hunting-windows-dll-hijacking-and-search-order SKILL.md skillA
hunting-windows-dll-hijacking-and-search-order from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-windows-dll-hijacking-and-search-order@git:20260908.e3ae18aPins git:20260908.e3ae18a in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-windows-dll-hijacking-and-search-order/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260908.e3ae18a, committed Sep 8, 2026
- Size
- 9,991 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt code execution through Windows library search order, where a privileged process loads a library by name and resolves it from a location a lower-privileged user can write, because the library is absent from its expected directory, the application directory or a path entry is writable, or the load uses an unsafe search that reaches the current or a user-controlled directory. Use when reviewing how a privileged executable or service resolves its dynamic libraries and whether any resolution…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting Windows DLL hijacking and search order: when a load-by-name lands in a writable directory A Windows process that loads a library by name, rather than by a fixed full path, asks the loader to find it, and the loader walks an ordered list of directories. That is safe only when every directory the loader reaches before the real library is writable by no one below the process's own privilege. When a privileged process requests a library that is missing from its own directory, or when its application directory or a path entry is writable by a standard user, or when it uses a search mode that includes the current directory, the loader can resolve the name to a file the attacker planted. The privileged process then maps and runs that code as itself. The bug is not the load; it is a resolved search location that a lower-privileged user can write, upstream of where the genuine library lives. You find these by tracing each privileged load to the directories the loader searches and asking which of them a non-admin can write. ## When to use - A privileged executable or service loads libraries by name and you can observe its load behavior. …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-windows-dll-hijacking-and-search-order@sha256:b6ee10213d943188The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260908.e3ae18a, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_363gbvycynnyxeqj)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Sep 8, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (9991 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_363gbvycynnyxeqj GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-windows-dll-hijacking-and-search-order GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/b6ee10213d9431881869c0d1691359dcbbf5f7b4dd4b8bf91eb59119737bbe04
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.