ponytail-sec-audit · diff
git:20260826.48838f1 to git:20260915.1335b79
281 added, 66 removed. Audit A to A.
---
name: ponytail-sec-audit
description: >
Full project security audit. Scans the entire codebase across three passes:
- code that shouldn't exist, all dependencies assessed, all hardening findings.
+ code that shouldn't exist, all dependencies assessed, all security findings.
Produces a comprehensive numbered report with blast-radius narrative.
Persists findings to .ponytail-sec/ for cross-scan tracking.
For per-diff review use ponytail-sec instead.
license: MIT
---
The lazy senior security engineer. The best vuln is the one you make
unreachable with the smallest change.
## Existing Findings
- Previous audit reports (newest first): !`find .ponytail-sec -maxdepth 1 -type d -name "audit-*" -print 2>/dev/null | sort -r`
When previous reports exist, read the most recent `findings.json` and compare
- with the current scan results:
- - **Resolved** — a previous finding no longer appears (same location + issue gone). Mark it ✅.
- - **Recurring** — same location and same issue still present. Mark it 🔁.
+ with the current scan results. `findings.json` holds three typed buckets —
+ `code`, `dependency`, `security`. Walk each bucket and compare **within the
+ same type**; never match a code finding against a security finding.
+
+ - **Resolved** — a previous finding no longer appears in its bucket (same location + issue gone). Mark it ✅.
+ - **Recurring** — same bucket, same location, same issue still present. Mark it 🔁.
- **Regression** — a new finding in a location that was previously clean. Mark it 🔴.
Open the report with a delta summary line when a previous scan exists:
> **Delta since last audit (`audit-<previous-timestamp>`):** X resolved, Y recurring, Z new.
If no previous reports exist, skip the delta summary and proceed normally.
## Scope
The entire project. All source files, Dockerfiles, manifests, config, and
dependency declarations. If the project is large, prioritise: auth paths,
TLS configuration, shell exec, dependency resolvers, and shipped config.
## Ranking model
Fix lower layers first. A network control does not excuse skipping a code fix.
```
Layer 4 · Code verify=False, InsecureSkipVerify ← must-fix
Layer 3 · Auth OAuth 2.1, JWT audience / issuer / alg ← must-fix
Layer 2 · Transport TLS with verified CA ← must-fix
Layer 1 · Network NetworkPolicy (default-deny) ← should-do
Layer 0 · Mesh Istio mTLS ← additive only
```
+ ## Break-risk — applies to all three passes
+
+ **Break-risk** is confidence that the *fix* could break functionality, based on
+ what static review can verify. It is orthogonal to severity, and every finding
+ in every pass carries one — code, dependency, and security alike.
+
+ - **Low** — additive, or provably-unused removal (nothing references it). Apply freely.
+ - **Med** — tightening that may reject real inputs/flows not visible in the read.
+ - **High** — removing/narrowing a grant, capability, or class whose consumers can
+ live outside the files reviewed (RBAC, shared service accounts, host mounts,
+ hooks, reflection). Static review is blind here.
+
+ Med/High findings of **any type** carry the ⚠️ validate-at-runtime line below.
+
## Three passes, in order
### Pass 1 — Code review
Does this code need to exist at all? YAGNI, stdlib first, remove over
refactor. Fewer lines = smaller attack surface. Dead code and unrequested
abstractions are security debt.
### Pass 2 — Dependency assessment
Every dependency is supply-chain surface — any language (npm, PyPI, Maven,
Cargo, Go modules, etc.). For each, web-search the registry page and OpenSSF
Scorecard before judging — do not assess from name alone. Check: last release
date, number of contributors, individual vs. company/org maintainer, presence
of SECURITY.md, and OpenSSF Scorecard maintained score.
- Does stdlib or the platform already do this? → **remove**.
- Solo maintainer, low OpenSSF Scorecard, stale commits, no security policy? → **fork or vendor** and flag the risk.
