hunting-iam-privilege-escalation-paths SKILL.md skillA
hunting-iam-privilege-escalation-paths from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-iam-privilege-escalation-paths@git:20260816.a99bfa3Pins git:20260816.a99bfa3 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-iam-privilege-escalation-paths/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260816.a99bfa3, committed Aug 16, 2026
- Size
- 7,407 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt privilege-escalation paths in cloud identity and access management: a low-privileged principal that chains role assumptions, policy rewrites, role-passing, and over-broad trust relationships to reach an administrative or data-access principal. Covers the identity-to-permission-to-resource graph, the known escalation primitives (passing a more privileged role to a service, rewriting a policy to a permissive version, assuming a role whose trust condition is too loose), and the boundary…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting IAM privilege-escalation paths: a reachable chain to admin is the bug Cloud access is a graph. Principals hold policies, policies grant permissions, and some of those permissions let a principal change the graph itself: pass a role, rewrite a policy, assume another identity. Privilege escalation is a path through that graph from where an attacker starts to a principal that can read the data or run the workloads that matter. No single permission looks alarming. The bug is the reachable chain, and you only see it when you follow the edges. ## When to use - You are reviewing cloud IAM: roles, policies, groups, and trust relationships. - A principal is meant to be low-privileged and you want to prove it cannot reach admin. - You have the policy documents and want to know what they compose into, not just what each says. ## Scope check Audit identity configuration in accounts you own or are authorized to test, with credentials provisioned for the review. If you can't name the authorization, stop. ## The loop 1. **Build the identity graph.** Inventory every principal, the policies attached to it, the permissions those policies grant, and the resources they touch. …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-iam-privilege-escalation-paths@sha256:d21c9e45eb6b3242The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260816.a99bfa3, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_i7ungjgfviixhapv)
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Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Aug 16, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (7407 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_i7ungjgfviixhapv GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-iam-privilege-escalation-paths GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/d21c9e45eb6b3242f13e41e3c06fc55eebdeed246fb0de902bf1a214e2285a7d
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.