hunting-container-escape-surface SKILL.md skillA
hunting-container-escape-surface from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-container-escape-surface@git:20260828.ce55026Pins git:20260828.ce55026 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-container-escape-surface/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260828.ce55026, committed Aug 28, 2026
- Size
- 9,076 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt for the configuration that lets a workload break out of its container onto the node: a pod that runs privileged or adds dangerous capabilities, a host namespace shared into the container (host PID, network, or IPC), a writable host path or device mounted in, and a security context that disables the defenses that would otherwise keep a process inside its container. Covers Kubernetes pods and standalone containers where a compromised or hostile process inside the container tries to reach…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting container escape surface: when the container boundary is the security boundary A container is only an isolation boundary while its security context keeps it one. Treat the container as a box a process might try to climb out of, and the question is which settings hand it a ladder. A privileged pod, an added capability that grants kernel-level power, a host namespace shared in, a writable host path, or a mounted device each turns a container-local compromise into node access, and node access is every other pod on that node. The hunt is not about a bug in the application; it is about the runtime configuration that decides whether a foothold stays contained. You hunt this by inventorying the security context of each workload and finding where a setting lets the process reach the node. ## When to use - Workloads run with elevated security contexts: privileged mode, added capabilities, or host access. - Pods share host namespaces (host PID, host network, host IPC) or mount host paths and devices. - A compromise inside a container would be far worse if it could reach the node or neighboring pods. ## Scope check …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-container-escape-surface@sha256:7d3c33c5e405495eThe line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260828.ce55026, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_j4tizaqi3gqxajso)
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Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Aug 28, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (9076 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_j4tizaqi3gqxajso GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-container-escape-surface GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/7d3c33c5e405495ebdb14a0f93ad9ee4a6199b7e0f14ac11d25ea569a6651570
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.