- Brings more than it costs, healthy upstream? → **keep, pin immutably**:
exact version + lockfile for package deps, commit hash for VCS deps, digest
for container images.
Prefer: remove > stdlib > vendor/fork > immutable pin > keep floating.
- ### Pass 3 — Hardening
+ This pass judges supply-chain **health** — who maintains it, is it stale,
+ should it exist at all. Enumerating published CVEs in third-party packages is
+ out of scope for now; that is scanner work, tracked separately.
+ ### Pass 3 — Security findings
+
Kill-chain stages in order. A Stage 1 break voids all downstream defences.
Rank within a stage by attacker leverage removed ÷ lines changed.
- Stage 1 · Trust: TLS cert bypass, token validation gaps, auth bypass modes.
- Stage 2 · Authz: RBAC wildcards, server-side claim validation, write/read separation.
- Stage 3 · Exec: container escape surface, supply chain, shell injection, deserialization.
- Stage 4 · Data: hardcoded secrets, debug endpoints, missing TLS, verbose logging.
Tags: `auth` `rbac` `isolate` `dep` `inject` `secret` `expose`
+ Every security finding carries a **kind**. The triage is practical, not
+ forensic — it exists so a reader can sort "there's a way in" from
+ "tighten this":
+
+ - `vulnerability` — an exploitable weakness in code this project owns:
+ privilege escalation, auth bypass, injection, path traversal, unsafe
+ deserialization. Something is broken and an attacker acts on it.
+ - `hardening` — a control is missing or too loose (ungated debug endpoint,
+ RBAC wildcard, missing TLS). Nothing is broken; you would rather it did
+ less. The fix is a small diff.
+ - `secret` — hardcoded credential or token material.
+
+ **Published CVEs in third-party dependencies are out of scope.** Do not
+ enumerate advisories for packages this project consumes. That boundary is
+ load-bearing: a stream of pre-scored advisory findings, each fixed by a version
+ bump, would outrank and bury the one small change that actually closes an
+ attack path.
+
+ The exception: if project code *misuses* a dependency in a way that creates an
+ exploitable path, that is a `vulnerability` at the call site — the finding is
+ the call, and the fix is the call, not the version.
+
## Output format
Emit three sections. No cap on findings — this is the full audit.
+ Findings are numbered with a type prefix, and the same prefixed IDs are used
+ in the tables, in `findings.json`, and in `expand N`:
+
+ - `C1`, `C2` … — code findings
+ - `D1`, `D2` … — dependency findings
+ - `S1`, `S2` … — security findings
+
---
### Pass 1 · Code
Prose commentary, one paragraph per file with findings. `Clean.` for files
with nothing to remove. State the security consequence, not just the smell.
+ Give each finding an ID and a break-risk.
Example:
- > `ProcessManager.scala`: The interactive `bash -i` actor (lines 17–56) exists
- > solely to shell-exec commands replaceable with `ProcessBuilder`. Every string
- > reaching its mailbox executes verbatim — delete the class.
+ > `C1` `ProcessManager.scala`: The interactive `bash -i` actor (lines 17–56)
+ > exists solely to shell-exec commands replaceable with `ProcessBuilder`. Every
+ > string reaching its mailbox executes verbatim — delete the class.
+ > **Break-risk: High** — the actor may be addressed by name from config or
+ > another subsystem.
>
> `ClientSslConfig.scala`: **Clean.**
---
### Pass 2 · Dependencies
- One sentence if clean. One line per dep if not, with verdict and reason.
+ One sentence if clean. One evidence block per risky dep:
+ - **Verdict** — remove / stdlib / vendor or fork / keep with immutable pin.
+ - **Upstream** — link to the exact pinned version where one exists, otherwise
+ to the latest version. Registry page preferred (pkg.go.dev, npmjs.com,
+ pypi.org, crates.io, Maven Central).
