derive-security-from-risk · git:20260526.6660702 · 2026-05-26 · sha256 7432b259c59b3c68
derive-security-from-risk git:20260526.6660702A
Immutable. This exact content never changes and is served at /api/v1/blob/7432b259c59b3c68.
No tool to install first
claude plugin marketplace add https://markdownregistry.com/mp/a/art_zipxzmdk22ydxcyi/7432b259c59b3c68b22058151234dbdf4ff4b3f0b64ced14d743a5cb96228d01.json
Then /plugin install derive-security-from-risk@markdownregistry-zipxzmdk22ydxcyi in Claude Code. It installs this exact version, the one graded A here, pinned to the commit it was graded at, and leaves it there.
--- name: derive-security-from-risk description: Derives security requirements from a named threat. tier: practical category: workflow created_by: human platforms: [windows, macos, linux] tags: [security, requirements, traceability, togaf, threat-modelling] author: Andreas Wasita (@andreaswasita) --- # Derive Security From Risk Turns a ratified business driver or functional requirement — together with a named threat — into a Security Requirement (SR) the gate can verify. This skill does NOT propose generic controls and does NOT parent SRs to unspecified parent risks; every SR names the obligation or threat it satisfies. ## When to Use - A `BR-*` or `FR-*` exists for the engagement and processes regulated data, money, identity, or controlled access. - A threat modelling session (STRIDE, LINDDUN, attack tree) has produced a concrete threat the architecture must mitigate. - A compliance obligation (PCI, HIPAA, APRA CPS 234, GDPR, ISO 27001 Annex A) maps to a control the design must enforce. - **NOT** when nobody can name the threat yet — run a threat-modelling session first; do not derive a control to look productive. ## Prerequisites - The parent `BR-*` or `FR-*` exists in `requirements/<engagement>/` and is ratified. - A named threat or obligation is recorded in `requirements/<engagement>/threats/<threat-id>.md` (free-form, but the SR body must cite it). - `spec/artifact-schema.md` is the contract for SR frontmatter. If no named threat exists, stop. The TOGAF red thread breaks the moment a control mitigates a threat nobody named. ## How to Run ```bash bash scripts/verify-traceability.sh requirements/<engagement> # create requirements/<engagement>/SR/SR-NNN.md bash scripts/verify-traceability.sh requirements/<engagement> ``` ## Quick Reference | Action | Tool | Notes | |---|---|---| | Read parent BR/FR | `view` | Get exact `id`. | | Read threat record | `view` | The threat ID goes in the SR body. | | Write SR | `create` | Frontmatter per schema; `measurable: true`. | | Verify lineage | `bash scripts/verify-traceability.sh` | Must pass before commit. | Example SR frontmatter: ```yaml --- id: SR-003 layer: SR title: PII masking before persistence parent_ids: [BR-001, FR-002] owner: security.lead@example.com measurable: true ratified_by: "" target: "Zero unmasked PII fields in storage; verified by daily DLP scan." derivation_skill: derive-security-from-risk tags: [pii, masking, data-protection, threat-T03] --- ``` ## Procedure ### Step 1: Assess - Read the parent artifact with `view`. Confirm the data classification (public / internal / confidential / regulated) is stated. - Read the threat record. Confirm it names a threat actor, a target asset, and a damaging outcome. A "threat" of "users might do something bad" is not a threat — stop. ### Step 2: Derive For each named threat or obligation, produce one SR with: - A **control statement** that names what the system MUST or MUST NOT do (RFC 2119 register, not prose). - A **measurable target**: a scan, a metric, an audit query, an attestation cadence. If the control cannot be measured the gate rejects it. - A **traceable obligation**: cite the threat ID or the regulation clause in the body. The agent never invents the obligation — it cites one. ### Step 3: Link - `parent_ids` includes the affected `BR-*` and/or `FR-*`. SRs MAY also parent to an `NFR-*` when the control constrains an existing quality attribute (e.g. an availability SR for a fraud-detection service). - `derivation_skill: derive-security-from-risk` is mandatory. ### Step 4: Confirm ```bash bash scripts/verify-traceability.sh requirements/<engagement> ``` Must exit 0. Then regenerate the RTM: ```bash bash scripts/gen-rtm.sh requirements/<engagement> ``` ## Pitfalls - **DO NOT** emit a generic "encrypt everything" SR with no threat cited. Generic controls produce generic audits and miss the actual risk. - **DO NOT** parent an SR to a threat record directly — the threat is the *justification* (cited in the body); the parent is always a ratified requirement. - **DO NOT** mark `measurable: true` without defining how it is measured. The gate cannot tell, but the auditor can. - **DO NOT** ratify the SR from the agent. The Security Architect (or a human approver) sets `ratified_by` after review. - **DO NOT** write an SR that mitigates a threat without an owner. An unowned control is an unowned control failure six months from now. ## Verification - [ ] `SR-*.md` filename equals its `id`. - [ ] `parent_ids` resolves to ratified `BR-*`/`FR-*`/`NFR-*`. - [ ] Body cites a named threat ID or a specific regulatory clause. - [ ] `target` describes how the control is measured. - [ ] `bash scripts/verify-traceability.sh requirements/<engagement>` exits 0. - [ ] `bash scripts/verify.sh` passes the full gate.