hunting-cicd-workflow-injection SKILL.md skillA
hunting-cicd-workflow-injection from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-cicd-workflow-injection@git:20260825.70f8609Pins git:20260825.70f8609 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-cicd-workflow-injection/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260825.70f8609, committed Aug 25, 2026
- Size
- 10,100 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt a CI/CD pipeline for attacker-controlled repository data that reaches a privileged execution context, after the trigger and the token scope are resolved. Covers an untrusted event field (an issue or pull-request title, a branch name, a commit message) interpolated directly into a run-step shell command, a pull_request_target or workflow_run job that checks out and builds the pull-request head with secrets in scope, a third-party action pinned to a mutable tag or branch rather than a…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting CI/CD workflow injection: attacker repository data reaching a privileged run step A CI/CD pipeline turns dangerous where data an outside contributor controls, an issue title, a branch name, a pull-request body, the contents of a fork, reaches a step that runs with the repository's secrets and write token. The two headline shapes are an expression that interpolates an untrusted event field straight into a shell command, and a privileged trigger that checks out and builds the untrusted pull-request head. You hunt it by resolving, per workflow, what triggers it (and therefore whether secrets and a write token are in scope) and then following each untrusted field to the run step or checkout it reaches. The discipline is separating an untrusted value interpolated into a shell from one passed safely through an environment variable, and a privileged trigger that runs untrusted code from one that only reads metadata. The OIDC trust boundary is the CI OIDC skill's; this skill owns data reaching execution. ## When to use - You are reviewing CI/CD workflow definitions, their triggers, and their token or secret scope. …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-cicd-workflow-injection@sha256:3254ed086ab5de48The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260825.70f8609, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_xbup7o7qr24k3uvp)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Aug 25, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (10100 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_xbup7o7qr24k3uvp GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-cicd-workflow-injection GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/3254ed086ab5de4805ade190d49efce979b44d1981634d19d22b45a78567e518
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.