+ - **Maintainer** — individual, company, foundation, or active org.
+ - **Freshness** — last release date and last meaningful commit/activity.
+ - **Security posture** — `SECURITY.md`, advisory handling, responsiveness.
+ - **OpenSSF Scorecard** — maintained score and any standout risk signals.
+ - **Action** — exact replacement, vendoring/forking plan, or immutable pinning.
+ - **Break-risk** — an immutable pin is Low; `remove`/`vendor` is Med or High.
+
Example:
- > `build.sbt` HTTP resolvers (spray.io, bintray, sonatype staging,
+ > `D1` `build.sbt` HTTP resolvers (spray.io, bintray, sonatype staging,
> download.java.net, geomajas) → **remove**: all 5 on Maven Central over
> HTTPS; `withAllowInsecureProtocol(true)` is live MITM surface on the build
- > network.
+ > network. **Break-risk: Med** — an artifact may resolve only from one of them.
---
- ### Pass 3 · Hardening
+ ### Pass 3 · Security findings
- All findings, numbered (#1, #2 …), stage order.
+ All findings, numbered (`S1`, `S2` …), stage order.
Severity is the CVSS 4.0 qualitative label (Critical / High / Medium / Low)
- with numeric score in parentheses. Every finding gets a score — hardening gaps
- are scored on what an attacker gains if the gap is exploited in combination
- with other weaknesses. No separate classification: the score is the signal.
+ with numeric score in parentheses. Every security finding gets a score —
+ hardening gaps are scored on what an attacker gains if the gap is exploited in
+ combination with other weaknesses. No separate classification: the score is
+ the signal.
- | # | Sev | Stage | Location | Finding | Fix | Break-risk |
- |----|----------------|-----------|----------|---------|-----|-----------|
- | #1 | Critical (9.3) | 1 · Trust | `ClientSslConfig.scala:43` | `auth` `DummyTrustManager` — `checkServerTrusted()` no-op; all manager→controller HTTPS MITMable | Load CA cert into real `TrustManagerFactory` | Low |
- | #2 | High (8.1) | 1 · Trust | `AuthenticationManager.scala:22` | `auth` session maps are `mutable.Map` — data race under concurrent logins | Replace with `ConcurrentHashMap` | Low |
- | #3 | High (7.4) | 2 · Authz | `rbac.yaml:30` | `rbac` operator SA granted `secrets: ["*"]`; no code path reads Secrets | Drop the grant | High |
+ Compute the full CVSS 4.0 vector **now**, at table time, for every finding —
+ it must be persisted to `findings.json`, so it cannot be deferred to `expand N`.
- Severity = impact if exploited. **Break-risk** is orthogonal: confidence the
- *fix* could break functionality, based on what static review can verify:
- - **Low** — additive, or provably-unused removal (nothing references it). Apply freely.
- - **Med** — tightening that may reject real inputs/flows not visible in the read.
- - **High** — removing/narrowing a grant or capability whose consumers can live
- outside the files reviewed (RBAC, shared service accounts, host mounts, hooks).
- Static review is blind here. Med/High findings carry the ⚠️ validate-at-runtime
- line below.
+ | # | Sev | Kind | Stage | Location | Finding | Fix | Break-risk |
+ |----|----------------|---------------|-----------|----------|---------|-----|-----------|
+ | S1 | Critical (9.3) | vulnerability | 1 · Trust | `ClientSslConfig.scala:43` | `auth` `DummyTrustManager` — `checkServerTrusted()` no-op; all manager→controller HTTPS MITMable | Load CA cert into real `TrustManagerFactory` | Low |
+ | S2 | High (8.1) | vulnerability | 3 · Exec | `ProcessManager.scala:34` | `inject` actor message interpolated into `bash -i` — any sender achieves RCE | Replace with `ProcessBuilder`, no shell | Med |
+ | S3 | High (7.4) | hardening | 2 · Authz | `rbac.yaml:30` | `rbac` operator SA granted `secrets: ["*"]`; no code path reads Secrets | Drop the grant | High |
+ | S4 | Medium (6.5) | secret | 4 · Data | `charts/values.yaml:12` | `secret` default Grafana admin password committed in chart values | Move to a Secret ref; fail closed if unset | Med |
+ Emit the computed vectors immediately below the table, one per line — not as a
+ column, which would make the table unreadable:
+
+ ```
+ Vectors:
+ S1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
+ S2 CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
+ S3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
+ S4 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
+ ```
+
+ Severity = impact if exploited. Break-risk is orthogonal — see the section above.
