hunt-cors · git:20261002.de4d363 · 2026-10-02 · sha256 2632c94a56dcb1e3
hunt-cors git:20261002.de4d363A
Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/2632c94a56dcb1e3.
No tool to install first
claude plugin marketplace add https://markdownregistry.com/mp/a/art_vaurjads7tmnpc2y/2632c94a56dcb1e3a4ea5a83dff95bd04bc95ca4e49771623c89c0a9410c5db4.json
Then /plugin install hunt-cors@markdownregistry-vaurjads7tmnpc2y in Claude Code. It installs this exact version, the one graded A here, pinned to the commit it was graded at, and leaves it there.
--- name: hunt-cors description: CORS — origin reflection, null origin, preflight abuse, wildcard detection. Establishes whether credentialed cross-origin reads are actually possible. --- # CORS ASSESSMENT **Core:** the only question that matters is whether a hostile origin can read an authenticated response. A reflected `Origin` without `Access-Control- Allow-Credentials: true` is not exploitable and must not be reported. ## DETECTION ```bash curl -s -I -H "Origin: https://evil.com" "https://target.com/api/userinfo" | grep -i "access-control" # ACAO reflects evil.com AND ACAC: true → credentialed read is possible curl -s -I -H "Origin: null" "https://target.com/api/userinfo" | grep -i "access-control" # Also check the OPTIONS preflight response, which is what the browser enforces curl -s -X OPTIONS -H "Origin: https://evil.com" \ -H "Access-Control-Request-Method: POST" \ -H "Access-Control-Request-Headers: authorization" \ "https://target.com/api/userinfo" -D- -o /dev/null ``` ## WHAT ACTUALLY MATTERS ``` Origin reflected + ACAC: true + sensitive response → exploitable Origin reflected + ACAC absent/false → NOT exploitable ACAO: * (no credentials) → NOT exploitable on authed data Null origin + ACAC: true → exploitable from a sandboxed iframe Trusted subdomain list + wildcard → check which hosts are actually trusted HTTP endpoint missing origin check → may bypass an HTTPS-only policy ``` ## PROOF (minimum sufficient) To confirm the read, show the response body actually crosses origins under `withCredentials` — a PoC page plus the returned payload. **Do not then use the stolen data to act** (no account takeover, no state change). A single demonstrated cross-origin read is the complete finding. ## REPORTING NOTES - Report the credentialed read and the data it exposes. That is the severity. - Where it *could* compound with XSS on a trusted subdomain, note it as a compound-risk line; do not go find the XSS to justify a higher severity. - `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on public, non-credentialed endpoints is correct behavior — reject it (Gate 6). --- ## THE COMPOUND RISK — CORS `*` + UNAUTHENTICATED API `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on its own is *not* a finding when the endpoint serves no credentialed data. But it becomes critical when paired with another weakness, and this pairing is more common than it should be. **The pattern:** ``` API accepts writes without authentication AND returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * → any website on the internet can make authenticated admin calls ``` This is not a theoretical chain. On a live target, an unauthenticated `POST /api/admin/products` that returns `ACAO: *` means a malicious website can create, modify, or delete products in every visitor's browser session — with the victim's IP, from the victim's network, with no credential needed. The CORS header turns a server-side auth failure into a client-side exploit that any site can trigger. **Test for it specifically:** ```bash # After finding an unauthenticated write endpoint, check the CORS header curl -s -I -H "Origin: https://attacker.com" \ "https://target.com/api/admin/products" | grep -i "access-control" ``` **If ACAO is `*` (or reflects the origin) on an unauthenticated write endpoint, report it as a compound finding.** The base finding is the missing auth; the compound risk is that the missing auth is reachable from any origin. This is the difference between a Critical that one team fixes and a Critical that gets a security advisory. **Do not build the exploit page.** Report the header combination and the endpoint. The owner can reproduce it in one curl command.