AGENTS.md@crates/nac-core/src/permissions · git:20261013.588dd42 · 2026-10-13 · sha256 fa069f50000f6b89
AGENTS.md@crates/nac-core/src/permissions git:20261013.588dd42A
Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/fa069f50000f6b89.
# Permission and execution-policy guide This directory owns the model-visible authorization decision for prepared tool operations. It evaluates ordered rules, classifies shell authority, projects and binds resources, enforces hard denials, brokers interactive approval, and scopes persisted grants. Runtime confinement and backend selection remain separate owners. ## Invariants and dependencies - Rule evaluation is ordered and deterministic. Hard policy cannot be overridden by approval or remembered grants. - Canonical resource binding must match the operation that eventually executes; reject resources that cannot be independently projected or revalidated. - Agent execution fails closed when approval is required without an approver. Authenticated human-initiated product operations never enter that agent approval lifecycle: private service-issued intent skips Ask only after hard and configured Deny. It creates no grants and does not read/change answer mode. Broker evaluation retains canonical targets and the selected backend. - Remembered grants are scoped to the exact supported resource/operation class. Broad/opaque shell authority and nonempty terminal input remain invocation- only where the current policy requires it. - Shell wrappers, redirections, mutable project launchers, interpreters, and opaque command forms must retain their conservative classification. - Approval authorizes a prepared invocation on the already-selected backend. It never changes Local/SSH/Podman selection and never claims to be a sandbox. - Explicit PTY controller transfer is private service-issued human intent, with deterministic control Deny and additional input Deny when granting human input. It grants no model approval bypass. Process-incarnation/controller revision fences must survive approval waits and actual queued writer admission. - Persistence of grants belongs to the store adapter; evaluation depends on a narrow grant interface rather than transport or UI types. ## Starting points - `mod.rs` — public permission contracts and composition. - `evaluation.rs` — ordered rule decision. - `hard_policy.rs` / `opaque_policy.rs` — non-overridable and broad authority. - `shell_parser.rs` / `command_classification.rs` — token/command semantics. - `resource_projection.rs` / `resource_binding.rs` — prepared resource identity before and after approval. - `broker.rs` — interactive request/reply lifecycle. - `../store/permission_grants.rs` — durable remembered-grant adapter. - `permissions_tests.rs` — sibling characterization suite. ## Verification ```sh cargo test --locked -p nac-core permissions cargo test --locked -p nac-core tools::kernel make crate-check CRATE=nac-core ``` Add regressions for every new command/resource form, especially denial-before- execution and approval/revalidation races. ## Generated artifacts and placement mistakes Permission rules and projected resources are runtime contracts; this directory owns no generated files. Persisted rule/grant compatibility is enforced by Rust types, store migrations, and tests. - Do not embed process execution, sandbox construction, HTTP approval DTOs, or frontend presentation in policy modules. - Do not treat tool registration or visibility as an authorization grant. - Do not persist a broad grant because a narrower argument happened to appear in one invocation. - Do not weaken classification to make an unsupported shell syntax convenient; either bind it safely or fail closed.