credential-attack · diff
git:20260923.82a4143 to git:20260929.29bbcb8
15 added, 11 removed. Audit A to A.
What this update changes in the checks
No check changed: every fixed check gives the same answer before and after this update.
A tripped check is a label, not a verdict: read the matched text and the lines below. This week's updates that newly trip a check.
---
name: credential-attack
description: Password spray methodology for bug bounty — when to do it vs web-vuln hunting, the wordlist-gen + breach-check + osint-employees + spray pipeline, mode selection (http-form / oauth / o365 / okta), rate-limit + lockout tactics, legal guardrails, success detection, and the spray → authenticated /hunt chain pattern.
---
# CREDENTIAL ATTACK PIPELINE
Real-world initial-access vector. Verizon DBIR consistently ranks Stolen Credentials in the top 3 incident types. Most BB hunters skip this because they only try `rockyou.txt` and get rate-limited.
**Core principle:** humans pick lazy passwords. `{CompanyName}{Year}!`, `{ProductName}{Season}`, `{City}123`. Harvesting company-specific vocabulary before spraying is what makes the hit-rate go from 0.01% to 1%+.
---
## WHEN TO RUN CREDENTIAL ATTACK
Credential attack is a **parallel branch** to `/hunt`, not a replacement:
```
/recon ──┬──▶ /hunt (web vuln scan) ──┐
│ ├──▶ /validate ──▶ /report
└──▶ /wordlist-gen → ... → /spray ──┘
```
**Run it when:**
- Target has a discoverable login endpoint (web form / O365 / Okta / OAuth)
- Program scope **explicitly permits** authentication testing or credential testing
- You can stomach a 30-min-to-multi-hour run (with conservative defaults)
**Skip it when:**
- Program policy lists "credential stuffing", "brute force", or "password attacks" as out-of-scope
- Target only has SSO via a provider you don't control
- Login endpoint is rate-limited so aggressively that even 1 attempt/30min triggers alerts
**KILL signals (don't even start):**
- No login surface in recon output
- WAF (Cloudflare with Bot Management, Akamai) on every auth endpoint
- Program runs an active red-team — they'll see your spray immediately
- You don't have a clean wordlist yet (running rockyou.txt is a waste of lockouts)
---
## THE 4-STAGE PIPELINE
```
/wordlist-gen ──▶ /breach-check ──▶ /osint-employees ──▶ /spray
(company words) (rank by HIBP) (real usernames) (live attempts)
```
### Stage 1 — Wordlist Generation
Crawls the target website with `cewler`, deduplicates, applies hashcat rules to mutate.
**Mode selection:**
| Mode | Rules | When |
|------|-------|------|
| `minimal` | top10_2025 (10 rules) | Cautious spray, paranoid program |
| `balanced` *(default)* | best66 (66 rules) | Standard — best signal/noise |
| `aggressive` | OneRuleToRuleThemAll (52k) | **Offline cracking only**, NOT spray |
**Filter selection:**
| Filter | When |
|--------|------|
| `strict` *(default)* | API-doc-heavy sites. Drops CSS hex colors, URL slugs, random API tokens |
| `loose` | Marketing sites without API examples |
### Stage 2 — Breach Check
Sends only first 5 chars of SHA-1 to HIBP (k-anonymity). **Free, no API key, full passwords never leave your machine.**
**Breach-count interpretation:**
| Range | Meaning | Spray strategy |
|-------|---------|----------------|
| **0** | Never leaked | Could be company-specific OR truly random |
| **1-1000** | "Sweet spot" — proven human use, not yet in every spray list | **Prioritize** |
| **1k-1M** | Mainstream | Usually already tried by previous attackers |
| **>1M** | Generic (`password`, `123456`) | Skip — every WAF expects these |
### Stage 3 — OSINT Employee Enumeration
`theHarvester` (search engines + CT logs) → derive names from email local-parts → `username-anarchy` permutations.