+
`kill-chain: N paths found.`
Close with two paragraphs:
**Paragraph 1 — blast radius.** 3–4 sentences: what the top findings enable
for an attacker, which are pre-existing vs. newly introduced, which are
already partially mitigated by other controls in the stack.
**Paragraph 2 — "if I were you".** A frank prioritisation that may differ
from the CVSS ranking. A higher score does not automatically mean higher
priority — consider: is it actually reachable given the deployment? Do
existing controls (network policy, WAF, auth layer) reduce its practical
urgency? Does fixing one finding make another redundant? Name 2–3 specific
findings to start with and say why — not because of their score, but because
- of their real-world leverage. Be direct: "I'd start with #X because…"
+ of their real-world leverage. Be direct: "I'd start with `S1` because…"
End with one conversational sentence inviting the user to dig deeper.
Example closing:
- > `#1` is the critical path — a network-adjacent attacker who MITMs the
+ > `S1` is the critical path — a network-adjacent attacker who MITMs the
> manager→controller link owns the entire cluster before auth is checked.
- > `#2` becomes exploitable under concurrent load and lives in the same class
- > as `#1`; fix them together. `#3` is scored High but has no day-to-day
- > exploit path if your build network is isolated.
+ > `S2` becomes exploitable from anywhere that can reach the actor, and lives
+ > in a class Pass 1 already recommends deleting outright. `S3` is scored High
+ > but has no day-to-day exploit path if your build network is isolated.
>
- > If I were you I'd start with `#1` and `#2` — same file, 4-line fix, and
- > closing them makes `#4` and `#5` significantly harder to reach. `#3` is
- > a sprint item not a hotfix; your build isolation is likely compensating.
+ > If I were you I'd start with `S1` and `S2` — deleting the actor closes `S2`
+ > and shrinks the surface `S4` sits on. `S3` is a sprint item not a hotfix;
+ > your build isolation is likely compensating.
>
> If you'd like to dig into any finding — why it's exploitable, what an
> attacker does with it, or a concrete fix — just ask by number.
When the user asks about a finding by number, emit:
- - **Root cause** — 1 sentence. Append the CVSS 4.0 vector on the same line:
- `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H`
+ - **Root cause** — 1 sentence. Append the CVSS 4.0 vector already computed for
+ the table on the same line; do not recompute it.
- **Exploit scenario** — 1 sentence: what the attacker does and what they gain.
- **Fix** — invoke ponytail on the affected file/snippet for the minimal diff.
Do not write the fix inline; delegate to ponytail.
## Persistence — save findings to disk
After emitting the report to the user, persist the results so future scans
can compare. Follow these steps exactly:
1. Capture the UTC timestamp (use the same value throughout):
```
SCAN_TS=$(date -u +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)
```
2. Create the output directory:
```
mkdir -p .ponytail-sec
SCAN_DIR=$(mktemp -d .ponytail-sec/audit-${SCAN_TS}-XXXXXX)
```
3. Write `${SCAN_DIR}/report.md` — the full audit output
(all three passes, exactly as emitted to the user).
