auditing-mobile-root-jailbreak-and-tamper-resistance SKILL.md skillA
auditing-mobile-root-jailbreak-and-tamper-resistance from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-mobile-root-jailbreak-and-tamper-resistance@git:20260908.e3ae18aPins git:20260908.e3ae18a in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/auditing-mobile-root-jailbreak-and-tamper-resistance/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260908.e3ae18a, committed Sep 8, 2026
- Size
- 10,588 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Audit whether a mobile app's integrity and environment checks actually enforce a security decision, where the app runs a root or jailbreak check, a repackaging or debugger check, or an emulator check but decides the result on the client, so a controlled device defeats it, or the app relies on such a check to protect a secret or an operation that a genuine attacker on their own device simply bypasses, because the check is advisory rather than a real control and the protected asset is reachable…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Auditing mobile root/jailbreak and tamper resistance: when a client check guards nothing A mobile app often tries to protect itself by checking its environment: is the device rooted or jailbroken, is the app repackaged or being debugged, is it running on an emulator. These checks are reasonable telemetry, but they become a false boundary when the app treats their outcome as a security decision made on the client. An attacker runs the app on a device they fully control, and any check whose verdict is computed and enforced locally can be forced to return the answer the attacker wants, the detection routine patched, the response hooked, the flag flipped. So the real question is not whether the app checks, but whether anything important depends on the check, and whether the dependency is enforced somewhere the attacker cannot reach. A secret gated only by a local root check is recovered the moment the check is defeated; an operation allowed only when the app believes it is untampered proceeds once the app is made to believe it. The bug is a security decision resting on a client-side integrity verdict. You audit these by finding what each check protects and whether a …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-mobile-root-jailbreak-and-tamper-resistance@sha256:b355bf8202285168The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260908.e3ae18a, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_hgtv5pawtzj5u5yz)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Sep 8, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (10588 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_hgtv5pawtzj5u5yz GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-mobile-root-jailbreak-and-tamper-resistance GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/b355bf82022851684475afed49e7d20310c2d628630d706ba4fee9614c5e94a7
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.