hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation SKILL.md skillA
hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation@git:20260819.61df029Pins git:20260819.61df029 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260819.61df029, committed Aug 19, 2026
- Size
- 8,918 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt local privilege escalation through setuid and setgid binaries and per-file capabilities: programs that run as a more privileged identity, or files granted a capability such as changing user id, overriding file permissions, raw disk or memory access, or loading kernel modules, that expose an exec, file-read, file-write, or library-load primitive an unprivileged caller can reach. Covers known dangerous tools left with the bit set, custom or bundled setuid programs that shell out or trust a…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting setuid and capability escalation: elevated identity plus a primitive A program that runs as a more privileged identity is only safe if it does exactly one narrow thing and exposes no way to turn that privilege into an arbitrary action. The bug is the pairing: an elevated identity (the setuid or setgid bit, or a file capability) next to a reachable primitive (spawn a shell or command, read or write a file, load a library) that an unprivileged user can steer. You find it by enumerating everything that carries elevated identity on the host, and for each asking what an unprivileged caller can make it do as that identity. ## When to use - You are auditing a host, container image, or package for local privilege escalation. - Binaries carry the setuid or setgid bit, or files are granted per-file capabilities. - Some of those programs are custom, bundled by a vendor, or left over from install. ## Scope check Audit local privilege escalation only on hosts or images you own or are authorized to test, with an unprivileged account you may escalate from. If you can't name the authorization, stop. ## The loop …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation@sha256:9e742368754a13feThe line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260819.61df029, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_pd64bqqtrjxoyzpa)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Aug 19, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (8918 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_pd64bqqtrjxoyzpa GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-setuid-and-capability-escalation GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/9e742368754a13fe789f32058e1a2937ed3ce87bdcea80a236bdf61ce9ae9341
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.