- 4. Write `${SCAN_DIR}/findings.json` — a JSON array of
- every Pass 3 finding. Schema:
+ 4. Write `${SCAN_DIR}/findings.json` — every finding from **all three passes**,
+ in three typed buckets. Schema:
```json
- [
- {
- "id": "#1",
- "severity": "Critical (9.3)",
- "stage": "1 · Trust",
- "location": "ClientSslConfig.scala:43",
- "tags": ["auth"],
- "finding": "DummyTrustManager — checkServerTrusted() no-op",
- "fix": "Load CA cert into real TrustManagerFactory",
- "break_risk": "Low",
- "status": "open"
+ {
+ "schema_version": 2,
+ "findings": {
+ "code": [
+ {
+ "id": "C1",
+ "type": "code",
+ "location": "internal/ssl/client.go:31",
+ "finding": "sync.Once caches the CA cert pool at first request; a CA rotation is silent until process restart",
+ "consequence": "Rotated CA is not honoured, so revoked intermediates stay trusted for the life of the pod",
+ "fix": "Drop the sync.Once and load the pool per-dial",
+ "break_risk": "Low",
+ "status": "open"
+ }
+ ],
+ "dependency": [
+ {
+ "id": "D1",
+ "type": "dependency",
+ "location": "go.mod:24",
+ "package": "github.com/tidwall/gjson",
+ "ecosystem": "go",
+ "current_version": "v1.14.0",
+ "upstream_url": "https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/tidwall/gjson@v1.14.0",
+ "pinned": true,
+ "verdict": "stdlib",
+ "finding": "Solo maintainer, used in one call site that encoding/json already covers",
+ "maintainer": "individual",
+ "last_release": "2023-11-02",
+ "scorecard": 4.1,
+ "fix": "Replace the single call with encoding/json; drop the require",
+ "break_risk": "Low",
+ "status": "open"
+ }
+ ],
+ "security": [
+ {
+ "id": "S1",
+ "type": "security",
+ "kind": "hardening",
+ "severity": "Medium (4.6)",
+ "cvss_score": 4.6,
+ "cvss_vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
+ "stage": "4 · Data",
+ "location": "internal/cmd/controller/root.go:147",
+ "tags": ["expose"],
+ "finding": "net/http/pprof on localhost:6060 started unconditionally in the controller while the agent gates the identical block behind FLEET_AGENT_PPROF_DISABLED",
+ "fix": "Apply the same env gate the agent already uses",
+ "break_risk": "Low",
+ "status": "open"
+ },
+ {
+ "id": "S2",
+ "type": "security",
+ "kind": "vulnerability",
+ "severity": "High (8.1)",
+ "cvss_score": 8.1,
+ "cvss_vector": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
+ "stage": "3 · Exec",
+ "location": "internal/exec/manager.go:34",
+ "tags": ["inject"],
+ "finding": "Job name is interpolated into a shell command string passed to sh -c; any caller that controls the name achieves command execution",
+ "fix": "Use exec.Command with an argument slice; drop the shell",
+ "break_risk": "Med",
+ "status": "open"
+ }
+ ]
}
- ]
+ }
```
- `status` is always `"open"` for new findings.
- - Use only the fields shown. Do not add extra keys.
+ - IDs carry their type prefix (`C`/`D`/`S`) and match the report tables.
+ - `kind` is one of `vulnerability`, `hardening`, `secret`.
+ - `cvss_score` is a JSON **number**, not a string, and must agree with the
+ score in the `severity` label.
+ - `cvss_vector` is the full CVSS 4.0 vector string, prefixed `CVSS:4.0/`,
+ and is the same vector printed under the report table.
+ - **CVSS fields apply to `security` findings only.** Never invent a
+ `cvss_score` or `cvss_vector` for a code or dependency finding — those
+ carry `break_risk` (and, for deps, `verdict`) as their signal. A
+ fabricated score is worse than no score.
+ - `break_risk` is required on every finding of every type.
+ - `upstream_url` points at the exact pinned version, or the latest version
+ when the dep is unpinned.
