v1.0.0 to v1.0.0
11 added, 4 removed. Audit A to A.
---
name: analyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion
- description: 'Uses the Linux Audit framework (auditd) with ausearch and aureport utilities to detect intrusion attempts, unauthorized
- access, privilege escalation, and suspicious system activity. Covers audit rule configuration, log querying, timeline reconstruction,
- and integration with SIEM platforms. Activates for requests involving auditd analysis, Linux audit log investigation, ausearch
- queries, aureport summaries, or host-based intrusion detection on Linux.
+ description: 'Uses the Linux Audit framework (auditd) with ausearch and aureport utilities
+ to detect intrusion attempts, unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and suspicious
+ system activity. Covers audit rule configuration, log querying, timeline reconstruction,
+ and integration with SIEM platforms. Activates for requests involving auditd analysis,
+ Linux audit log investigation, ausearch queries, aureport summaries, or host-based
+ intrusion detection on Linux.
'
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: incident-response
tags:
- auditd
- ausearch
- aureport
- linux-security
- intrusion-detection
- HIDS
- forensics
version: 1.0.0
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- RS.MA-01
- RS.MA-02
- RS.AN-03
- RC.RP-01
+ mitre_attack:
+ - T1059.004
+ - T1070
+ - T1548.003
+ - T1543.002
---
# Analyzing Linux Audit Logs for Intrusion
## When to Use
- Investigating suspected unauthorized access or privilege escalation on Linux hosts
- Hunting for evidence of exploitation, backdoor installation, or persistence mechanisms
- Auditing compliance with security baselines (CIS, STIG, PCI-DSS) that require system call monitoring
- Reconstructing a timeline of attacker actions during incident response
- Detecting file tampering on critical system files such as `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, or SSH keys
**Do not use** for network-level intrusion detection; use Suricata or Zeek for network traffic analysis. Auditd operates at the kernel level on individual hosts.
## Prerequisites
- Linux system with `auditd` package installed and the audit daemon running (`systemctl status auditd`)
- Root or sudo access to configure audit rules and query logs
- Audit rules deployed via `/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules` or loaded with `auditctl`
- Recommended: Neo23x0/auditd ruleset from GitHub for comprehensive baseline coverage
- Familiarity with Linux syscalls (`execve`, `open`, `connect`, `ptrace`, etc.)
- Log storage with sufficient retention (default location: `/var/log/audit/audit.log`)
## Workflow
### Step 1: Verify Audit Daemon Status and Configuration
Confirm the audit system is running and check the current rule set:
```bash
# Check auditd service status
systemctl status auditd
# Show current audit rules loaded in the kernel
auditctl -l
# Show audit daemon configuration
cat /etc/audit/auditd.conf | grep -E "log_file|max_log_file|num_logs|space_left_action"
# Check if the audit backlog is being exceeded (dropped events)
auditctl -s
```
If the backlog limit is being reached, increase it:
```bash
auditctl -b 8192
```
### Step 2: Deploy Intrusion-Focused Audit Rules
Add rules that target common intrusion indicators. Place these in `/etc/audit/rules.d/intrusion.rules`:
```bash
# Monitor credential files for unauthorized reads or modifications
-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k credential_access
-w /etc/shadow -p rwa -k credential_access
-w /etc/gshadow -p rwa -k credential_access
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k privilege_escalation
-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k privilege_escalation
# Monitor SSH configuration and authorized keys
-w /etc/ssh/sshd_config -p wa -k sshd_config_change
-w /root/.ssh/authorized_keys -p wa -k ssh_key_tampering
# Monitor user and group management commands
-w /usr/sbin/useradd -p x -k user_management
-w /usr/sbin/usermod -p x -k user_management
-w /usr/sbin/groupadd -p x -k user_management
# Detect process injection via ptrace
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x4 -k process_injection
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x5 -k process_injection
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S ptrace -F a0=0x6 -k process_injection
# Monitor execution of programs from unusual directories
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F exe=/tmp -k exec_from_tmp
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F exe=/dev/shm -k exec_from_shm
# Detect kernel module loading (rootkit installation)
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -S finit_module -k kernel_module_load
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S delete_module -k kernel_module_remove
-w /sbin/insmod -p x -k kernel_module_tool
-w /sbin/modprobe -p x -k kernel_module_tool
# Monitor network socket creation for reverse shells
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F a0=2 -k network_socket_created
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S connect -F a0=2 -k network_connection
# Detect cron job modifications (persistence)
-w /etc/crontab -p wa -k cron_persistence
-w /etc/cron.d/ -p wa -k cron_persistence
-w /var/spool/cron/ -p wa -k cron_persistence
# Monitor log deletion or tampering
-w /var/log/ -p wa -k log_tampering
```
Reload rules after editing:
```bash
augenrules --load
auditctl -l | wc -l # Confirm rule count
```
### Step 3: Search for Intrusion Indicators with ausearch
Use `ausearch` to query the audit log for specific events:
```bash
# Search for all failed login attempts in the last 24 hours
ausearch -m USER_LOGIN --success no -ts recent
# Search for commands executed by a specific user
ausearch -ua 1001 -m EXECVE -ts today
# Search for all file access events on /etc/shadow
ausearch -f /etc/shadow -ts this-week
# Search for privilege escalation via sudo
ausearch -m USER_CMD -ts today
# Search for kernel module loading events
ausearch -k kernel_module_load -ts this-month
# Search for processes executed from /tmp (common attack staging)
ausearch -k exec_from_tmp -ts this-week
# Search for SSH key modifications
ausearch -k ssh_key_tampering -ts this-month
# Search for a specific event by audit event ID
ausearch -a 12345
# Search events in a specific time range
ausearch -ts 03/15/2026 08:00:00 -te 03/15/2026 18:00:00
# Interpret syscall numbers and format output readably
ausearch -k credential_access -i -ts today
```
### Step 4: Generate Summary Reports with aureport
Use `aureport` to produce aggregate summaries for triage:
