auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust SKILL.md skillA
auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust from unboundcompute/security-agent-skills is an agent skill: a SKILL.md folder an AI agent loads when a task calls for it.
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust@git:20260828.ce55026Pins git:20260828.ce55026 in mdr.lock. Pin the fingerprint instead.
- Audit grade
- A, 17 of 17 checks passed
- Kind
- SKILL.md skill
- Repository
- unboundcompute/security-agent-skills
- Path
skills/auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust/SKILL.md- Versions recorded
- 1
- Latest version
- git:20260828.ce55026, committed Aug 28, 2026
- Size
- 9,958 bytes
- Repository stars
- 26
- License
- MIT
Audit the init and sidecar containers a workload runs, including ones injected by a mutating admission webhook, for trust the main container never granted: an injected sidecar that runs with broader privileges, host access, or credentials than the workload, an init container that fetches and executes remote content before the app starts, a shared volume or process namespace that lets a sidecar read the main container's secrets, and an injection whose image and configuration come from a source…
Collected from public GitHub. Every version is saved exactly as it was and never changes. Install it at an exact version with the mdr tool, and every file is checked before it reaches your agent. The main file is checked against the SHA-256 fingerprint recorded here, and the others against the fingerprints GitHub keeps for its source commit. The automatic checks below grade the latest version, and the same checks always give the same file the same grade.
What the file says
# Auditing init and sidecar injection trust: the containers you did not write share your pod A pod is not just its application container. Init containers run first, sidecars run alongside, and many are injected automatically by a mutating admission webhook that the workload owner never sees in their manifest. All of them share the pod: the same network namespace, often shared volumes, sometimes the process namespace, and they can be granted their own security context and credentials. That makes every init and sidecar container a trust question the main container did not ask. An injected sidecar may run privileged or with host access the app never needed; an init container may fetch and execute remote content before the app starts; a shared secret volume or process namespace lets a sidecar read the application's secrets; and the injected image and its configuration may come from a source outside the workload owner's control. The pod looks like one workload but is a collection of containers with different privileges and origins. You audit this by enumerating every init and sidecar container, declared and injected, and checking what trust each holds. ## When to use …
Read the whole file at its exact version.
How to install
mdr add unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust@sha256:3a2cd87dca73a0c7The line at the top of this page pins the label git:20260828.ce55026, which is what most people want. This one pins the sha256 fingerprint of the contents instead, so it survives a label being moved. Either way the exact version is written to mdr.lock, and mdr install downloads and checks those contents again, so it installs them exactly or stops with an error.
[](https://markdownregistry.com/a/art_ztjutehshnptpqxk)
2 badge image fetches in 30 days. What the badge shows.
Versions
The registry has recorded 1 version of this file, committed on Aug 28, 2026.
Audit of the latest version
- pass: Frontmatter block present
- pass: Frontmatter declares a name
- pass: Frontmatter declares a description
- pass: Size between 200 bytes and 200 KB (9958 bytes)
- pass: No zero-width or bidi control characters
- pass: No instruction hidden inside an HTML comment
- pass: No link to an exfiltration or paste host
- pass: No credential-shaped string
- pass: No instruction to send local credentials anywhere
- pass: No text hidden with inline styles
- pass: No prompt-injection phrasing
- pass: No curl or wget piped into a shell
- pass: No recursive delete of root, home or parent
- pass: No instruction to read or print local credentials
- pass: No base64 blob over 200 characters
- pass: No link to a raw IP address
- pass: No script tag
Source
unboundcompute/security-agent-skills · 26 stars · license MIT · pushed 2026-09-08 · branch main
API
GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/artifacts/art_ztjutehshnptpqxk GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/resolve?ref=unboundcompute/security-agent-skills/auditing-init-and-sidecar-injection-trust GET https://markdownregistry.com/api/v1/blob/3a2cd87dca73a0c7776dfbb72c837ee6b9ff69ae2f4718c3004101a479ef95be
Your AI assistant does the legwork. You hear about the deals worth your word. Hand yours the standing instructions at modelranch.com and it joins the network that reads files like this one.
Guides: the SKILL.md format and its required fields · what to check before you install a skill · how to pin a skill to an exact version · where to find agent skills · keeping a team on the same skills · which agent file does what.