+ - Each bucket may be an empty array, but always emit all three keys.
- Validate: the file must be valid JSON (no trailing commas, no comments).
- 5. Write `${SCAN_DIR}/meta.json`:
+ 5. Compute the integrity digest of `findings.json`. Do this **after** the file
+ is written and final — the digest covers `findings.json` only, never
+ `meta.json` itself:
+ ```
+ command -v sha256sum >/dev/null \
+ && FINDINGS_SHA=$(sha256sum "${SCAN_DIR}/findings.json" | cut -d' ' -f1) \
+ || FINDINGS_SHA=$(shasum -a 256 "${SCAN_DIR}/findings.json" | cut -d' ' -f1)
+ ```
+ `sha256sum` is absent on macOS, hence the `shasum` fallback.
+
+ 6. Collect scan cost. **Detect only — never install anything.** If a usage CLI
+ is already present on PATH, read from it; otherwise emit nulls. Do not run
+ `npx`, `bunx`, `pnpm dlx`, or any package-runner invocation: those fetch and
+ execute remote code at scan time, which this skill must never do, and an
+ unpinned `@latest` fetch is precisely what Pass 2 tells users to avoid.
+
+ ```
+ if command -v ccusage >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
+ USAGE_JSON=$(ccusage session --json --offline 2>/dev/null); then
+ USAGE_SOURCE="ccusage"
+ else
+ USAGE_JSON='{}'
+ USAGE_SOURCE="unavailable"
+ fi
+ INPUT_TOKENS=$(echo "$USAGE_JSON" | jq '.input_tokens // null')
+ OUTPUT_TOKENS=$(echo "$USAGE_JSON" | jq '.output_tokens // (if (.input_tokens != null and .output_tokens != null) then .input_tokens + .output_tokens else null end)')
+ TOTAL_TOKENS=$(echo "$USAGE_JSON" | jq '.total_tokens // (if (.input_tokens != null and .output_tokens != null) then .input_tokens + .output_tokens else null end)')
+ ESTIMATED_COST=$(echo "$USAGE_JSON" | jq '.total_cost // null')
+ MODEL=$(echo "$USAGE_JSON" | jq -r '.model // "unknown"')
+ ```
+
+ `--offline` uses cached pricing rather than reaching the network mid-scan.
+
+ **Never estimate, extrapolate, or invent token counts or dollar figures.** A
+ fabricated cost is worse than an absent one; `null` is a truthful "not
+ measurable in this runtime". Same standard as CVSS on non-security findings.
+
+ If the user wants cost tracking, point them at the upstream project and let
+ them install it themselves, pinned:
+ `https://github.com/ccusage/ccusage`
+
+ 7. Write `${SCAN_DIR}/meta.json`:
```json
{
+ "schema_version": 2,
"timestamp": "2026-08-24T15:30:00Z",
"commit": "<output of git rev-parse HEAD>",
"branch": "<output of git branch --show-current>",
"scope": "full-project",
- "passes": ["code", "dependencies", "hardening"],
- "finding_count": 5
+ "passes": ["code", "dependencies", "security"],
+ "finding_count": {
+ "code": 1,
+ "dependency": 1,
+ "security": 2,
+ "total": 4
+ },
+ "max_cvss_score": 8.1,
+ "findings_sha256": "9f2c1e8a7b3d4c5e6f708192a3b4c5d6e7f8091a2b3c4d5e6f708192a3b4c5d6",
+ "usage": {
+ "model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
+ "input_tokens": 92541,
+ "output_tokens": 4233,
+ "total_tokens": 96774,
+ "estimated_cost_usd": 0.84,
+ "source": "ccusage"
+ }
}
```
- `commit` and `branch` come from git commands, not hardcoded.
- - `finding_count` is the length of the findings array.
+ - `finding_count` counts each bucket; `total` is their sum.
+ - `max_cvss_score` is the highest `cvss_score` across security findings,
+ or `null` when there are none.
