com/api/userinfo" -D- -o /dev/null
```
## WHAT ACTUALLY MATTERS
```
Origin reflected + ACAC: true + sensitive response → exploitable
Origin reflected + ACAC absent/false → NOT exploitable
ACAO: * (no credentials) → NOT exploitable on authed data
Null origin + ACAC: true → exploitable from a sandboxed iframe
Trusted subdomain list + wildcard → check which hosts are actually trusted
HTTP endpoint missing origin check → may bypass an HTTPS-only policy
```
## PROOF (minimum sufficient)
To confirm the read, show the response body actually crosses origins under
`withCredentials` — a PoC page plus the returned payload. **Do not then use
the stolen data to act** (no account takeover, no state change). A single
demonstrated cross-origin read is the complete finding.
## REPORTING NOTES
- Report the credentialed read and the data it exposes. That is the severity.
- Where it *could* compound with XSS on a trusted subdomain, note it as a
compound-risk line; do not go find the XSS to justify a higher severity.
- `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on public, non-credentialed endpoints is
correct behavior — reject it (Gate 6).
+ ---
+
+ ## THE COMPOUND RISK — CORS `*` + UNAUTHENTICATED API
+
+ `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on its own is *not* a finding when the
+ endpoint serves no credentialed data. But it becomes critical when paired
+ with another weakness, and this pairing is more common than it should be.
+
+ **The pattern:**
+ ```
+ API accepts writes without authentication
+ AND returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
+ → any website on the internet can make authenticated admin calls
+ ```
+
+ This is not a theoretical chain. On a live target, an unauthenticated
+ `POST /api/admin/products` that returns `ACAO: *` means a malicious
+ website can create, modify, or delete products in every visitor's browser
+ session — with the victim's IP, from the victim's network, with no
+ credential needed. The CORS header turns a server-side auth failure into
+ a client-side exploit that any site can trigger.
+
+ **Test for it specifically:**
+ ```bash
+ # After finding an unauthenticated write endpoint, check the CORS header
+ curl -s -I -H "Origin: https://attacker.com" \
+ "https://target.com/api/admin/products" | grep -i "access-control"
+ ```
+
+ **If ACAO is `*` (or reflects the origin) on an unauthenticated write
+ endpoint, report it as a compound finding.** The base finding is the
+ missing auth; the compound risk is that the missing auth is reachable
+ from any origin. This is the difference between a Critical that one team
+ fixes and a Critical that gets a security advisory.
+
+ **Do not build the exploit page.** Report the header combination and the
+ endpoint. The owner can reproduce it in one curl command.
+