chain-reasoning · git:20261103.b72aef9 · 2026-11-03 · sha256 baf1379608b973b9
chain-reasoning git:20261103.b72aef9A
Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/baf1379608b973b9.
No tool to install first
claude plugin marketplace add https://markdownregistry.com/mp/a/art_wi2mxaykbxue3wil/baf1379608b973b90b3d612c28cdb6a9cd69bc3c4efe2a685e7ed1fc9567d9a9.json
Then /plugin install chain-reasoning@markdownregistry-wi2mxaykbxue3wil in Claude Code. It installs this exact version, the one graded A here, pinned to the commit it was graded at, and leaves it there.
--- name: chain-reasoning description: Build and validate compatible vulnerability chains, prioritize newly reachable boundaries, and distinguish demonstrated impact from hypothetical escalation. --- # Evidence-backed chain reasoning A primitive is a capability under specific conditions. It is not a severity label. Connect demonstrated capabilities to protected operations through an explicit graph, using `investigation-control` for clue continuity and `real-world-validation` for controls and proof. Continue already-authorized investigation without repeated permission requests; a new host or capability does not expand scope. Confirm the next action is permitted before executing it. ## Represent each edge ```text Edge ID / source clue or finding: Actor, tenant, session, origin, version/configuration: Capability observed, constraints and exact evidence: Output obtained -> prerequisite required by next edge: Next protected operation and expected security boundary: Controlled fixture / baseline / negative control: Next discriminating experiment / budget / stop condition: State: proposed | reachable | tested-supported | refuted | blocked ``` Require compatible prerequisites across all edges. Check principal continuity, cookie/token scope, read versus write authority, user interaction, lifetime, origin, network reachability and configuration. A leak from an admin-only debug page is not an unauthenticated entry point. Public DNS does not prove access to an internal service. A credential-looking string does not prove a valid secret. ## Choose follow-up by what the primitive actually permits | Primitive | Useful follow-up within existing authorization | Insufficient evidence | |---|---|---| | Error/config disclosure | Confirm a reachable feature/version or owned private configuration boundary | Automatically assigning Low/Medium severity or assuming an internal service is accessible | | Object read | Compare another owned tenant's private canary and relevant export/download path | Guessable IDs, public fields or same-owner objects | | Object/field write | Verify a documented forbidden change on a disposable owned fixture, then read persisted state | Changing an ordinary writable `display_name` and calling it mass assignment | | File upload/storage | Trace who retrieves the object, how it is interpreted and whether access control holds | Upload accepted, renamed extension, or inert payload stored | | SSRF-like callback | Distinguish DNS, HTTP fetch and an actual authorized protected-resource consequence | Treating a callback alone as internal read or credential access | | Credential exposure | Check source, environment, audience and narrowly permitted capability with owned data | Inferring broad account takeover from the string or enumerating unrelated records | | Workflow/race | Identify invariant, run a sequential control and verify the settled controlled result | Several success responses, transient duplicate UI, or a production financial loss | | Agent instruction following | Correlate actual tool call, principal and resulting controlled state | A model saying it performed an action | ## Demonstrate the requested consequence Once an edge is proven, stop redundant proof. Reprioritize independent coverage or test another necessary edge if it is in scope and needed to establish the requested consequence. Use reversible fixtures, small canaries and bounded concurrency. A new permission requirement or excluded action blocks that edge; preserve the hypothesis and continue permitted work. Do not truncate a legitimate authorized chain merely because its first edge was interesting. Do not deepen a chain solely to inflate severity. Decide from the engagement objective, satisfied prerequisites, safety limits and sufficient proof. ## Report the graph honestly Separate: - Demonstrated path: tested entry point, compatible actor context, verified edges and observed end effect, each linked to captured evidence. - Conditional path: untested edges, missing prerequisites and what would establish or refute them. Exclude hypothetical effects from the demonstrated severity. - Remediation: the earliest enforceable trust boundary and any independent controls that must also be corrected. Deduplicate shared causes without hiding separately exploitable boundaries. Report exact affected fixtures and tested breadth. One instance does not prove all tenants, routes or records are affected. A failed higher-impact edge does not invalidate an independently proven lower-impact finding.