**Realistic expectations:**
| Target type | Expected emails | Expected names |
|-------------|----------------|----------------|
| US/EU SaaS | 5-50 | depends |
| State utility | **0** | 0 |
| Local SME | 0-10 | 0-5 |
### Stage 4 — The Spray
**Mode selection:**
| Mode | Use case | Engine |
|------|----------|--------|
| `http-form` | Custom login page (most BB targets) | Pure Python urllib |
| `oauth` | OAuth password grant (`grant_type=password`) | Pure Python urllib |
| `o365` | Microsoft 365 / Azure AD | `trevorspray` |
| `okta` | Okta SSO | `trevorspray` |
**Hard guards (no override possible without `--i-understand`):**
1. **Typed-hostname confirmation** — you must type the target hostname back
2. **Lockout warning** — calculates per-user failed-attempt count
3. **Audit log JSONL** — every attempt logged (passwords as SHA-256 prefix only)
4. **Spray order** — `pass[i] × all_users` per round (not brute per-user)
---
## SPRAY ORDER — WHY IT MATTERS
```
WRONG (brute-force order, will lockout):
alice: pass1, pass2, pass3, ... ← alice gets 8 failed attempts in seconds
bob: pass1, pass2, pass3, ...
RIGHT (spray order, distributes failures):
Round 1: pass1 → alice, bob, charlie (1 failed each)
[delay 30 min]
Round 2: pass2 → alice, bob, charlie (2 failed total each)
```
Default rate-limit: `--delay 1800 --jitter 60` (30 min/round + ±60s).
---
## SUCCESS DETECTION
### http-form mode (checked in order):
1. `--success-regex <body-regex>` matches → success
2. `--fail-regex` set AND body does NOT match → success
3. HTTP redirect to non-login path → success (heuristic)
4. **Always supply `--fail-regex "Invalid|incorrect|wrong"` for production sprays**
### oauth mode:
- HTTP 200 with `"access_token"` in JSON → success
- HTTP 4xx → fail (unambiguous)
---
- ## CHAIN PATTERN: SPRAY → AUTHENTICATED /HUNT
+ ## REPORTING CREDENTIAL TESTING
+ Report what you proved, at the severity it supports:
+
```
- /spray finds valid creds (low-payout finding by itself)
- ↓
- Re-run /hunt with the session cookie or bearer token
- ↓
- Authenticated /hunt sees admin pages, internal APIs, IDOR on user data
- ↓
- Find a P1/P2 IDOR or business-logic bug behind the login wall
- ↓
- Chain report: "ATO via spray + IDOR exposes all user PII" (high payout)
+ Rate limit absent on login → Low/Medium, on its own merits
+ A known-credential pattern accepted → Medium, note the weak-credential issue
+ A single test account you own works → Info, or not reportable
```
- The spray-only finding alone is **usually rejected** by mature BBPs. The chain is what pays.
+ If the program requires demonstrating account impact, ask the user before
+ going further. Do **not** use recovered credentials to browse other users'
+ data, and do not attempt privilege escalation with them — that crosses from
+ "credential testing" into unauthorized access, and it is the single easiest
+ way to turn an authorized engagement into an incident.
+
+ Where authenticated testing would clearly change the answer, say so as a
+ recommendation ("with a test account for role X we could confirm whether
+ this reaches admin data") and let the user or program grant it.
---
## LEGAL GUARDRAILS
Before running `/spray` against ANY target, verify:
1. **Program policy explicitly allows credential testing**
2. **The wordlist does not contain plaintext breach data** (HIBP hash-prefix is fine; plaintext breach corpus is not)
3. **Stop on first hit by default**
4. **Report the lockout impact** with timestamps from the audit log
---
## OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST
Before pressing enter on `/spray`:
- [ ] `/scope <login-host>` returns IN SCOPE
- [ ] Program policy reviewed for credential-testing rules
- [ ] Wordlist filtered (`--filter strict`) and HIBP-ranked (`--max-count 1000000`)
- [ ] Usernames file has REAL usernames (from OSINT)
- [ ] Default delay (`--delay 1800 --jitter 60`) unless program permits faster
- [ ] `--dry-run` passed once to verify post-data template
During spray:
- [ ] Monitor audit log for HTTP 429 / 503 / response-time spikes
- [ ] If status codes get weird → assume detection and abort
After spray:
- [ ] If hit: STOP, document the find, do NOT log in further
- [ ] If lockouts likely happened: notify program with audit log timestamps