```bash
# Summary of all authentication events
aureport -au -ts this-week --summary
# Report of all failed events (login, access, etc.)
aureport --failed --summary -ts today
# Report of executable runs
aureport -x --summary -ts today
# Report of all anomaly events (segfaults, promiscuous mode, etc.)
aureport --anomaly -ts this-week
# Report of file access events
aureport -f --summary -ts today
# Report of all events by key (maps to your custom rule keys)
aureport -k --summary -ts this-month
# Report of all system calls
aureport -s --summary -ts today
# Report of events grouped by user
aureport -u --summary -ts this-week
# Detailed time-based event report for timeline building
aureport -ts 03/15/2026 08:00:00 -te 03/15/2026 18:00:00 --summary
```
### Step 5: Reconstruct the Attack Timeline
Combine ausearch queries to build a chronological narrative:
```bash
# Step 5a: Identify the initial access timestamp
ausearch -m USER_LOGIN -ua 0 --success yes -ts this-week -i | head -50
# Step 5b: Trace what the attacker did after gaining access
# Get all events from the compromised account within the incident window
ausearch -ua <UID> -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -te "03/15/2026 18:00:00" -i \
| aureport -f -i
# Step 5c: Extract all commands executed during the incident window
ausearch -m EXECVE -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -te "03/15/2026 18:00:00" -i
# Step 5d: Check for persistence mechanisms installed
ausearch -k cron_persistence -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -i
ausearch -k ssh_key_tampering -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -i
# Step 5e: Check for lateral movement (outbound connections)
ausearch -k network_connection -ts "03/15/2026 14:00:00" -i
```
### Step 6: Forward Audit Logs to SIEM
Configure `audisp-remote` or `auditbeat` to ship logs to a central SIEM for correlation:
```bash
# Option A: Using audisp-remote plugin
# Edit /etc/audit/plugins.d/au-remote.conf
active = yes
direction = out
path = /sbin/audisp-remote
type = always
# Configure remote target in /etc/audit/audisp-remote.conf
remote_server = siem.internal.corp
port = 6514
transport = tcp
# Option B: Using Elastic Auditbeat
# Install auditbeat and configure /etc/auditbeat/auditbeat.yml
# Auditbeat reads directly from the kernel audit framework
```
## Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|------|------------|
| **auditd** | The Linux Audit daemon that receives audit events from the kernel and writes them to `/var/log/audit/audit.log` |
| **auditctl** | Command-line utility to control the audit system: add/remove rules, check status, set backlog size |
| **ausearch** | Query tool that searches audit logs by message type, user, file, key, time range, or event ID |
| **aureport** | Reporting tool that generates aggregate summaries of audit events for triage and compliance |
| **audit rule key (-k)** | A user-defined label attached to an audit rule, enabling fast filtering of related events with ausearch and aureport |
| **syscall auditing** | Kernel-level monitoring of system calls (execve, open, connect, ptrace) that captures process and file activity |
| **augenrules** | Utility that merges all files in `/etc/audit/rules.d/` into `/etc/audit/audit.rules` and loads them into the kernel |
## Verification
- [ ] auditd is running and rules are loaded (`auditctl -l` returns expected rule count)
- [ ] No audit backlog overflow (`auditctl -s` shows `backlog: 0` or low value, lost: 0)
- [ ] ausearch returns events for each custom key (`ausearch -k <key> -ts today` returns results)
- [ ] aureport generates non-empty summaries for authentication, executable, and file events
- [ ] Timeline reconstruction produces a coherent chronological sequence of attacker actions
- [ ] Critical file watches trigger alerts on test modifications (`touch /etc/shadow` generates an event)
- [ ] Logs are forwarding to central SIEM (verify with a test event and confirm receipt)
- [ ] Audit rules persist across reboot (rules in `/etc/audit/rules.d/`, not only via `auditctl`)