+ - `findings_sha256` is the digest from step 5 — lowercase hex, no filename suffix. During a subsequent scan, the system must read this digest and recompute the hash of the existing `findings.json` before proceeding to compare buckets. This explicit integrity check detects if a committed `findings.json` was hand-edited after the fact, and lets the delta comparison safely skip re-reading an unchanged file.
+ - `usage.source` records provenance: `"ccusage"`, `"runtime"`, or
+ `"unavailable"`. When unavailable, emit the block with every numeric
+ field `null` rather than omitting it, so consumers can rely on the key:
+ ```json
+ "usage": {
+ "model": "unknown",
+ "input_tokens": null,
+ "output_tokens": null,
+ "total_tokens": null,
+ "estimated_cost_usd": null,
+ "source": "unavailable"
+ }
+ ```
- 6. Confirm to the user: "Findings saved to `${SCAN_DIR}`."
+ 8. Confirm to the user: "Findings saved to `${SCAN_DIR}`."
Security notes for persistence:
- Never interpolate finding content into shell commands. Write files using the
tool's file-write capability, not `echo` or `cat <<EOF`.
- The `.ponytail-sec/` directory should be committed to the repository so
findings travel with the code. Recommend the user `git add .ponytail-sec/`.
## Validation caveat — attach to removal/tightening findings
This audit reads the project statically. "Unused", "unreachable", and "safe to
remove" are hypotheses about runtime behaviour, not facts — and an audit spans
subsystems the reviewer has little runtime context for, so the blind spot is
- wider than in a per-diff review. RBAC grants, capabilities, and permissions are
- frequently consumed by machinery that no source file names: install hooks, sidecars,
- worker pods an operator spawns, init containers, CI jobs, service accounts
- borrowed by other components. A grant that looks dead may be load-bearing.
+ wider than in a per-diff review. RBAC grants, capabilities, permissions, and
+ whole classes are frequently consumed by machinery that no source file names:
+ install hooks, sidecars, worker pods an operator spawns, init containers, CI
+ jobs, reflection, service accounts borrowed by other components. A grant — or a
+ class — that looks dead may be load-bearing.
- So every **Med/High break-risk** finding (any removal/tightening of a
- permission/grant/capability an out-of-band component might rely on) gets this
- line appended; skip it for Low-risk findings that only add a control:
+ So every **Med/High break-risk** finding, in **any** of the three passes, gets
+ this line appended; skip it for Low-risk findings that only add a control:
> ⚠️ Static analysis only — validate at runtime. Apply the fix and run it (build +
> deploy + exercise the real path) before trusting it; removal findings can be
> wrong. If you have Claude Code with cluster/build access, run the fix there to
> confirm before merging.
This is not hypothetical. In one audit, two "unused, safe to remove" RBAC
findings were both **bugs**: a namespace `secrets` grant and a `serviceaccounts`
grant that no code path touched. One was used at runtime by a worker component
the controller spawns out-of-band; the other by a chart install hook. Both broke
the product on deploy, and only a live run surfaced it — the static read looked
clean.
If a runtime test shows the fix breaks something, don't just restore the broad
grant — ask, in the same session, for a safer angle that keeps the functionality
(mount a Secret as a file, scope a grant to one resource name, a short-lived or
projected token). e2e and tests are how you find this.
Stay humble. When there's no clearly correct call, recommend the most secure
option but present it as a choice, not a mandate — and give a risk-based read on
keeping the current implementation so the user can decide:
> Most secure is X. If you keep your current Y, the exposure is Z — acceptable if
> [condition holds]. Your call; want me to apply X or leave Y as-is?
Never pretend a judgement call is a hard rule.
## Boundaries
Security findings only. Correctness bugs go to ponytail, not here.
Lists findings, applies nothing. For per-diff review use ponytail-sec.
"stop ponytail-sec-audit" or "normal mode": revert to standard review.