hunting-wallet-drainer-and-dapp-approval-abuse SKILL.md skillA
hunting-wallet-drainer-and-dapp-approval-abuse from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-wallet-drainer-and-dapp-approval-abuse@git:20260901.f8395d1Pins git:20260901.f8395d1 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-wallet-drainer-and-dapp-approval-abuse/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260901.f8395d1, committed Sep 1, 2026
- Size
- 10,204 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt for dApp flows that trick a user's wallet into signing away its assets: an unlimited or unnecessary token approval a user grants to a contract that can then move all of their tokens, a signed permit or approve-for-all that authorizes spending far beyond the intended action, a blind-signing prompt that hides what is really being authorized, a malicious or spoofed spender or contract address the user is led to approve, and a transaction whose displayed intent differs from what it actually…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting wallet drainer and dApp approval abuse: users sign what they are shown, not what they mean A wallet drainer does not break cryptography; it gets the user to authorize the theft themselves. Every token a dApp moves on a user's behalf requires an approval or a signed permit, and the danger is the gap between what the user believes they are authorizing and what the approval actually grants. A user who wants to swap one token often gets asked for an unlimited approval, granting the contract the right to move all of that token, forever, not just the amount for this trade. A signed permit or an approve-for-all can authorize spending far beyond the intended action. A blind-signing prompt shows an opaque blob instead of a human-readable action, so the user cannot see what they are agreeing to. And a spoofed spender address, a malicious contract, or a transaction whose displayed intent differs from its real effect turns a routine-looking click into a drain. The hunt is to look at every approval and signature a dApp asks for and compare the scope and the real effect against what the user is shown and actually needs. You hunt this by walking the approval flow as a user and …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-wallet-drainer-and-dapp-approval-abuse@sha256:80526ff62ee1c17dThe line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260901.f8395d1, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_b35aqvsn3bwf6rgw)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Sep 1, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (10204 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_b35aqvsn3bwf6rgw GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-wallet-drainer-and-dapp-approval-abuse GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/80526ff62ee1c17d42cd11b78b5dde5501f2a9db4d4764322bfbd02097e0210b
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.