exploiting-ssrf-to-cloud-metadata SKILL.md skillA
exploiting-ssrf-to-cloud-metadata from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/exploiting-ssrf-to-cloud-metadata@git:20260816.e670f56Pins git:20260816.e670f56 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/exploiting-ssrf-to-cloud-metadata/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260816.e670f56, committed Aug 16, 2026
- Size
- 7,149 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Adjudicate whether a server-side request-forgery primitive actually reaches high-value internal targets, especially a cloud instance metadata endpoint that hands out credentials. Covers proving the fetch is attacker-steered, reaching link-local and internal addresses, defeating allowlist and parser-based filters through DNS rebinding and URL confusion, retrieving instance credentials, and blind out-of-band confirmation. Use when a feature fetches a URL, host, or address the user can influence…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Exploiting SSRF to cloud metadata: reach is what makes it critical A server that fetches a URL an attacker can influence is only dangerous if that fetch reaches something worth reaching. The highest-value target in a cloud environment is the instance metadata service, a link-local endpoint that returns the workload's credentials to anything that can make it a request. Turning an SSRF lead into a real finding means proving the request is steerable, reaches an internal target, survives the filters, and returns something that matters, usually a credential. ## When to use - A feature makes a server-side request to a URL, host, or address the user influences (a webhook, importer, link preview, URL parameter). - You are triaging an SSRF lead and need to know its real impact. - You are assessing exposure of a cloud workload's metadata and credentials. ## Scope check Test only infrastructure you are authorized to assess. Retrieve credentials solely from your own instances and revoke them after. If you can't name the authorization, stop. ## The loop 1. **Confirm the fetch is attacker-steered.** Find the feature that makes a …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/exploiting-ssrf-to-cloud-metadata@sha256:f0631b4a006d9612The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260816.e670f56, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_lrignopzf4rga7ie)
3 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Aug 16, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (7149 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_lrignopzf4rga7ie GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/exploiting-ssrf-to-cloud-metadata GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/f0631b4a006d9612cc1b462a44f6e1ca64a72b60438e32459251c39cc27c67b9
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.