auditing-ota-and-firmware-update-channel-trust SKILL.md skillA
auditing-ota-and-firmware-update-channel-trust from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-ota-and-firmware-update-channel-trust@git:20260901.f8395d1Pins git:20260901.f8395d1 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/auditing-ota-and-firmware-update-channel-trust/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260901.f8395d1, committed Sep 1, 2026
- Size
- 11,132 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Audit an over-the-air or firmware update channel for a device that accepts an image it should reject: an update whose signature is not verified so an attacker installs arbitrary firmware, an update fetched over an unauthenticated transport an on-path attacker can swap, a rollback to an older signed image with known vulnerabilities because the device does not enforce version monotonicity, an update server or manifest URL the device trusts without authentication, and an unencrypted image that…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Auditing OTA and firmware update channel trust: whatever a device installs, it runs forever A firmware update is the most powerful thing that can happen to a device: whatever image it installs becomes the code it runs, persistently, with full control of the hardware. So the update channel is the highest-value boundary on the device, and the only thing standing between an attacker and permanent control is whether the device verifies an image before it installs it. The failures are a checklist of that verification. If the device does not verify a cryptographic signature over the image against a key it trusts, an attacker installs arbitrary firmware. If it fetches the image over an unauthenticated transport, an on-path attacker swaps the image in flight even if the server is honest. If it does not enforce version monotonicity, an attacker rolls the device back to an older, still-signed image with known vulnerabilities and re-exploits it. If it trusts an update server or manifest URL without authenticating it, an attacker who controls or spoofs that endpoint feeds it a malicious image. And an unencrypted image leaks embedded secrets and hands a reverse engineer the code. …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-ota-and-firmware-update-channel-trust@sha256:b39b13446650552fThe line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260901.f8395d1, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_pg6gjt5y5hqvndcy)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Sep 1, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (11132 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_pg6gjt5y5hqvndcy GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-ota-and-firmware-update-channel-trust GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/b39b13446650552f1049217273fae29c58784e114c8b6c3d5c731d64c98f2a26
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.