auditing-secure-boot-and-firmware-signing SKILL.md skillA
auditing-secure-boot-and-firmware-signing from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-secure-boot-and-firmware-signing@git:20260821.57dfaf1Pins git:20260821.57dfaf1 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/auditing-secure-boot-and-firmware-signing/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260821.57dfaf1, committed Aug 21, 2026
- Size
- 9,869 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Audit updater and bootloader code for a firmware trust boundary that lets an unsigned or downgraded image be flashed or booted. Covers an update image that reaches a flash write or a boot jump with no signature check between receipt and commit, a verification result that is ignored or inverted, an integrity hash mistaken for an authenticity signature, a signature checked over the wrong or partial bytes or over a different buffer than the one committed, a verification key kept in writable…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Auditing secure boot and firmware signing: does a verified signature gate every path to flash and boot Firmware is the most durable place an attacker can land, and the whole defense is one property: an image is verified for authenticity before any code writes it to a boot slot or jumps to it. Auditing that property is a domination question, not a checklist. Trace the received image to every place it is committed, to flash or to the program counter, and ask whether a correct, enforced signature check stands on every path, over the exact bytes that reach the commit, against a key the attacker cannot influence. The common failures are all ways that check is absent, thrown away, checking the wrong thing, or checking the wrong bytes. You find them by reading the receipt-to-commit path, not by trusting that a function named verify verifies. ## When to use - Code receives a firmware image over an update channel and writes it to flash or activates a boot slot. - A bootloader decides whether to execute an image at startup. - You want to know whether an unsigned, tampered, or downgraded image can be flashed or booted. ## Scope check …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-secure-boot-and-firmware-signing@sha256:2e9b903a13c3c595The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260821.57dfaf1, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_pqhmyeh65f7eqko5)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Aug 21, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (9869 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_pqhmyeh65f7eqko5 GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-secure-boot-and-firmware-signing GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/2e9b903a13c3c595e0e03bd9dec358b7f5db9f56048aea6cbd3be79b46a7b757
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.