hunting-tenant-onboarding-and-discovery-abuse SKILL.md skillA
hunting-tenant-onboarding-and-discovery-abuse from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-tenant-onboarding-and-discovery-abuse@git:20260903.19a7174Pins git:20260903.19a7174 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-tenant-onboarding-and-discovery-abuse/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260903.19a7174, committed Sep 3, 2026
- Size
- 11,632 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt for multi-tenant SaaS onboarding and organization-discovery flows that let an attacker join, claim, or enumerate a tenant they should not: a self-service signup that auto-joins a new user to an existing organization by email domain so anyone with a matching address lands inside it, a domain-claim step that can be satisfied without proving ownership so an attacker claims a domain and its users, an invitation whose token is guessable, reusable, or not bound to the invited address, a…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting tenant onboarding and discovery abuse: how you get into an organization decides who is inside it In multi-tenant SaaS the organization is the trust boundary, and onboarding is how someone gets put inside it, so the onboarding flow decides membership as surely as any access-control check. The trouble is that onboarding is built for growth, self-service signup, easy domain-based joining, frictionless invitations, and growth-shaped defaults are exactly where an attacker walks in. A signup that auto-joins a new user to an existing organization because their email domain matches lets anyone who can get an address at that domain, or spoof one, land inside the tenant with whatever a member sees. A domain-claim step that can be satisfied without truly proving ownership lets an attacker claim a domain and, with it, the users under it. An invitation whose token is guessable, reusable, or not bound to the address it was sent to lets an attacker redeem someone else's invite. A tenant-discovery endpoint that answers which organizations exist or which domains are registered hands an …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-tenant-onboarding-and-discovery-abuse@sha256:2ed47fcd49458ca8The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260903.19a7174, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_u4zvlyw6x7mobt53)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Sep 3, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (11632 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_u4zvlyw6x7mobt53 GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-tenant-onboarding-and-discovery-abuse GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/2ed47fcd49458ca82e71458829c45cb8efb3234c3b485c66f90859468ae39e17
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.