auditing-service-mesh-mtls-and-authz-trust SKILL.md skillA
auditing-service-mesh-mtls-and-authz-trust from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-service-mesh-mtls-and-authz-trust@git:20260828.ce55026Pins git:20260828.ce55026 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/auditing-service-mesh-mtls-and-authz-trust/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260828.ce55026, committed Aug 28, 2026
- Size
- 9,282 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Audit a service mesh for the trust it claims but does not enforce: a mesh in permissive mode that accepts plaintext alongside mutual TLS so an unauthenticated caller still gets through, an authorization policy that is absent, scoped too narrowly, or defaults to allow, a workload reachable outside the mesh that bypasses the sidecar entirely, and an identity check that trusts a header a caller can set. Covers service meshes where sidecars are supposed to enforce mutual TLS and per-service…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Auditing service mesh mTLS and authz trust: when the mesh asserts a trust it does not enforce A service mesh is sold as identity and encryption between workloads: sidecars establish mutual TLS so every call is authenticated, and authorization policies decide who may call whom. Teams then reason about the cluster as if those guarantees hold everywhere. The gaps are where the guarantee is asserted but not enforced. A mesh in permissive mode accepts plaintext next to mutual TLS, so an unauthenticated caller is still served while the dashboards show encryption. Authorization frequently defaults to allow, or a policy covers some services and not the one that matters. A workload reachable outside the mesh, directly by pod IP or through an ingress that skips the sidecar, bypasses every mesh control. And an identity check that trusts a caller-set header authenticates nothing. You audit this by testing whether the mesh actually refuses an unauthenticated and an unauthorized call, rather than trusting that it does. ## When to use - A service mesh is the control enforcing mutual TLS and per-service authorization between workloads. …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-service-mesh-mtls-and-authz-trust@sha256:fa678e9978d244fdThe line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260828.ce55026, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_xmftpxl3ybwah74y)
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Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Aug 28, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
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- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_xmftpxl3ybwah74y GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-service-mesh-mtls-and-authz-trust GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/fa678e9978d244fdc889394ec55b6c2815943fc3f1970ec49fc8718718192dfc
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.