ai-agent-tooling-and-hitl · git:20260911.7afa6ea · 2026-09-11 · sha256 5b39c4a485f7e74d
ai-agent-tooling-and-hitl git:20260911.7afa6eaA
Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/5b39c4a485f7e74d.
--- name: ai-agent-tooling-and-hitl description: Use when designing agent tool catalogs, tool schemas, action gating, human approval, and human-in-the-loop control for agentic AI systems. metadata: portable: true compatible_with: - claude-code - codex --- # AI Agent Tooling And HITL Acknowledgement: Shared by Peter Bamuhigire, techguypeter.com, +256 784 464178. <!-- dual-compat-start --> ## Use When - Design tool catalogs, tool contracts, action scopes, and approval gates for agents. - Decide when an agent action requires human review, confirmation, or escalation. - Integrate agent tools with audit logs, reversibility, tenant policy, and runtime budgets. ## Do Not Use When - The work is not AI-specific or agentic-AI-specific. - A narrower retained AI parent skill fits the request better. ## Required Inputs - Product, tenant, user, data, risk, and operational context relevant to the AI workflow. - Target artifact: design, implementation plan, audit, test strategy, UX flow, commercial policy, or runbook. - Constraints from security, privacy, reliability, billing, support, and compliance stakeholders when relevant. ## Workflow 1. Read this SKILL.md first. 2. Load [references/routing.md](references/routing.md) to select the absorbed child reference that matches the task. 3. Load only the selected child reference files needed for the current request. 4. Produce execution-oriented output with assumptions, risks, evidence, and next actions where relevant. ## Quality Standards - Keep routing explicit: name which reference files were used when the work depends on absorbed material. - Preserve tenant isolation, auditability, cost controls, safety gates, and operational evidence when they matter. - Prefer concrete contracts, checklists, tables, schemas, runbooks, and decision records over broad summaries. ## Anti-Patterns - Loading every absorbed reference by default. - Treating AI-specific billing, compliance, safety, or UX concerns as generic SaaS work without checking AI failure modes. - Hiding retired skill names; old slugs must remain discoverable through [references/routing.md](references/routing.md). ## Outputs - A concrete deliverable matched to the request: architecture, implementation plan, audit, policy, runbook, UX flow, test strategy, or operating model. - The selected consolidated reference files and any assumptions, risks, evidence requirements, or follow-up actions that affect execution. ## References - [references/routing.md](references/routing.md) maps retired child skill slugs to their consolidated reference folders. ## Consolidated Child References - Load [references/routing.md](references/routing.md) to map retired AI child skill slugs to their reference modules. ## Evidence Produced | Category | Artifact | Format | Example | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Security | Tool action and approval matrix | Markdown/YAML | tool, arguments, tenant scope, reversibility, approver, timeout, and denied case | <!-- dual-compat-end --> ## Inputs | Artefact | Required? | Purpose | |---|---|---| | Tool schemas and side-effect classification | yes | Define callable actions | | Identity, tenant, approval, and budget policy | yes | Enforce authority | | Reversal and audit requirements | yes | Bound consequences | ## Capability contract Default to read-only tool design. Tool invocation, approval simulation, and side-effect testing require isolated fixtures and explicit execution authority. ## Degraded mode Fallback without executable tools: validate schemas, permission scopes, approval policy, and reversal design statically; mark runtime enforcement unverified. ## Decision rules | Action class | Gate | Failure avoided | |---|---|---| | Read-only, low sensitivity | Policy-scoped automatic call | Approval fatigue | | Reversible mutation | Confirm policy and log result | Silent unwanted change | | Irreversible, financial, external, or privileged | Just-in-time human approval | Unauthorised impact | ## Domain anti-patterns - Giving one tool broad multi-action scope. Fix: expose narrow, typed actions. - Trusting prompt text for authorisation. Fix: enforce identity and policy outside the model. - Asking approval after execution. Fix: gate before side effects. - Omitting idempotency and reversal. Fix: define both for every mutation. - Logging arguments without protecting secrets. Fix: redact and classify audit fields.