auditing-windows-token-and-privilege-abuse SKILL.md skillA
auditing-windows-token-and-privilege-abuse from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-windows-token-and-privilege-abuse@git:20260908.e3ae18aPins git:20260908.e3ae18a in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/auditing-windows-token-and-privilege-abuse/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260908.e3ae18a, committed Sep 8, 2026
- Size
- 10,173 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Audit privilege escalation through Windows access token and privilege abuse, where a process holds a sensitive privilege or can obtain a more privileged token, letting a lower-privileged foothold impersonate a privileged caller, load a driver, take ownership, back up protected files, or debug another process to reach a higher context. Use when a service or process runs with a named sensitive privilege enabled or can receive and impersonate tokens from privileged callers. Covers impersonation…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Auditing Windows token and privilege abuse: when a held privilege is a ladder A Windows access token carries the privileges a process may exercise, and a handful of them are equivalent to full control of the host even when the account is not an administrator. A process that can impersonate a client can capture a privileged caller's token and act as that caller. One that holds the privilege to load a driver runs code in the kernel. One that can back up or restore files reads and writes past every access control. One that can take ownership or debug any process reaches into a more privileged context directly. The bug is not that the privilege exists; it is that a lower-privileged foothold holds a privilege, or can obtain a token, whose authorized operation lifts it to a higher context. You audit these by listing the privileges each process holds and each token it can capture, and asking which of them crosses a trust boundary the account was not meant to cross. ## When to use - A service or process runs with a named sensitive privilege enabled that you can enumerate. - A process accepts connections from privileged callers and can impersonate their tokens. …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-windows-token-and-privilege-abuse@sha256:cb5327573457596bThe line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260908.e3ae18a, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_t6pyct236le6bb7t)
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Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Sep 8, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (10173 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_t6pyct236le6bb7t GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-windows-token-and-privilege-abuse GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/cb5327573457596b45d566b4586e65a176777777d612b78294833889e443e9dd
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.