hunting-mobile-secret-and-storage-exposure SKILL.md skillA
hunting-mobile-secret-and-storage-exposure from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-mobile-secret-and-storage-exposure@git:20260823.e797ed0Pins git:20260823.e797ed0 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-mobile-secret-and-storage-exposure/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260823.e797ed0, committed Aug 23, 2026
- Size
- 8,799 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt a mobile app for a real credential shipped in the binary or written to storage another party can read, scoped strictly to mobile-specific sinks. Covers a live secret embedded in the app package or its resources, sensitive data written to world-or-sandbox-readable storage without encryption, a secret placed outside the platform keystore where a weaker guard protects it, data cached or logged where another app or a device-level reader reaches it, and a backup or debug path that carries…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting mobile secret and storage exposure: a real credential a real reader can reach Not every string that looks like a key is a secret, and not every file an app writes is exposed, so this hunt turns on two questions the noisy scanners skip: is this value actually a credential, and can a party who should not read it actually reach it. A public app identifier shipped in the binary is meant to be public; a value inside the platform sandbox is readable only by the app itself on a non-compromised device. The bug is a live credential in the package or in storage that a reachable party (another app, a device-level reader, a backup, a log sink) can read. You hunt it by finding the mobile-specific sinks and adjudicating both the value's sensitivity and the reader's reach. Stay on mobile-specific storage and packaging; server-side secret handling is a different skill. ## When to use - You have a mobile app package, its embedded resources, and the code that writes storage and logs. - You see an embedded key or token, a file written to storage, a cache, a log line, or a backup rule. - You want to know which values are real credentials and which of those a party can actually read. …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-mobile-secret-and-storage-exposure@sha256:0f0e59ad209bfc1bThe line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260823.e797ed0, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_l5dvae7eywc6iqjs)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Aug 23, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (8799 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_l5dvae7eywc6iqjs GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-mobile-secret-and-storage-exposure GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/0f0e59ad209bfc1b6b9aecfde99238eca5ad0ea9c2e4331d24174e28b2123ea0
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.