hunting-windows-credential-material-exposure SKILL.md skillA
hunting-windows-credential-material-exposure from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-windows-credential-material-exposure@git:20260908.e3ae18aPins git:20260908.e3ae18a in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/hunting-windows-credential-material-exposure/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260908.e3ae18a, committed Sep 8, 2026
- Size
- 10,120 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Hunt exposure of Windows credential material, where secrets that authenticate a user or machine, cached logon verifiers, stored service and task passwords, protected-store secrets, saved connection credentials, and credentials left in memory of a privileged process, are readable by a principal that should not reach them because of a weak permission, an over-privileged token, or storage that does not bind the secret to the intended account. Use when reviewing where Windows keeps authentication…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Hunting Windows credential material exposure: when a secret is readable by the wrong principal Windows keeps a lot of authentication material on a host: verifiers that let a user log on when the domain is unreachable, passwords for services and scheduled tasks that must start unattended, secrets in a protected store, credentials saved for connections, and live credentials in the memory of processes that authenticated. Each store is meant to be readable only by a specific principal, the account that owns it, the system, or an administrator. The exposure is a store readable by a principal that should not reach it: a weak permission on a file or registry location, an over-privileged token that opens a protected process or store, or storage that protects the secret with a key the wrong account can also derive. The bug is not that the secret exists; it is that a principal below the intended one can read usable material from it. You hunt these by listing where credentials live and checking, for each, which principals can read the material and whether what they read is usable. ## When to use …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-windows-credential-material-exposure@sha256:2875f609d2fe7433The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260908.e3ae18a, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_yg4sidi5sc6q777n)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Sep 8, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (10120 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_yg4sidi5sc6q777n GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/hunting-windows-credential-material-exposure GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/2875f609d2fe7433115599d50beba4f31b158773aee19fb03e2aa6984aafa5c7
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.