hunting-path-traversal-and-file-access SKILL.md skillA
hunting-path-traversal-and-file-access from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-path-traversal-and-file-access@git:20260903.6dac719Pins git:20260903.6dac719 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-path-traversal-and-file-access/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260903.6dac719, committed Sep 3, 2026
- Size
- 9,531 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt path traversal and unsafe file access where untrusted input builds a filesystem path and the resolved path escapes the intended base directory, so the process reads or writes files it should not. Covers download and upload names, template and include paths, static-file routes, and archive members driven to dot-dot or absolute or drive-letter targets, encoded and double-encoded separators, null-byte truncation on legacy stacks, symlink following, and the difference between checking the raw…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting path traversal and file access: when a name escapes its directory Applications constantly turn a name into a file: a download parameter into a file to send, an upload name into a destination to write, a template name into an include, a route into a static asset. The danger is that a filesystem path is hierarchical, and a name carrying dot-dot segments, an absolute prefix, or a drive letter can climb out of the directory the code meant to stay in. When that happens a read reaches secrets, configuration, or source outside the intended base, and a write lands a file, sometimes an executable one, where it should never go. The reliable defense is to resolve the path to a canonical absolute form and then confirm it is still under the intended base, but many applications check the raw input before decoding or normalizing, which an encoded or layered payload walks straight past. You find these by locating every path built from input and asking whether confinement is verified after canonicalization. ## When to use - Untrusted input names a file to read, write, include, or send: downloads, uploads, templates, static routes. …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-path-traversal-and-file-access@sha256:4d4ab20ea250f476The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260903.6dac719, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_j5e632x5xy522qov)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Sep 3, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (9531 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_j5e632x5xy522qov GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-path-traversal-and-file-access GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/4d4ab20ea250f47670cd5effdffa132812e4f762ed3da6ac0d3a0f51e610ada4
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.